AZL-99555 (CVE-2026-80892)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-09-04 18:17 – Updated: 2026-09-08 05:27 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size
fs/erofs/decompressor_lzma.c sizes the module-global MicroLZMA stream pool from num_possible_cpus() when the lzma_streams module parameter is unset, then z_erofs_load_lzma_config() preallocates one image-supplied dictionary per stream, accepting dictionaries up to 8 MiB. On high-CPU systems, a small EROFS image can pin hundreds of MiB of vmalloc-backed decoder state until the erofs module is unloaded.
Impact: An EROFS image mounted by the system can pin up to 8 MiB of vmalloc memory per LZMA stream, either as intended or unexpectedly.
Bound the default stream count by a new CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS option, default 16, so the worst-case default preallocation is 128 MiB if the number of CPUs is no less than 16 while preserving the existing per-image dictionary limit. An explicit lzma_streams module parameter is still honoured as-is, so administrators who deliberately size the pool are not affected.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80892 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.150.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.150.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nerofs: cap LZMA stream pool size\n\nfs/erofs/decompressor_lzma.c sizes the module-global MicroLZMA stream\npool from num_possible_cpus() when the lzma_streams module parameter is\nunset, then z_erofs_load_lzma_config() preallocates one image-supplied\ndictionary per stream, accepting dictionaries up to 8 MiB. On high-CPU\nsystems, a small EROFS image can pin hundreds of MiB of vmalloc-backed\ndecoder state until the erofs module is unloaded.\n\nImpact: An EROFS image mounted by the system can pin up to 8 MiB of\nvmalloc memory per LZMA stream, either as intended or unexpectedly.\n\nBound the default stream count by a new\nCONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS option, default 16, so the\nworst-case default preallocation is 128 MiB if the number of CPUs is no\nless than 16 while preserving the existing per-image dictionary limit.\nAn explicit lzma_streams module parameter is still honoured as-is, so\nadministrators who deliberately size the pool are not affected.",
"id": "AZL-99555",
"modified": "2026-09-08T05:27:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:17:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80892"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80892 affecting package kernel 6.6.150.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80892"
]
}
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