BREW-VDIRSYNCER-CVE-2022-36087 (GHSA-3PGJ-PG6C-R5P7)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:46 – Updated: 2026-09-10 01:32 – Source websiteImpact
- Attacker providing malicious redirect uri can cause DoS to oauthlib's web application.
- Attacker can also leverage usage of
uri_validatefunctions depending where it is used.
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Oauthlib applications using OAuth2.0 provider support or use directly uri_validate function.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Issue fixed in 3.2.2 release.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
The redirect_uri can be verified in web toolkit (i.e bottle-oauthlib, django-oauth-toolkit, ...) before oauthlib is called. A sample check if : is present to reject the request can prevent the DoS, assuming no port or IPv6 is fundamentally required.
References
Attack Vector:
- Attacker providing malicious redirect uri:
https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/d4bafd9f1d0eba3766e933b1ac598cbbf37b8914/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/base.py#L232
- Vulnerable uri_validate functions:
https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/2b8a44855a51ad5a5b0c348a08c2564a2e197ea2/oauthlib/uri_validate.py
PoC
is_absolute_uri("http://[:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::]/path")
Acknowledgement
Special thanks to Sebastian Chnelik - PyUp.io
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "oauthlib",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/oauthlib@3.3.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "vdirsyncer",
"purl": "pkg:brew/vdirsyncer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.20.0_8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/oauthlib@3.3.1",
"name": "oauthlib",
"resource": "oauthlib",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.3.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Impact\n- Attacker providing malicious redirect uri can cause DoS to oauthlib\u0027s web application.\n- Attacker can also leverage usage of `uri_validate` functions depending where it is used.\n\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nOauthlib applications using OAuth2.0 provider support or use directly `uri_validate` function.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nIssue fixed in 3.2.2 release.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThe `redirect_uri` can be verified in web toolkit (i.e `bottle-oauthlib`, `django-oauth-toolkit`, ...) before oauthlib is called. A sample check if `:` is present to reject the request can prevent the DoS, assuming no port or IPv6 is fundamentally required.\n\n### References\nAttack Vector:\n- Attacker providing malicious redirect uri:\nhttps://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/d4bafd9f1d0eba3766e933b1ac598cbbf37b8914/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/base.py#L232\n- Vulnerable `uri_validate` functions:\nhttps://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/2b8a44855a51ad5a5b0c348a08c2564a2e197ea2/oauthlib/uri_validate.py\n\n### PoC\n```python\nis_absolute_uri(\"http://[:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::]/path\")\n```\n\n### Acknowledgement\nSpecial thanks to Sebastian Chnelik - PyUp.io",
"id": "BREW-vdirsyncer-CVE-2022-36087",
"modified": "2026-09-10T01:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:46:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/security/advisories/GHSA-3pgj-pg6c-r5p7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/commit/2e40b412c844ecc4673c3fa3f72181f228bdbacd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/2b8a44855a51ad5a5b0c348a08c2564a2e197ea2/oauthlib/uri_validate.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/d4bafd9f1d0eba3766e933b1ac598cbbf37b8914/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/base.py#L232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/releases/tag/v3.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/oauthlib/PYSEC-2022-269.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LXOPIA6M57CFQPUT6HHSNXCTV6QA3UDI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/NBCQJR3ZF7FVNTJYRVPVSQEQRAYZIUHU"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QRYLYHE5HWF6R2CRLJFUK4PILR47WXOE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/X2CQZM5CKOUM4GW2GTAPQEQFPITQ6F7S"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OAuthLib vulnerable to DoS when attacker provides malicious IPV6 URI",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-3pgj-pg6c-r5p7",
"CVE-2022-36087",
"PYSEC-2022-269"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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