AZL-98171 (CVE-2026-80716)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-80716 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: pcm: wake linked drain waiters on unlink

snd_pcm_drain() on a linked stream parks an on-stack wait entry on the drained peer's runtime->sleep, and after schedule_timeout() removes it only if that peer is still found in the caller's group. If group membership changes during the wait and the sleep ends by signal or timeout (so autoremove_wake_function() does not run), finish_wait() is skipped and snd_pcm_drain() returns with the entry still queued on that stream's sleep list; a later wake_up() then walks a freed stack frame. This is reachable by unlinking either the drained or the draining stream.

Unlike the close path (snd_pcm_drop() -> snd_pcm_post_stop()), snd_pcm_unlink() never wakes the sleep queues. Wake every group member under the group lock before the membership change, so a linked drainer is released and drops its entry while the streams are still grouped.

The window was opened when snd_pcm_link_rwsem stopped being held across the wait and the removal became conditional on group membership (see Fixes). The later switch to finish_wait() kept that conditional removal, so the signal/timeout case remained.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: pcm: wake linked drain waiters on unlink\n\nsnd_pcm_drain() on a linked stream parks an on-stack wait entry on the\ndrained peer\u0027s runtime-\u003esleep, and after schedule_timeout() removes it\nonly if that peer is still found in the caller\u0027s group.  If group\nmembership changes during the wait and the sleep ends by signal or\ntimeout (so autoremove_wake_function() does not run), finish_wait() is\nskipped and snd_pcm_drain() returns with the entry still queued on that\nstream\u0027s sleep list; a later wake_up() then walks a freed stack frame.\nThis is reachable by unlinking either the drained or the draining stream.\n\nUnlike the close path (snd_pcm_drop() -\u003e snd_pcm_post_stop()),\nsnd_pcm_unlink() never wakes the sleep queues.  Wake every group member\nunder the group lock before the membership change, so a linked drainer is\nreleased and drops its entry while the streams are still grouped.\n\nThe window was opened when snd_pcm_link_rwsem stopped being held across\nthe wait and the removal became conditional on group membership (see\nFixes). The later switch to finish_wait() kept that conditional removal,\nso the signal/timeout case remained.",
  "id": "AZL-98171",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T08:16:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80716"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-80716 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80716"
  ]
}



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