CERTA-2011-AVI-615
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Une vulnérabilité dans le proxy Squid permet de mener une attaque par déni de service à distance.
Description
Une erreur de segmentation a lieu lors d'une libération mémoire lorsque Squid tente de résoudre une requête DNS où un enregistrement de type CNAME pointe sur un autre enregistrement de type CNAME qui pointe sur un enregistrement de type A vide. Une personne malintentionnée peut envoyer une requête spécifique à un proxy Squid, provoquant cette erreur pour mener une attaque par déni de service à distance.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Squid version 3.1 non patchée.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eSquid\u003c/SPAN\u003e version 3.1 non patch\u00e9e.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne erreur de segmentation a lieu lors d\u0027une lib\u00e9ration m\u00e9moire lorsque\nSquid tente de r\u00e9soudre une requ\u00eate DNS o\u00f9 un enregistrement de type\nCNAME pointe sur un autre enregistrement de type CNAME qui pointe sur un\nenregistrement de type A vide. Une personne malintentionn\u00e9e peut envoyer\nune requ\u00eate sp\u00e9cifique \u00e0 un proxy Squid, provoquant cette erreur pour\nmener une attaque par d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-4096",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-4096"
}
],
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-615",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-11-03T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans le proxy \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eSquid\u003c/span\u003e permet\nde mener une attaque par d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Squid",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Avis Bugzilla - Bug 3237",
"url": "http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3237"
}
]
}
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