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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Package helm-operator-fips version 1.41.1-r2 fixes 52 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mh2q-q3fh-2475, CVE-2026-39820, CVE-2025-68121, CVE-2026-25679, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3...
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "helm-operator-fips"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.41.1-r2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.41.1-r2"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package helm-operator-fips version 1.41.1-r2 fixes 52 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mh2q-q3fh-2475, CVE-2026-39820, CVE-2025-68121, CVE-2026-25679, ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3...",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-JV33217",
"modified": "2026-07-30T09:33:09Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/operator-framework/operator-sdk"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in helm-operator-fips 1.41.1-r2",
"upstream": [
"ghsa-mh2q-q3fh-2475",
"CVE-2026-39820",
"CVE-2025-68121",
"CVE-2026-25679",
"ghsa-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
"ghsa-78h2-9frx-2jm8",
"CVE-2026-27143",
"CVE-2026-27142",
"CVE-2026-42499",
"ghsa-8rm2-7qqf-34qm",
"CVE-2026-39836",
"ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2",
"CVE-2026-32281",
"CVE-2026-32280",
"CVE-2026-32283",
"CVE-2026-33814",
"CVE-2026-33811",
"ghsa-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq",
"CVE-2026-39817",
"CVE-2025-68119",
"ghsa-wg65-39gg-5wfj",
"CVE-2026-27142",
"CVE-2026-39826",
"ghsa-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx",
"CVE-2026-39825",
"CVE-2026-32289",
"CVE-2026-42501",
"ghsa-vffh-x6r8-xx99",
"CVE-2026-39823",
"CVE-2026-32282",
"CVE-2026-39819",
"CVE-2026-39817",
"CVE-2026-27144",
"CVE-2026-27140",
"CVE-2026-32288",
"CVE-2026-27139",
"ghsa-fw8g-cg8f-9j28",
"CVE-2026-34986",
"CVE-2026-35469",
"CVE-2026-42151",
"CVE-2026-42154",
"CVE-2026-40179",
"CVE-2026-44903",
"CVE-2026-35206",
"CVE-2026-29181",
"CVE-2026-24051",
"CVE-2026-39883",
"CVE-2026-33186",
"ghsa-hr2v-4r36-88hr",
"CVE-2025-61728",
"CVE-2025-61731",
"CVE-2025-61732"
]
}
GHSA-8RM2-7QQF-34QM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 19:34 – Updated: 2026-06-08 16:22Impact
The remote read endpoint (/api/v1/read) does not validate the declared decoded length in a snappy-compressed request body before allocating memory.
An unauthenticated attacker can send a small payload that causes a huge heap allocation per request. Under concurrent load this can exhaust available memory and crash the Prometheus process.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fixed in 3.11.3 and 3.5.3 LTS. Users should upgrade to these versions or later.
Workarounds
User who can not upgrade can place Prometheus behind a reverse proxy or firewall that requires authentication before requests reach /api/v1/read.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.306.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.311.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.305.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-rc.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:34:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T19:16:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe remote read endpoint (`/api/v1/read`) does not validate the declared decoded length in a snappy-compressed request body before allocating memory.\nAn unauthenticated attacker can send a small payload that causes a huge heap allocation per request. Under concurrent load this can exhaust available memory and crash the Prometheus process.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nFixed in 3.11.3 and 3.5.3 LTS. Users should upgrade to these versions or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nUser who can not upgrade can place Prometheus behind a reverse proxy or firewall that requires authentication before requests reach /api/v1/read.",
"id": "GHSA-8rm2-7qqf-34qm",
"modified": "2026-06-08T16:22:14Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T19:34:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/security/advisories/GHSA-8rm2-7qqf-34qm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/pull/18584"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/pull/18585"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/releases/tag/v3.11.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/releases/tag/v3.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prometheus: Remote read endpoint allows denial of service via crafted snappy payload"
}
GHSA-9H8M-3FM2-QJRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 20:07 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:39Impact
The OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version v1.20.0-1.39.0 is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in sdk/resource/host_id.go executes the ioreg system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.
Patches
This has been patched in d45961b, which was released with v1.40.0.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.21.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.40.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24051"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-426"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T20:07:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T23:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version `v1.20.0`-`1.39.0` is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in `sdk/resource/host_id.go` executes the `ioreg` system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched in [d45961b](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53), which was released with `v1.40.0`.\n\n### References\n- [CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html)",
"id": "GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq",
"modified": "2026-02-27T21:39:46Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T20:07:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4394"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking"
}
GHSA-FW8G-CG8F-9J28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:53 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:34Impact
In the Prometheus server's legacy web UI (enabled via the command-line flag --enable-feature=old-ui), the histogram heatmap chart view does not escape le label values when inserting them into the HTML for use as axis tick mark labels.
An attacker who can inject crafted metrics (e.g. via a compromised scrape target, remote write, or OTLP receiver endpoint) can execute JavaScript in the browser of any Prometheus user who views the metric in the heatmap chart UI. From the XSS context, an attacker could for example:
- Read
/api/v1/status/configto extract sensitive configuration (although credentials / secrets are redacted by the server) - Call
/-/quitto shut down Prometheus (only if--web.enable-lifecycleis set) - Call
/api/v1/admin/tsdb/delete_seriesto delete data (only if--web.enable-admin-apiis set) - Exfiltrate metric data to an external server
Note that this only affects users who have explicitly enabled the legacy Prometheus web UI using the --enable-feature=old-ui command-line flag.
Patches
https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/38f23b9075ced1de2b82d2dad8b2bebb1ecd5b7d
Workarounds
If at all possible, disable the legacy web UI by removing the --enable-feature=old-ui command-line flag).
If this is not an option, take the following precautions:
- If using the remote write receiver (
--web.enable-remote-write-receiver), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources. - If using the OTLP receiver (
--web.enable-otlp-receiver), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources. - Ensure scrape targets are trusted and not under attacker control.
- Do not enable admin / mutating API endpoints (e.g.
--web.enable-admin-apiorweb.enable-lifecycle) in cases where you cannot prevent untrusted data from being ingested. - Users should avoid clicking untrusted links, especially those containing functions such as
label_replace, as they may generate poisoned label names and values.
References
- CVE-2019-10215 — prior stored DOM XSS vulnerability in Prometheus query history, fixed in v2.7.2
- CVE-2026-40179 — prior stored DOM XSS vulnerability in Prometheus web UI (hover tooltips and metrics explorer), fixed in v3.11.2
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.311.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44903"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:53:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIn the Prometheus server\u0027s legacy web UI (enabled via the command-line flag `--enable-feature=old-ui`), the histogram heatmap chart view does not escape `le` label values when inserting them into the HTML for use as axis tick mark labels.\n\nAn attacker who can inject crafted metrics (e.g. via a compromised scrape target, remote write, or OTLP receiver endpoint) can execute JavaScript in the browser of any Prometheus user who views the metric in the heatmap chart UI. From the XSS context, an attacker could for example:\n\n- Read `/api/v1/status/config` to extract sensitive configuration (although credentials / secrets are redacted by the server)\n- Call `/-/quit` to shut down Prometheus (only if `--web.enable-lifecycle` is set)\n- Call `/api/v1/admin/tsdb/delete_series` to delete data (only if `--web.enable-admin-api` is set)\n- Exfiltrate metric data to an external server\n\nNote that this only affects users who have explicitly enabled the legacy Prometheus web UI using the `--enable-feature=old-ui` command-line flag.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/38f23b9075ced1de2b82d2dad8b2bebb1ecd5b7d\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf at all possible, disable the legacy web UI by removing the `--enable-feature=old-ui` command-line flag).\n\nIf this is not an option, take the following precautions:\n\n- If using the remote write receiver (`--web.enable-remote-write-receiver`), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources.\n- If using the OTLP receiver (`--web.enable-otlp-receiver`), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources.\n- Ensure scrape targets are trusted and not under attacker control.\n- Do not enable admin / mutating API endpoints (e.g. `--web.enable-admin-api` or `web.enable-lifecycle`) in cases where you cannot prevent untrusted data from being ingested.\n- Users should avoid clicking untrusted links, especially those containing functions such as `label_replace`, as they may generate poisoned label names and values.\n\n### References\n\n- CVE-2019-10215 \u2014 prior stored DOM XSS vulnerability in Prometheus query history, fixed in v2.7.2\n- CVE-2026-40179 \u2014 prior stored DOM XSS vulnerability in Prometheus web UI (hover tooltips and metrics explorer), fixed in v3.11.2",
"id": "GHSA-fw8g-cg8f-9j28",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:34:45Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T21:53:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/security/advisories/GHSA-fw8g-cg8f-9j28"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/38f23b9075ced1de2b82d2dad8b2bebb1ecd5b7d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Prometheus vulnerable to stored XSS via crafted histogram bucket label values in the old web UI heatmap display"
}
GHSA-HFVC-G4FC-PQHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 19:22 – Updated: 2026-04-09 14:29Summary
The fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin ioreg command to use an absolute path but left the BSD kenv command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.
Root Cause
sdk/resource/host_id.go line 42:
if result, err := r.execCommand("kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {
Compare with the fixed Darwin path at line 58:
result, err := r.execCommand("/usr/sbin/ioreg", "-rd1", "-c", "IOPlatformExpertDevice")
The execCommand helper at sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go uses exec.Command(name, arg...) which searches $PATH when the command name contains no path separator.
Affected platforms (per build tag in host_id_bsd.go:4): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.
The kenv path is reached when /etc/hostid does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.
Attack
- Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk - Attacker places a malicious
kenvbinary earlier in$PATH - Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup
hostIDReaderBSD.read()callsexec.Command("kenv", ...)which resolves to the malicious binary- Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application
Same attack vector and impact as CVE-2026-24051.
Suggested Fix
Use the absolute path:
if result, err := r.execCommand("/bin/kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {
On FreeBSD, kenv is located at /bin/kenv.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.42.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.43.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-426"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T19:22:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin `ioreg` command to use an absolute path but left the BSD `kenv` command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`sdk/resource/host_id.go` line 42:\n\n if result, err := r.execCommand(\"kenv\", \"-q\", \"smbios.system.uuid\"); err == nil {\n\nCompare with the fixed Darwin path at line 58:\n\n result, err := r.execCommand(\"/usr/sbin/ioreg\", \"-rd1\", \"-c\", \"IOPlatformExpertDevice\")\n\nThe `execCommand` helper at `sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go` uses `exec.Command(name, arg...)` which searches `$PATH` when the command name contains no path separator.\n\nAffected platforms (per build tag in `host_id_bsd.go:4`): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.\n\nThe `kenv` path is reached when `/etc/hostid` does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.\n\n## Attack\n\n1. Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports `go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk`\n2. Attacker places a malicious `kenv` binary earlier in `$PATH`\n3. Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup\n4. `hostIDReaderBSD.read()` calls `exec.Command(\"kenv\", ...)` which resolves to the malicious binary\n5. Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application\n\nSame attack vector and impact as CVE-2026-24051.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nUse the absolute path:\n\n if result, err := r.execCommand(\"/bin/kenv\", \"-q\", \"smbios.system.uuid\"); err == nil {\n\nOn FreeBSD, `kenv` is located at `/bin/kenv`.",
"id": "GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx",
"modified": "2026-04-09T14:29:41Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T19:22:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39883"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.43.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "opentelemetry-go: BSD kenv command not using absolute path enables PATH hijacking"
}
GHSA-HR2V-4R36-88HR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-04-10 15:33Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions <=3.20.1 and <=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause helm pull --untar [chart URL | repo/chartname] to write the Chart's contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the --destination and --untardir flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart's name.
Impact
The bug enables writing the Chart's contents (unpackaged/untar'ed) to the output directory <output dir>/, instead of the expected <output dir>/<chart name>/, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.
Note: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.
Patches
This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3
A Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be "." or ".."), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.
Workarounds
Ensure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot ("..") or dot ("."). In addition, ensuring that the pull --untar flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.
Credits
Oleh Konko @1seal
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "helm.sh/helm/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "helm.sh/helm/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.20.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35206"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T21:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions \u003c=3.20.1 and \u003c=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause `helm pull --untar [chart URL | repo/chartname]` to write the Chart\u0027s contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the `--destination` and `--untardir` flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart\u0027s name.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe bug enables writing the Chart\u0027s contents (unpackaged/untar\u0027ed) to the output directory `\u003coutput dir\u003e/`, instead of the expected `\u003coutput dir\u003e/\u003cchart name\u003e/`, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.\n\nNote: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3\n\nA Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be \".\" or \"..\"), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot (\"..\") or dot (\".\"). In addition, ensuring that the `pull --untar` flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.\n\n### Credits\n\nOleh Konko\n@1seal",
"id": "GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr",
"modified": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/4e7994d4467182f535b6797c94b5b0e994a91436"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/releases/tag/v4.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Helm Chart extraction output directory collapse via `Chart.yaml` name dot-segment"
}
GHSA-MH2Q-Q3FH-2475
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 20:12 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:04multi-value baggage: header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many baggage: header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit.
severity
HIGH (availability / remote request amplification)
relevant links
- repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go
- pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58
vulnerability details
pins: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a as-of: 2026-02-04 policy: direct (no program scope provided)
callsite: propagation/baggage.go:58 (extractMultiBaggage)
attacker control: inbound HTTP request headers (many baggage field-values) → propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values("baggage") → repeated baggage.Parse + member aggregation
root cause
extractMultiBaggage iterates over all baggage header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit).
impact
in a default net/http configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many baggage: header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency.
example from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests):
- canonical:
per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458andp95_ms=7 - control:
per_req_alloc_bytes=133429andp95_ms=0
proof of concept
canonical:
mkdir -p poc
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make test
output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage
[PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165
control:
cd poc
make control
control output (excerpt):
[NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480
expected: multiple baggage header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined baggage value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget.
actual: multiple baggage header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes.
fix recommendation
avoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total).
fix accepted when: under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for per_req_alloc_bytes and per_req_allocs, and p95_ms stays below 2ms.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.40.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.36.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.41.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29181"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T21:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "multi-value `baggage:` header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many `baggage:` header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit.\n\n## severity\n\nHIGH (availability / remote request amplification)\n\n## relevant links\n\n- repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go\n- pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58\n\n## vulnerability details\n\n**pins:** open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a\n**as-of:** 2026-02-04\n**policy:** direct (no program scope provided)\n\n**callsite:** propagation/baggage.go:58 (`extractMultiBaggage`)\n**attacker control:** inbound HTTP request headers (many `baggage` field-values) \u2192 `propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values(\"baggage\")` \u2192 repeated `baggage.Parse` + member aggregation\n\n### root cause\n\n`extractMultiBaggage` iterates over all `baggage` header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit).\n\n### impact\n\nin a default `net/http` configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many `baggage:` header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency.\n\nexample from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests):\n\n- canonical: `per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458` and `p95_ms=7`\n- control: `per_req_alloc_bytes=133429` and `p95_ms=0`\n\n## proof of concept\n\ncanonical:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p poc\nunzip poc.zip -d poc\ncd poc\nmake test\n```\n\noutput (excerpt):\n\n```\n[CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage\n[PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165\n```\n\ncontrol:\n\n```bash\ncd poc\nmake control\n```\n\ncontrol output (excerpt):\n\n```\n[NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480\n```\n\n**expected:** multiple `baggage` header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined `baggage` value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget.\n**actual:** multiple `baggage` header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes.\n\n## fix recommendation\n\navoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total).\n\n**fix accepted when:** under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for `per_req_alloc_bytes` and `per_req_allocs`, and `p95_ms` stays below 2ms.\n\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079945/poc.zip)\n[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079946/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)",
"id": "GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:04:24Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/7880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/aa1894e09e3fe66860c7885cb40f98901b35277f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.41.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry-Go: multi-value `baggage` header extraction causes excessive allocations (remote dos amplification)"
}
GHSA-P77J-4MVH-X3M3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:10 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:12Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.
The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.
Who is impacted?
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:
1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx).
2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).
The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.
Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer): * v1.79.3 * The latest master branch.
It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:
1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)
Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:
func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
}
return handler(ctx, req)
}
// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)
2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization
If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.
3. Policy Hardening
Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "google.golang.org/grpc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.79.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T23:16:45Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nIt is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.\n\nThe gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, \"deny\" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback \"allow\" rule was present.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\nThis affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:\n1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.\n2. Their security policy contains specific \"deny\" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback \"allow\" rule).\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nYes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.\n\nUsers should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):\n* **v1.79.3**\n* The latest **master** branch.\n\nIt is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nWhile upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:\n\n#### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)\nAdd an \"outermost\" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:\n\n```go\nfunc pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {\n if info.FullMethod == \"\" || info.FullMethod[0] != \u0027/\u0027 {\n return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, \"malformed method name\")\n } \n return handler(ctx, req)\n}\n\n// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain\ns := grpc.NewServer(\n grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),\n)\n```\n\n#### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization\nIf your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a leading slash.\n\n#### 3. Policy Hardening\nSwitch to a \"default deny\" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.",
"id": "GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:12:09Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T20:10:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path"
}
GHSA-PC3F-X583-G7J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 20:44 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:36The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate
attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A
remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can
cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of
malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.
Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:
1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit
numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size
without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker
can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload,
triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.
2. Header count -- parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bit
numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an
http.Header map of that size with no upper bound.
3. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are
read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with
no validation.
Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire
payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser
interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is
enough to exhaust process memory.
Impact
Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.
Affected versions
github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0
Fix
v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related
hardening:
Core fixes:
- SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now
checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame
length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.
- Header count limit -- parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximum
number of headers per frame (default: 1000).
- Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value
lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)
before allocation.
- Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop
now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an
InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the
same connection.
Additional hardening:
- Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify
that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the
library from producing invalid frames.
Configurable limits:
- Callers can adjust the defaults using NewConnectionWithOptions or
the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options:
WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and
WithMaxHeaderCount.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/moby/spdystream"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35469"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T20:44:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T22:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate\nattacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A\nremote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can\ncause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of\nmalformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.\n\u00a0\nThree allocation paths in the receive side are affected:\n1. **SETTINGS entry count** -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit\n`numSettings` from the payload and allocates a slice of that size\nwithout checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker\ncan set `numSettings` to a value far exceeding the actual payload,\ntriggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.\n\u00a0\n2. **Header count** -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` reads a 32-bit\n`numHeaders` from the decompressed header block and allocates an\n`http.Header` map of that size with no upper bound.\n\u00a0\n3. **Header field size** -- Individual header name and value lengths are\nread as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with\nno validation.\n\u00a0\nBecause SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire\npayload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser\ninterprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is\nenough to exhaust process memory.\n## Impact\n\u00a0Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly\nor through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can\nsend SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single\ncrafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.\n## Affected versions\n\u00a0`github.com/moby/spdystream` \u003c= v0.5.0\n## Fix\n\u00a0v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related\nhardening:\n\u00a0\n**Core fixes:**\n\u00a0\n- **SETTINGS entry-count validation** -- The SETTINGS frame reader now\nchecks that `numSettings` is consistent with the declared frame\nlength (`numSettings \u003c= (length-4)/8`) before allocating.\n\u00a0\n- **Header count limit** -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` enforces a maximum\nnumber of headers per frame (default: 1000).\n\u00a0\n- **Header field size limit** -- Individual header name and value\nlengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)\nbefore allocation.\n\u00a0\n- **Connection closure on protocol error** -- The connection read loop\nnow closes the underlying `net.Conn` when it encounters an\n`InvalidControlFrame` error, preventing further exploitation on the\nsame connection.\n\u00a0\n**Additional hardening:**\n\u00a0\n- **Write-side bounds checks** -- All frame write methods now verify\nthat payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the\nlibrary from producing invalid frames.\n\u00a0\n**Configurable limits:**\n\u00a0\n- Callers can adjust the defaults using `NewConnectionWithOptions` or\nthe lower-level `spdy.NewFramerWithOptions` with functional options:\n`WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize`, `WithMaxHeaderFieldSize`, and\n`WithMaxHeaderCount`.\n\u00a0",
"id": "GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:36:28Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T20:44:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/security/advisories/GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/commit/ef6121f62c730110bf5ae604a865a8613bfb787f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/spdystream/releases/tag/v0.5.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SpdyStream: DOS on CRI"
}
GHSA-VFFH-X6R8-XX99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-13 16:39 – Updated: 2026-04-27 16:21Impact
Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via crafted metric names in the Prometheus web UI:
- Old React UI + New Mantine UI: When a user hovers over a chart tooltip on the Graph page, metric names containing HTML/JavaScript are injected into
innerHTMLwithout escaping, causing arbitrary script execution in the user's browser. - Old React UI only: When a user opens the Metric Explorer (globe icon next to the PromQL expression input field), and a metric name containing HTML/JavaScript is rendered in the fuzzy search results, it is injected into
innerHTMLwithout escaping, causing arbitrary script execution in the user's browser. - Old React UI only: When a user views a heatmap chart and hovers over a cell, the
lelabel values of the underlying histogram buckets are interpolated intoinnerHTMLwithout escaping. Whileleis conventionally a numeric bucket boundary, Prometheus does not enforce this — arbitrary UTF-8 strings are accepted as label values, allowing script injection via a crafted scrape target or remote write.
With Prometheus v3.x defaulting to UTF-8 metric and label name validation, characters like <, >, and " are now valid in metric names and labels, making this exploitable.
An attacker who can inject metrics (via a compromised scrape target, remote write, or OTLP receiver endpoint) can execute JavaScript in the browser of any Prometheus user who views the metric in the Graph UI. From the XSS context, an attacker could for example:
- Read
/api/v1/status/configto extract sensitive configuration (although credentials / secrets are redacted by the server) - Call
/-/quitto shut down Prometheus (only if--web.enable-lifecycleis set) - Call
/api/v1/admin/tsdb/delete_seriesto delete data (only if--web.enable-admin-apiis set) - Exfiltrate metric data to an external server
Both the new Mantine UI and the old React UI are affected. The vulnerable code paths are:
web/ui/mantine-ui/src/pages/query/uPlotChartHelpers.ts— tooltipinnerHTMLwith unescapedlabels.__name__web/ui/react-app/src/pages/graph/GraphHelpers.ts— tooltip content with unescapedlabels.__name__web/ui/react-app/src/pages/graph/MetricsExplorer.tsx— fuzzy search results rendered viadangerouslySetInnerHTMLwithout sanitizationweb/ui/react-app/src/vendor/flot/jquery.flot.heatmap.js— heatmap tooltip with unescaped label values
Patches
A patch has been published in Prometheus 3.5.2 LTS and Prometheus 3.11.2. The fix applies escapeHTML() to all user-controlled values (metric names and label values) before inserting them into innerHTML. This advisory will be updated with the patched version once released.
Workarounds
- If using the remote write receiver (
--web.enable-remote-write-receiver), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources. - If using the OTLP receiver (
--web.enable-otlp-receiver), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources. - Ensure scrape targets are trusted and not under attacker control.
- Do not enable admin / mutating API endpoints (e.g.
--web.enable-admin-apiorweb.enable-lifecycle) in cases where you cannot prevent untrusted data from being ingested. - Users should avoid clicking untrusted links, especially those containing functions such as label_replace, as they may generate poisoned label names and values.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to @gladiator9797 (Duc Anh Nguyen from TinyxLab) for reporting this.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.6.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.311.2-0.20260410083055-07c6232d159b"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40179"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-13T16:39:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-15T23:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nStored cross-site scripting (XSS) via crafted metric names in the Prometheus web UI:\n\n* **Old React UI + New Mantine UI:** When a user hovers over a chart tooltip on the Graph page, metric names containing HTML/JavaScript are injected into `innerHTML` without escaping, causing arbitrary script execution in the user\u0027s browser.\n* **Old React UI only:** When a user opens the Metric Explorer (globe icon next to the PromQL expression input field), and a metric name containing HTML/JavaScript is rendered in the fuzzy search results, it is injected into `innerHTML` without escaping, causing arbitrary script execution in the user\u0027s browser.\n* **Old React UI only:** When a user views a heatmap chart and hovers over a cell, the `le` label values of the underlying histogram buckets are interpolated into `innerHTML` without escaping. While `le` is conventionally a numeric bucket boundary, Prometheus does not enforce this \u2014 arbitrary UTF-8 strings are accepted as label values, allowing script injection via a crafted scrape target or remote write.\n\nWith Prometheus v3.x defaulting to UTF-8 metric and label name validation, characters like `\u003c`, `\u003e`, and `\"` are now valid in metric names and labels, making this exploitable.\n\nAn attacker who can inject metrics (via a compromised scrape target, remote write, or OTLP receiver endpoint) can execute JavaScript in the browser of any Prometheus user who views the metric in the Graph UI. From the XSS context, an attacker could for example:\n\n- Read `/api/v1/status/config` to extract sensitive configuration (although credentials / secrets are redacted by the server)\n- Call `/-/quit` to shut down Prometheus (only if `--web.enable-lifecycle` is set)\n- Call `/api/v1/admin/tsdb/delete_series` to delete data (only if `--web.enable-admin-api` is set)\n- Exfiltrate metric data to an external server\n\nBoth the new Mantine UI and the old React UI are affected. The vulnerable code paths are:\n\n- `web/ui/mantine-ui/src/pages/query/uPlotChartHelpers.ts` \u2014 tooltip `innerHTML` with unescaped `labels.__name__`\n- `web/ui/react-app/src/pages/graph/GraphHelpers.ts` \u2014 tooltip content with unescaped `labels.__name__`\n- `web/ui/react-app/src/pages/graph/MetricsExplorer.tsx` \u2014 fuzzy search results rendered via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` without sanitization\n- `web/ui/react-app/src/vendor/flot/jquery.flot.heatmap.js` \u2014 heatmap tooltip with unescaped label values\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch has been published in Prometheus 3.5.2 LTS and Prometheus 3.11.2. The fix applies `escapeHTML()` to all user-controlled values (metric names and label values) before inserting them into `innerHTML`. This advisory will be updated with the patched version once released.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- If using the remote write receiver (`--web.enable-remote-write-receiver`), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources.\n- If using the OTLP receiver (`--web.enable-otlp-receiver`), ensure it is not exposed to untrusted sources.\n- Ensure scrape targets are trusted and not under attacker control.\n- Do not enable admin / mutating API endpoints (e.g. `--web.enable-admin-api` or `web.enable-lifecycle`) in cases where you cannot prevent untrusted data from being ingested.\n- Users should avoid clicking untrusted links, especially those containing functions such as label_replace, as they may generate poisoned label names and values.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to @gladiator9797 (Duc Anh Nguyen from TinyxLab) for reporting this.",
"id": "GHSA-vffh-x6r8-xx99",
"modified": "2026-04-27T16:21:30Z",
"published": "2026-04-13T16:39:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/security/advisories/GHSA-vffh-x6r8-xx99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/pull/18506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/commit/07c6232d159bfb474a077788be184d87adcfac3c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Prometheus has Stored XSS via metric names and label values in Prometheus web UI tooltips and metrics explorer"
}
GHSA-WG65-39GG-5WFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 19:33 – Updated: 2026-05-05 19:33Impact
Users who use Azure AD remote write with OAuth authentication are impacted.
The client_secret field in the Azure AD remote write OAuth configuration (storage/remote/azuread) was typed as string instead of Secret. Prometheus redacts fields of type Secret when serving the configuration via the /-/config HTTP API endpoint. Because the field was a plain string, the Azure OAuth client secret was exposed in plaintext to any user or process with access to that endpoint.
Patches
The problem has been patched by changing ClientSecret in OAuthConfig to Secret. Users should upgrade to 3.11.3 or 3.5.3 LTS.
Workarounds
Users who can not upgrade can switch to Managed Identity or Workload Identity authentication for Azure AD remote write, which do not involve a client secret.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.45.2"
},
{
"fixed": "0.311.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42151"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-312"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:33:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T19:16:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nUsers who use Azure AD remote write with OAuth authentication are impacted.\n\nThe `client_secret` field in the Azure AD remote write OAuth configuration (`storage/remote/azuread`) was typed as `string` instead of `Secret`. Prometheus redacts fields of type `Secret` when serving the configuration via the `/-/config` HTTP API endpoint. Because the field was a plain string, the Azure OAuth client secret was exposed in plaintext to any user or process with access to that endpoint.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched by changing `ClientSecret` in `OAuthConfig` to `Secret`. Users should upgrade to 3.11.3 or 3.5.3 LTS.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers who can not upgrade can switch to Managed Identity or Workload Identity authentication for Azure AD remote write, which do not involve a client secret.",
"id": "GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj",
"modified": "2026-05-05T19:33:47Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T19:33:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/security/advisories/GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/pull/18587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/pull/18590"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/releases/tag/v3.11.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/releases/tag/v3.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prometheus Azure AD remote write OAuth client secret exposed via config API"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.