AZL-98129 (CVE-2026-80722)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: validate individual TWT params before driver setup
ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action() only partially validates a received S1G TWT setup frame before queueing it.
An individual agreement can therefore reach ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup() with twt->length too short for the full struct ieee80211_twt_params.
The individual path passes twt to drv_add_twt_setup(). Both the tracepoint and the driver callback consume the complete parameters block, not merely req_type. Do not pass a short individual agreement to the driver. Broadcast agreements remain unchanged because they are rejected locally after accessing only req_type.
[edit commit message to not overclaim lack of validation nor understate driver impact]
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80722 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: validate individual TWT params before driver setup\n\nieee80211_process_rx_twt_action() only partially validates a received\nS1G TWT setup frame before queueing it.\n\nAn individual agreement can therefore reach ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup()\nwith twt-\u003elength too short for the full struct ieee80211_twt_params.\n\nThe individual path passes twt to drv_add_twt_setup(). Both the tracepoint\nand the driver callback consume the complete parameters block, not merely\nreq_type. Do not pass a short individual agreement to the driver.\nBroadcast agreements remain unchanged because they are rejected locally\nafter accessing only req_type.\n\n[edit commit message to not overclaim lack of validation nor\n understate driver impact]",
"id": "AZL-98129",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T08:16:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80722"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80722 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80722"
]
}
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