BREW-PNPM@9-CVE-2025-69263 (GHSA-7VHP-VF5G-R2FW)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:28 – Updated: 2026-11-03 16:35 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies
Details

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects: - HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz") - Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo") - Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes: - A server that returns different tarball content on each request - A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball - A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

  • Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
  • Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
  • Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Homebrew pnpm@9
pkg:brew/pnpm%409
Affected: ≥ 9.15.4 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "10.26.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "pnpm@9",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%409"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.15.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9",
        "name": "pnpm",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "9.15.9"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "Alpine",
        "key": "Alpine/pnpm",
        "name": "pnpm",
        "strategy": "distro"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "upstream:pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9",
        "name": "pnpm",
        "strategy": "distro",
        "subject_version": "9.15.9"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nHTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm\u0027s tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:\n\n`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:\n```javascript\nreturn {\n  resolution: {\n    tarball: resolvedUrl,\n    // No integrity field\n  },\n  resolvedVia: \u0027url\u0027,\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:\n```yaml\nremote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:\n  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}\n  version: 1.0.0\n```\n\nSince there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. \n\nThis affects:\n- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`\"pkg\": \"https://example.com/pkg.tgz\"`)\n- Git shorthand dependencies (`\"pkg\": \"github:user/repo\"`)\n- Git URLs (`\"pkg\": \"git+https://github.com/user/repo\"`)\n\nnpm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.\n\n### PoC\n\nSee attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)\n\nThe POC includes:\n- A server that returns different tarball content on each request\n- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball\n- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`\n\nTo run:\n```bash\ncd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc\n./run-poc.sh\n```\n\nThe output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:\n\n- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)\n- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)\n- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time\n\nThe attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim\u0027s lockfile provides no protection.",
  "id": "BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2025-69263",
  "modified": "2026-11-03T16:35:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:28:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw",
    "CVE-2025-69263"
  ]
}



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