BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-GHSA-5… (GHSA-5847-RM3G-23MW)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-12 09:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants
Details
Vulnerability
The hook authentication throttle keyed failed attempts by raw socket remoteAddress text.
IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of the same client (for example 1.2.3.4 and ::ffff:1.2.3.4) were treated as different clients, allowing separate rate-limit buckets.
Impact
An attacker could split failed hook-auth attempts across both address forms and effectively double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60-second window.
Affected Components
src/gateway/server-http.tssrc/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Patched version (planned next release):
2026.2.22
Remediation
Centralize and reuse canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate-limiting, and use that canonical key for hook auth throttling.
Fix Commit(s)
3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.22) so once npm release 2026.2.22 is published, this advisory can be published directly.
OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
Severity
References
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "## Vulnerability\n\nThe hook authentication throttle keyed failed attempts by raw socket `remoteAddress` text.\n\nIPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of the same client (for example `1.2.3.4` and `::ffff:1.2.3.4`) were treated as different clients, allowing separate rate-limit buckets.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could split failed hook-auth attempts across both address forms and effectively double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60-second window.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- `src/gateway/server-http.ts`\n- `src/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts`\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.22`\n\n## Remediation\n\nCentralize and reuse canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate-limiting, and use that canonical key for hook auth throttling.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.22`) so once npm release `2026.2.22` is published, this advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw",
"modified": "2026-09-12T09:47:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw"
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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