BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-CCG8-46R6-9QGJ)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source websiteSummary
A wrapper-depth parsing mismatch in system.run allowed nested transparent dispatch wrappers (for example repeated /usr/bin/env) to suppress shell-wrapper detection while still matching allowlist resolution. In security=allowlist + ask=on-miss, this could bypass the expected approval prompt for shell execution.
Severity / Trust Model
OpenClaw’s documented model treats authenticated gateway callers as trusted operators and exec approvals as operator guardrails. This issue is still a real approval-boundary bypass and is triaged as Medium in that model.
Technical Details
- Dispatch-wrapper unwrapping stopped at
MAX_DISPATCH_WRAPPER_DEPTH. - Shell-wrapper extraction could return non-wrapper once depth was exhausted.
- Allowlist resolution could still succeed on partially unwrapped argv beginning with
/usr/bin/env. - Result: nested wrapper chains could execute
/bin/sh -c ...without fresh approval inallowlist+ask=on-miss.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published version at triage time:
2026.2.23 - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.23 - Patched versions (planned next release):
>= 2026.2.24
Fix Commit(s)
57c9a18180c8b14885bbd95474cbb17ff2d03f0b
Verification
- Added regression coverage for depth-overflow wrapper chains at resolution and
system.runinvocation layers. - Reproduced previous PoC behavior before fix, then confirmed denial after fix with
SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval required.
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.24) so once npm publish is complete, advisory publication can proceed without additional version edits.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Publication Update (2026-02-25)
openclaw@2026.2.24 is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.24"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nA wrapper-depth parsing mismatch in `system.run` allowed nested transparent dispatch wrappers (for example repeated `/usr/bin/env`) to suppress shell-wrapper detection while still matching allowlist resolution. In `security=allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`, this could bypass the expected approval prompt for shell execution.\n\n### Severity / Trust Model\nOpenClaw\u2019s documented model treats authenticated gateway callers as trusted operators and exec approvals as operator guardrails. This issue is still a real approval-boundary bypass and is triaged as **Medium** in that model.\n\n### Technical Details\n- Dispatch-wrapper unwrapping stopped at `MAX_DISPATCH_WRAPPER_DEPTH`.\n- Shell-wrapper extraction could return non-wrapper once depth was exhausted.\n- Allowlist resolution could still succeed on partially unwrapped argv beginning with `/usr/bin/env`.\n- Result: nested wrapper chains could execute `/bin/sh -c ...` without fresh approval in `allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version at triage time: `2026.2.23`\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.23`\n- Patched versions (planned next release): `\u003e= 2026.2.24`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `57c9a18180c8b14885bbd95474cbb17ff2d03f0b`\n\n### Verification\n- Added regression coverage for depth-overflow wrapper chains at resolution and `system.run` invocation layers.\n- Reproduced previous PoC behavior before fix, then confirmed denial after fix with `SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval required`.\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`) so once npm publish is complete, advisory publication can proceed without additional version edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `\u003e= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32023",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-ccg8-46r6-9qgj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/57c9a18180c8b14885bbd95474cbb17ff2d03f0b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-approval-gating-bypass-via-dispatch-wrapper-depth-cap-mismatch-in-system-run"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s dispatch-wrapper depth-cap mismatch can bypass shell-wrapper approval gating in system.run allowlist mode",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-ccg8-46r6-9qgj",
"CVE-2026-32023"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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