CERTA-2011-AVI-149
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Une vulnérabilité dans Majordomo permet à un utilisateur malveillant d'accéder à des fichiers arbitraires sur le serveur.
Description
La correction d'une vulnérabilité précédemment découverte dans Majordomo 2 (voir l'avis CERTA-2011-AVI-057) est insuffisante, et la vulnérabilité est toujours exploitable, mais d'une manière différente. Une erreur dans le traitement des chemins vers des fichiers permet à un attaquant d'accéder à des fichiers arbitraires sur le serveur.
Solution
Mettre à jour Majordomo 2 dans une version supérieure ou égale à 20110204. Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Majordomo 2 versions inférieures à 20110204.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eMajordomo 2 versions inf\u00e9rieures \u00e0 20110204.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nLa correction d\u0027une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment d\u00e9couverte dans Majordomo\n2 (voir l\u0027avis CERTA-2011-AVI-057) est insuffisante, et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9\nest toujours exploitable, mais d\u0027une mani\u00e8re diff\u00e9rente. Une erreur dans\nle traitement des chemins vers des fichiers permet \u00e0 un attaquant\nd\u0027acc\u00e9der \u00e0 des fichiers arbitraires sur le serveur.\n\n## Solution\n\nMettre \u00e0 jour Majordomo 2 dans une version sup\u00e9rieure ou \u00e9gale \u00e0\n20110204. Se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour\nl\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0063",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0063"
}
],
"links": [
{
"title": "T\u00e9l\u00e9chargement de Majordomo 2 :",
"url": "http://ftp.mj2.org/pub/mj2/snapshots/2011-03/"
},
{
"title": "Avis CERTA-2011-AVI-057 :",
"url": "http://www.certa.ssi.gouv.fr/site/CERTA-2011-AVI-057/CERTA-2011-AVI-057.html"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-149",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-03-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Majordomo permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malveillant\nd\u0027acc\u00e9der \u00e0 des fichiers arbitraires sur le serveur.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Majordomo 2",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Rapport de bug 631307 du 3 mars 2011",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=631307"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.