CERTA-2011-AVI-602
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Une vulnérabilité dans des caméras de vidéosurveillance Cisco permet à un utilisateur malveillant de réaliser un déni de service à distance.
Description
Les caméras de vidéosurveillance Cisco des séries vulnérables ne traitent pas correctement des paquets RTSP mal formés. Cette vulnérabilité est exploitable par un utilisateur malintentionné pour provoquer à distance un arrêt avec redémarrage de l'appareil vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Caméra de vidéosurveillance Cisco, séries 2421, 2500 et 2600.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eCam\u00e9ra de vid\u00e9osurveillance Cisco, s\u00e9ries 2421, 2500 et 2600.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nLes cam\u00e9ras de vid\u00e9osurveillance Cisco des s\u00e9ries vuln\u00e9rables ne\ntraitent pas correctement des paquets RTSP mal form\u00e9s. Cette\nvuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 est exploitable par un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 pour\nprovoquer \u00e0 distance un arr\u00eat avec red\u00e9marrage de l\u0027appareil vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-3318",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-3318"
}
],
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20111026-camera du 26 octobre 2011 :",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20111026-camera"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-602",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-10-28T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans des cam\u00e9ras de vid\u00e9osurveillance Cisco permet \u00e0\nun utilisateur malveillant de r\u00e9aliser un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans des cam\u00e9ras Cisco",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20111026-camera du 26 octobre 2011",
"url": null
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.