AZL-99054 (CVE-2026-80731)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-09-03 13:06 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header
dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:
if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev->hard_header_len - len);
return true;
}
Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation, the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.
This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.
This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.
Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and have no memory safety impact.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80731 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header\n\ndev_validate_header() reads dev-\u003ehard_header_len directly when\nzero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:\n\n if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {\n memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev-\u003ehard_header_len - len);\n return true;\n }\n\nPacket send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was\nallocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is\nreconfigured so that dev-\u003ehard_header_len increases before validation,\nthe memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.\n\nThis out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because\nthe same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the\nreserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding\nbranch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the\nsnapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.\n\nThis path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where\nlen \u003c hard_header_len but len \u003e= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree\nvariable length L2 protocol implements header_ops-\u003evalidate, and the\nCAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no\nreal value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.\n\nDrop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of\ndev-\u003ehard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and\nhave no memory safety impact.",
"id": "AZL-99054",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T13:06:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80731"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80731 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80731"
]
}
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