CERTA-2011-AVI-271

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:

Plusieurs vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans VMware ESX et ESXi permettant à un utilisateur malintentionné de provoquer un déni de service, une élévation de privilèges ou un contournement de la politique de sécurité.

Description

Plusieurs vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans les produits VMware ESX et ESXi :

  • Une vulnérabilité (CVE-2010-2240) présente dans le noyau Linux (cf. avi CERTA CERTA-2010-AVI-392) ;
  • quatre vulnérabilités (CVE-2010-1323, CVE-2010-1324, CVE-2010-4020 et CVE-2010-4021) présentes dans Kerberos (cf. avi CERTA CERTA-2010-AVI-571) ;
  • deux vulnérabilités (CVE-2011-1785 et CVE-2011-1786) concernent la gestion des ressources réseau.

Solution

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

None
Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
VMware ESXi VMware ESX 4.0 et 4.1 ;
VMware ESXi VMware ESXi 4.0 et 4.1.
References

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{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [
    {
      "description": "VMware ESX 4.0 et 4.1 ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "ESXi",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "VMware",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "VMware ESXi 4.0 et 4.1.",
      "product": {
        "name": "ESXi",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "VMware",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "affected_systems_content": null,
  "content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans les produits VMware ESX\net ESXi\u00a0:\n\n-   Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 (CVE-2010-2240) pr\u00e9sente dans le noyau Linux (cf.\n    avi CERTA CERTA-2010-AVI-392)\u00a0;\n-   quatre vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s (CVE-2010-1323, CVE-2010-1324, CVE-2010-4020\n    et CVE-2010-4021) pr\u00e9sentes dans Kerberos (cf. avi CERTA\n    CERTA-2010-AVI-571)\u00a0;\n-   deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s (CVE-2011-1785 et CVE-2011-1786) concernent la\n    gestion des ressources r\u00e9seau.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2011-1785",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-1785"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-4020",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-4020"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-2240",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-2240"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-4021",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-4021"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-1324",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1324"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-1323",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1323"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2011-1786",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-1786"
    }
  ],
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Document du CERTA CERTA-2010-AVI-571 du 01 d\u00e9cembre 2010    (CVE-2010-1323, CVE-2010-1324, CVE-2010-4020 et CVE-2010-4021)    :",
      "url": "http://www.certa.ssi.gouv.fr/site/CERTA-2010-AVI-571/index.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 VMware VMSA-2011-0007 du 28 avril 2011    :",
      "url": "http://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2011-0007.html"
    },
    {
      "title": "Document du CERTA CERTA-2010-AVI-392 du 19 ao\u00fbt 2010    (CVE-2010-2240) :",
      "url": "http://www.certa.ssi.gouv.fr/site/CERTA-2010-AVI-392/index.html"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-271",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2011-04-29T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
    },
    {
      "description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
    },
    {
      "description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans VMware ESX et ESXi\npermettant \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de\nservice, une \u00e9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges ou un contournement de la politique\nde s\u00e9curit\u00e9.\n",
  "title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans VMware ESX et ESXi",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 VMware WMSA-2011-0007 du 28 avril 2011",
      "url": null
    }
  ]
}



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