Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from cleanstart

Published

2026-07-30 07:10

Modified

2026-07-30 09:31

Summary

Security fixes in grafana-alloy-fips 1.12.1-r2

Details

Package grafana-alloy-fips version 1.12.1-r2 fixes 13 vulnerabilities: ghsa-x6gf-mpr2-68h6, CVE-2026-25679, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3, CVE-2026-27142, ghsa-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x...

References

URL

Type

https://github.com/grafana/alloy

WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpine",
        "name": "grafana-alloy-fips"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.1-r2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.12.1-r2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Package grafana-alloy-fips version 1.12.1-r2 fixes 13 vulnerabilities: ghsa-x6gf-mpr2-68h6, CVE-2026-25679, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3, CVE-2026-27142, ghsa-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x...",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-DK78557",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T09:31:11Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grafana/alloy"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fixes in grafana-alloy-fips 1.12.1-r2",
  "upstream": [
    "ghsa-x6gf-mpr2-68h6",
    "CVE-2026-25679",
    "ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
    "CVE-2026-27142",
    "ghsa-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x",
    "ghsa-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq",
    "ghsa-fw7p-63qq-7hpr",
    "CVE-2026-27139",
    "ghsa-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x",
    "ghsa-jqcq-xjh3-6g23",
    "CVE-2026-1229",
    "CVE-2026-24051",
    "CVE-2026-33186"
  ]
}

GHSA-P77J-4MVH-X3M3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:10 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:12

Summary

gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path

Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.

The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.

Who is impacted? This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria: 1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx). 2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).

The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.

Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer): * v1.79.3 * The latest master branch.

It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:

func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
    if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
    }   
    return handler(ctx, req)
}

// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.

3. Policy Hardening

Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "google.golang.org/grpc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.79.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33186"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T23:16:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nIt is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.\n\nThe gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, \"deny\" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback \"allow\" rule was present.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\nThis affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:\n1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.\n2. Their security policy contains specific \"deny\" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback \"allow\" rule).\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nYes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.\n\nUsers should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):\n* **v1.79.3**\n* The latest **master** branch.\n\nIt is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nWhile upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:\n\n#### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)\nAdd an \"outermost\" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:\n\n```go\nfunc pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {\n    if info.FullMethod == \"\" || info.FullMethod[0] != \u0027/\u0027 {\n        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, \"malformed method name\")\n    }   \n    return handler(ctx, req)\n}\n\n// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain\ns := grpc.NewServer(\n    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),\n)\n```\n\n#### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization\nIf your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a leading slash.\n\n#### 3. Policy Hardening\nSwitch to a \"default deny\" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.",
  "id": "GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:12:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path"
}

GHSA-Q9HV-HPM4-HJ6X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 19:17 – Updated: 2026-02-25 19:17

Summary

CIRCL has an incorrect calculation in secp384r1 CombinedMult

Details

The CombinedMult function in the CIRCL ecc/p384 package (secp384r1 curve) produces an incorrect value for specific inputs. The issue is fixed by using complete addition formulas. ECDH and ECDSA signing relying on this curve are not affected.

The bug was fixed in v1.6.3.

Severity

2.9 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/U:Amber

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cloudflare/circl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1229"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-682"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T19:17:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T08:16:28Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The CombinedMult function in the CIRCL ecc/p384 package (secp384r1 curve) produces an incorrect value for specific inputs. The issue is fixed by using complete addition formulas.\nECDH and ECDSA signing relying on this curve are not affected.\n\nThe bug was fixed in **[v1.6.3](https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/releases/tag/v1.6.3)**.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T19:17:50Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T19:17:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/security/advisories/GHSA-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1229"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/pull/583"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/releases/tag/v1.6.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CIRCL has an incorrect calculation in secp384r1 CombinedMult"
}

GHSA-X6GF-MPR2-68H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-30 21:09

Summary

Duplicate Advisory: pgproto3: Negative field length panics in DataRow.Decode

Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

A flaw was found in pgproto3. A malicious or compromised PostgreSQL server can exploit this by sending a DataRow message with a negative field length. This input validation vulnerability can lead to a denial of service (DoS) due to a slice bounds out of range panic.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4427"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-129"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:34:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T15:16:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nA flaw was found in pgproto3. A malicious or compromised PostgreSQL server can exploit this by sending a DataRow message with a negative field length. This input validation vulnerability can lead to a denial of service (DoS) due to a slice bounds out of range panic.",
  "id": "GHSA-x6gf-mpr2-68h6",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T21:09:40Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/golang/vulndb/issues/4518"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgx/issues/2507"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-4427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2448626"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jackc/pgproto3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://securityinfinity.com/research/memory-safety-vulnerabilities-in-go-postgresql-wire-protocol-parsers-pgproto3-pgx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: pgproto3: Negative field length panics in DataRow.Decode",
  "withdrawn": "2026-03-30T21:09:40Z"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

Vulnerability from cleanstart

GHSA-P77J-4MVH-X3M3

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

3. Policy Hardening

GHSA-Q9HV-HPM4-HJ6X

GHSA-X6GF-MPR2-68H6

Duplicate Advisory

Original Description

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature