CERTA-2011-AVI-682
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: - Updated:
Deux vulnérabilités, permettant à un utilisateur malintentionné d'effectuer un déni de service à distance et de porter atteinte à la confidentialité de certaines données, sont présentes dans Asterisk.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Asterisk.
La première, AST-2011-013, permet à une personne malintentionée d'énumérer les noms d'utilisateur. Cette vulnérabilité est causée par une mauvaise configuration du NAT.
La seconde, AST-2011-014, permet à un utilisateur malintentionné de causer un déni de service à distance, lorsque l'option automon est activée dans le fichier features.conf, grâce à l'envoi d'une suite de paquets SIP.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
AST-2011-013 concerne :
- Asterisk Open Source 1.6.2.x toutes versions ;
- Asterisk Open Source 1.8.x toutes versions.
AST-2011-014 concerne :
- Asterisk Open Source toutes versions.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eAST-2011-013 concerne : \u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eAsterisk Open Source 1.6.2.x toutes versions ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eAsterisk Open Source 1.8.x toutes versions.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e \u003cP\u003eAST-2011-014 concerne :\u003c/P\u003e \u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eAsterisk Open Source toutes versions.\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans Asterisk.\n\nLa premi\u00e8re, AST-2011-013, permet \u00e0 une personne malintention\u00e9e\nd\u0027\u00e9num\u00e9rer les noms d\u0027utilisateur. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 est caus\u00e9e par\nune mauvaise configuration du NAT.\n\nLa seconde, AST-2011-014, permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 de\ncauser un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance, lorsque l\u0027option automon est\nactiv\u00e9e dans le fichier features.conf, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l\u0027envoi d\u0027une suite de\npaquets SIP.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-4598",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-4598"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-4597",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-4597"
}
],
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-682",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-12-13T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s, permettant \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9\nd\u0027effectuer un d\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance et de porter atteinte \u00e0 la\nconfidentialit\u00e9 de certaines donn\u00e9es, sont pr\u00e9sentes dans \u003cspan\nclass=\"textit\"\u003eAsterisk\u003c/span\u003e.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Asterisk",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Asterisk AST-2011-014 du 03 novembre 2011",
"url": null
},
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Asterisk AST-2011-013",
"url": "http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2011-013.html"
}
]
}
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