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brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-3jx4-q2m7-r496
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew
Published
2026-08-13 17:21
Modified
2026-09-17 17:24
Summary
OpenClaw: Hardlink alias checks could bypass workspace-only file boundaries in specific configurations
Details

Summary

In certain workspace-restricted configurations, OpenClaw could follow hardlink aliases inside the workspace that reference files outside the workspace boundary.

By default, tools.fs.workspaceOnly is off. This primarily affects deployments that intentionally enable workspace-only filesystem restrictions (and workspace-only apply_patch checks).

Impact

  • Confidentiality: out-of-workspace files could be read through in-workspace hardlink aliases.
  • Integrity: out-of-workspace files could be modified through in-workspace hardlink aliases.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published version at triage time: 2026.2.24
  • Affected range: <= 2026.2.24
  • Planned patched version: 2026.2.25

Fix Commit(s)

  • 04d91d0319b82fd4de91ed05e9fc5219ff2ab64e (main)

Remediation

OpenClaw now rejects hardlinked final-file aliases during workspace boundary validation for: - workspace-only path checks (read / write / edit) - workspace-only apply_patch read/write paths - sandbox mount-root path-safety checks

Regression tests were added for apply_patch, workspace fs tools, and sandbox fs bridge hardlink alias escapes.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Severity
7.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.25"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn certain workspace-restricted configurations, OpenClaw could follow hardlink aliases inside the workspace that reference files outside the workspace boundary.\n\nBy default, `tools.fs.workspaceOnly` is off. This primarily affects deployments that intentionally enable workspace-only filesystem restrictions (and workspace-only `apply_patch` checks).\n\n### Impact\n- Confidentiality: out-of-workspace files could be read through in-workspace hardlink aliases.\n- Integrity: out-of-workspace files could be modified through in-workspace hardlink aliases.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version at triage time: `2026.2.24`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Planned patched version: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `04d91d0319b82fd4de91ed05e9fc5219ff2ab64e` (main)\n\n### Remediation\nOpenClaw now rejects hardlinked final-file aliases during workspace boundary validation for:\n- workspace-only path checks (`read` / `write` / `edit`)\n- workspace-only `apply_patch` read/write paths\n- sandbox mount-root path-safety checks\n\nRegression tests were added for `apply_patch`, workspace fs tools, and sandbox fs bridge hardlink alias escapes.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-3jx4-q2m7-r496",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3jx4-q2m7-r496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/04d91d0319b82fd4de91ed05e9fc5219ff2ab64e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Hardlink alias checks could bypass workspace-only file boundaries in specific configurations",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-3jx4-q2m7-r496"
  ]
}



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