Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-03-12 08:39
Modified
2026-03-12 09:10
Summary
Envoy global rate limit may crash when the response phase limit is enabled and the response phase request is failed directly
Details

Envoy is a high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Prior to 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13, At the rate limit filter, if the response phase limit with apply_on_stream_done in the rate limit configuration is enabled and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy. When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request. But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When a second limit request is sent at response phase, and the second limit request fails directly, the previous request's inner state may be accessed and result in crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.34.13"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.35.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.9"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.36.5"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.37.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.37.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26330"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "Envoy is a high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Prior to 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13, At the rate limit filter, if the response phase limit with apply_on_stream_done in the rate limit configuration is enabled and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy. When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request. But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When a second limit request is sent at response phase, and the second limit request fails directly, the previous request\u0027s inner state may be accessed and result in crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2026-26330",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T09:10:07.191Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T08:39:47.564Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-c23c-rp3m-vpg3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26330"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "Envoy global rate limit may crash when the response phase limit is enabled and the response phase request is failed directly"
}


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