AZL-99497 (CVE-2026-80794)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-09-04 16:18 – Updated: 2026-09-08 05:27 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf / nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF technology-specific parameters are only extracted when rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol();
- activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol().
nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0 nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0 nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30 nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0 process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0 worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0 kthread+0x376/0x500 Local variable ntf.i created at: nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30
Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as zero when no technology-specific parameters are present.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80794 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.150.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.150.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers\n\nnci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each\nparse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /\nnci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF\ntechnology-specific parameters are only extracted when\nrf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a\nzero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and\nboth handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:\n\n - discover: nci_add_new_target() -\u003e nci_add_new_protocol();\n - activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -\u003e nci_add_new_protocol().\n\nnci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll-\u003enfcid1_len as both a branch\ncondition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into\nndev-\u003etargets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.\n\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0\n nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0\n nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30\n nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0\n process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0\n worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0\n kthread+0x376/0x500\n Local variable ntf.i created at:\n nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30\n\nZero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as\nzero when no technology-specific parameters are present.",
"id": "AZL-99497",
"modified": "2026-09-08T05:27:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T16:18:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80794"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80794 affecting package kernel 6.6.150.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80794"
]
}
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