CERTA-2011-AVI-033
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Plusieurs vulnérabilités sont présentes dans Cisco Content Service Gateway CSG2. Elles permettent de contourner la politique de sécurité (accés à des sites non autorisés, non facturation de l'accés), ou de provoquer un déni de service à distance.
Description
Plusieurs vulnérabilités sont présentes dans Cisco Content Service Gateway.
- L'envoi d'un paquet TCP particulier peut entrainer un déni de service sur la passerelle ;
- L'envoi d'une requête HTTP particulière, aprés avoir accédé à un site autorisé, permet un contournement de la politique de sécurité en place. Il est ainsi possible d'accéder à des sites normalement interdits ou de contourner le système de facturation. Cette vulnérabilité ne concerne que le traffic HTTP et non les autres protocoles tel que HTTPS.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Cisco Content Service Gateway deuxième génération (CSG2).
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eCisco Content Service Gateway deuxi\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (CSG2).\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s sont pr\u00e9sentes dans Cisco Content Service\nGateway.\n\n- L\u0027envoi d\u0027un paquet TCP particulier peut entrainer un d\u00e9ni de\n service sur la passerelle ;\n- L\u0027envoi d\u0027une requ\u00eate HTTP particuli\u00e8re, apr\u00e9s avoir acc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 un\n site autoris\u00e9, permet un contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\n en place. Il est ainsi possible d\u0027acc\u00e9der \u00e0 des sites normalement\n interdits ou de contourner le syst\u00e8me de facturation. Cette\n vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 ne concerne que le traffic HTTP et non les autres\n protocoles tel que HTTPS.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0349",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0349"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0350",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0350"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0348",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0348"
}
],
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20110126-csg2 du 26 janvier 2011 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110126-csg2.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-033",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-01-27T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s sont pr\u00e9sentes dans Cisco Content Service\nGateway CSG2. Elles permettent de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\n(acc\u00e9s \u00e0 des sites non autoris\u00e9s, non facturation de l\u0027acc\u00e9s), ou de\nprovoquer un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Cisco Content Service Gateway",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Avis Cisco-sa-20110126-csg2",
"url": null
}
]
}
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