CERTA-2011-AVI-412
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Une vulnérabilité dans Apple iOS a été corrigée et permet à une personne malintentionnée de porter atteinte à l'intégrité et à la confidentialité des données envoyées sur le réseau lors d'une session SSL/TLS.
Description
Une vulnérabilité dans Apple iOS liée à la validation de la chaîne des certificats X.509 a été corrigée. Elle permet à un utilisateur malintentionné d'utiliser un certificat X.509 spécialement conçu afin d'intercepter le traffic réseau lors d'une session SSL/TLS (attaque de type «man in the middle»).
Solution
Se référer aux bulletins de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | N/A | Apple iOS versions 3.2 à 4.3.4 pour iPad. | ||
| Apple | N/A | Apple iOS versions 3.1 à 4.3.4 pour iPod touch de 3ème génération et postérieures ; | ||
| Apple | N/A | Apple iOS versions 3.0 à 4.3.4 pour iPhone 3GS et iPhone 4 modèle GSM ; | ||
| Apple | N/A | Apple iOS versions 4.2.5 à 4.2.9 pour iPhone 4 modèle CDMA ; |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Apple iOS versions 3.2 \u00e0 4.3.4 pour iPad.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Apple",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Apple iOS versions 3.1 \u00e0 4.3.4 pour iPod touch de 3\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration et post\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Apple",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Apple iOS versions 3.0 \u00e0 4.3.4 pour iPhone 3GS et iPhone 4 mod\u00e8le GSM ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Apple",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Apple iOS versions 4.2.5 \u00e0 4.2.9 pour iPhone 4 mod\u00e8le CDMA ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Apple",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Apple iOS li\u00e9e \u00e0 la validation de la cha\u00eene des\ncertificats X.509 a \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9e. Elle permet \u00e0 un utilisateur\nmalintentionn\u00e9 d\u0027utiliser un certificat X.509 sp\u00e9cialement con\u00e7u afin\nd\u0027intercepter le traffic r\u00e9seau lors d\u0027une session SSL/TLS (attaque de\ntype \u00abman in the middle\u00bb).\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer aux bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-0228",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0228"
}
],
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Apple HT4824 du 25 juillet 2011 :",
"url": "http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4824"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Apple HT4825 du 25 juillet 2011 :",
"url": "http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4825"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-412",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-07-26T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 l\u0027int\u00e9grit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Apple iOS a \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9e et permet \u00e0 une personne\nmalintentionn\u00e9e de porter atteinte \u00e0 l\u0027int\u00e9grit\u00e9 et \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9\ndes donn\u00e9es envoy\u00e9es sur le r\u00e9seau lors d\u0027une session SSL/TLS.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Apple iOS",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletins de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Apple HT4824 et HT4825 du 25 juillet 2011",
"url": null
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.