AZL-99062 (CVE-2026-80726)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-09-03 13:06 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and clear role.invalid when creating a child shadow page
Explicitly clear role.invalid when deriving a child shadow page's role from its parent to harden against bugs elsewhere in KVM, as violating KVM's invariant that invalid pages are NOT on the list of active MMU pages leads to use-after-free due to __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() using list_add() instead of list_move() when processing an invalid shadow page, i.e. makes a bad situation far worse.
Yell loudly if the parent is invalid, as it means KVM has missed a validity check, i.e. KVM is attempting to map memory using an invalid/obsolete root, but continue on as the child is otherwise still a valid shadow page.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm] Write of size 8 at addr ff11000153dd1368 by task repro/853
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 853 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.2.0-rc2-3aec122bdcaf-next-vm #5 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x70 print_report+0x153/0x49c kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0 __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm] mmu_alloc_root+0x141/0x320 [kvm] kvm_mmu_load+0x612/0x20f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3dd5/0x6150 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Allocated by task 853: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x5f/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xfe/0x2e0 __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache+0x135/0x530 [kvm] paging64_page_fault+0x318/0x1e30 [kvm] kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0x21d/0x630 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x18c/0x17b0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1f35/0x6150 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Freed by task 853: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0xe2/0x400 kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x1e2/0x310 [kvm] kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x283/0x560 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x33c8/0x6150 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80726 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86/mmu: WARN and clear role.invalid when creating a child shadow page\n\nExplicitly clear role.invalid when deriving a child shadow page\u0027s role from\nits parent to harden against bugs elsewhere in KVM, as violating KVM\u0027s\ninvariant that invalid pages are NOT on the list of active MMU pages leads\nto use-after-free due to __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() using list_add()\ninstead of list_move() when processing an invalid shadow page, i.e. makes a\nbad situation far worse.\n\nYell loudly if the parent is invalid, as it means KVM has missed a validity\ncheck, i.e. KVM is attempting to map memory using an invalid/obsolete root,\nbut continue on as the child is otherwise still a valid shadow page.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]\n Write of size 8 at addr ff11000153dd1368 by task repro/853\n\n CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 853 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.2.0-rc2-3aec122bdcaf-next-vm #5 PREEMPT\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x70\n print_report+0x153/0x49c\n kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0\n __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]\n mmu_alloc_root+0x141/0x320 [kvm]\n kvm_mmu_load+0x612/0x20f0 [kvm]\n kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3dd5/0x6150 [kvm]\n kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0\n do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 853:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_slab_alloc+0x5f/0x70\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xfe/0x2e0\n __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache+0x135/0x530 [kvm]\n paging64_page_fault+0x318/0x1e30 [kvm]\n kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0x21d/0x630 [kvm]\n kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x18c/0x17b0 [kvm]\n kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1f35/0x6150 [kvm]\n kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0\n do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\n Freed by task 853:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70\n kmem_cache_free+0xe2/0x400\n kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x1e2/0x310 [kvm]\n kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x283/0x560 [kvm]\n kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x33c8/0x6150 [kvm]\n kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0\n do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53",
"id": "AZL-99062",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T13:06:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80726 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80726"
]
}
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