Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-03-12 08:39
Modified
2026-03-12 09:10
Summary
Envoy HTTP: filter chain execution on reset streams causing UAF crash
Details

Envoy is a high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Prior to 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13, a logic vulnerability in Envoy's HTTP connection manager (FilterManager) that allows for Zombie Stream Filter Execution. This issue creates a "Use-After-Free" (UAF) or state-corruption window where filter callbacks are invoked on an HTTP stream that has already been logically reset and cleaned up. The vulnerability resides in source/common/http/filter_manager.cc within the FilterManager::decodeData method. The ActiveStream object remains valid in memory during the deferred deletion window. If a DATA frame arrives on this stream immediately after the reset (e.g., in the same packet processing cycle), the HTTP/2 codec invokes ActiveStream::decodeData, which cascades to FilterManager::decodeData. FilterManager::decodeData fails to check the saw_downstream_reset_ flag. It iterates over the decoder_filters_ list and invokes decodeData() on filters that have already received onDestroy(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.34.13"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.35.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.9"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.36.5"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.37.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.37.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "Envoy is a high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Prior to 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13, a logic vulnerability in Envoy\u0027s HTTP connection manager (FilterManager) that allows for Zombie Stream Filter Execution. This issue creates a \"Use-After-Free\" (UAF) or state-corruption window where filter callbacks are invoked on an HTTP stream that has already been logically reset and cleaned up. The vulnerability resides in source/common/http/filter_manager.cc within the FilterManager::decodeData method. The ActiveStream object remains valid in memory during the deferred deletion window. If a DATA frame arrives on this stream immediately after the reset (e.g., in the same packet processing cycle), the HTTP/2 codec invokes ActiveStream::decodeData, which cascades to FilterManager::decodeData. FilterManager::decodeData fails to check the saw_downstream_reset_ flag. It iterates over the decoder_filters_ list and invokes decodeData() on filters that have already received onDestroy(). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2026-26311",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T09:10:07.191Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T08:39:46.109Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-84xm-r438-86px"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26311"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "Envoy HTTP: filter chain execution on reset streams causing UAF crash"
}


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