cve-2022-48892
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-08-21 06:10
Modified
2024-12-19 08:09
Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()
Since commit 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be
restricted on asymmetric systems"), the setting and clearing of
user_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,
dup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock
protection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another
process, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at
the same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and
possibly double-free in arm64 kernel.
Commit 8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested
cpumask") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never
be cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced
in commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in
do_set_cpus_allowed()") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
do_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.
Fix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly
cloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the
user_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.
Note to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.
Just copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.
References
Impacted products
{ containers: { adp: [ { metrics: [ { other: { content: { id: "CVE-2022-48892", options: [ { Exploitation: "none", }, { Automatable: "no", }, { "Technical Impact": "partial", }, ], role: "CISA Coordinator", timestamp: "2024-09-10T16:04:18.997658Z", version: "2.0.3", }, type: "ssvc", }, }, ], providerMetadata: { dateUpdated: "2024-09-12T17:33:06.281Z", orgId: "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", shortName: "CISA-ADP", }, title: "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", }, ], cna: { affected: [ { defaultStatus: "unaffected", product: "Linux", programFiles: [ "kernel/sched/core.c", ], repo: "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", vendor: "Linux", versions: [ { lessThan: "b22faa21b6230d5eccd233e1b7e0026a5002b287", status: "affected", version: "07ec77a1d4e82526e1588979fff2f024f8e96df2", versionType: "git", }, { lessThan: "7b5cc7fd1789ea5dbb942c9f8207b076d365badc", status: "affected", version: "07ec77a1d4e82526e1588979fff2f024f8e96df2", versionType: "git", }, { lessThan: "87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8", status: "affected", version: "07ec77a1d4e82526e1588979fff2f024f8e96df2", versionType: "git", }, ], }, { defaultStatus: "affected", product: "Linux", programFiles: [ "kernel/sched/core.c", ], repo: "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", vendor: "Linux", versions: [ { status: "affected", version: "5.15", }, { lessThan: "5.15", status: "unaffected", version: "0", versionType: "semver", }, { lessThanOrEqual: "5.15.*", status: "unaffected", version: "5.15.89", versionType: "semver", }, { lessThanOrEqual: "6.1.*", status: "unaffected", version: "6.1.7", versionType: "semver", }, { lessThanOrEqual: "*", status: "unaffected", version: "6.2", versionType: "original_commit_for_fix", }, ], }, ], descriptions: [ { lang: "en", value: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()\n\nSince commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\"sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be\nrestricted on asymmetric systems\"), the setting and clearing of\nuser_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,\ndup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock\nprotection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another\nprocess, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at\nthe same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\n__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and\npossibly double-free in arm64 kernel.\n\nCommit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\"sched: Always preserve the user requested\ncpumask\") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never\nbe cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced\nin commit 851a723e45d1 (\"sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in\ndo_set_cpus_allowed()\") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\ndo_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.\n\nFix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly\ncloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the\nuser_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.\n\nNote to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.\nJust copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.", }, ], providerMetadata: { dateUpdated: "2024-12-19T08:09:59.365Z", orgId: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", shortName: "Linux", }, references: [ { url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b22faa21b6230d5eccd233e1b7e0026a5002b287", }, { url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5cc7fd1789ea5dbb942c9f8207b076d365badc", }, { url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8", }, ], title: "sched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()", x_generator: { engine: "bippy-5f407fcff5a0", }, }, }, cveMetadata: { assignerOrgId: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", assignerShortName: "Linux", cveId: "CVE-2022-48892", datePublished: "2024-08-21T06:10:24.407Z", dateReserved: "2024-08-21T06:06:23.290Z", dateUpdated: "2024-12-19T08:09:59.365Z", state: "PUBLISHED", }, dataType: "CVE_RECORD", dataVersion: "5.1", "vulnerability-lookup:meta": { fkie_nvd: { configurations: "[{\"nodes\": [{\"operator\": \"OR\", \"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"vulnerable\": true, \"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.15\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"5.15.89\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"AF60D859-5B7E-4CFA-9318-AFEFAB130E64\"}, {\"vulnerable\": true, \"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.16\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.1.7\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"9275C81F-AE96-4CDB-AD20-7DBD36E5D909\"}]}]}]", descriptions: "[{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nsched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()\\n\\nSince commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\\\"sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be\\nrestricted on asymmetric systems\\\"), the setting and clearing of\\nuser_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,\\ndup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock\\nprotection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another\\nprocess, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at\\nthe same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\n__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and\\npossibly double-free in arm64 kernel.\\n\\nCommit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\\\"sched: Always preserve the user requested\\ncpumask\\\") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never\\nbe cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced\\nin commit 851a723e45d1 (\\\"sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed()\\\") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.\\n\\nFix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly\\ncloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the\\nuser_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.\\n\\nNote to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.\\nJust copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"En el kernel de Linux, se resolvi\\u00f3 la siguiente vulnerabilidad: sched/core: corrige el error de use-after-free en dup_user_cpus_ptr() Desde el commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\\\"sched: permitir que la afinidad de la CPU de la tarea se restrinja en sistemas asim\\u00e9tricos\\\"), la configuraci\\u00f3n y La limpieza de user_cpus_ptr se realiza en pi_lock para la arquitectura arm64. Sin embargo, dup_user_cpus_ptr() accede a user_cpus_ptr sin ninguna protecci\\u00f3n de bloqueo. Dado que sched_setaffinity() puede invocarse desde otro proceso, el proceso que se est\\u00e1 modificando puede estar pasando por fork() al mismo tiempo. Cuando se corre con la limpieza de user_cpus_ptr en __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), puede llevar a una liberaci\\u00f3n posterior del usuario y posiblemente a una liberaci\\u00f3n doble en el kernel arm64. El commit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\\\"programaci\\u00f3n: conservar siempre la m\\u00e1scara de CPU solicitada por el usuario\\\") soluciona este problema ya que user_cpus_ptr, una vez configurado, nunca se borrar\\u00e1 durante la vida de una tarea. Sin embargo, este error se reintrodujo en el commit 851a723e45d1 (\\\"sched: borrar siempre user_cpus_ptr en do_set_cpus_allowed()\\\") que permite borrar user_cpus_ptr en do_set_cpus_allowed(). Esta vez afectar\\u00e1 a todos los arcos. Corrija este error borrando siempre el user_cpus_ptr de la tarea reci\\u00e9n clonada/bifurcada antes de que comience el proceso de copia y verifique el estado de user_cpus_ptr de la tarea fuente en pi_lock. Nota para las versiones estables: este parche no se aplicar\\u00e1 a las versiones estables. Simplemente copie la nueva funci\\u00f3n dup_user_cpus_ptr().\"}]", id: "CVE-2022-48892", lastModified: "2024-08-29T02:35:56.343", metrics: "{\"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"cvssData\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9}]}", published: "2024-08-21T07:15:05.420", references: "[{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5cc7fd1789ea5dbb942c9f8207b076d365badc\", \"source\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"tags\": [\"Patch\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8\", \"source\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"tags\": [\"Patch\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b22faa21b6230d5eccd233e1b7e0026a5002b287\", \"source\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"tags\": [\"Patch\"]}]", sourceIdentifier: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", vulnStatus: "Analyzed", weaknesses: "[{\"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-415\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-416\"}]}]", }, nvd: "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2022-48892\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2024-08-21T07:15:05.420\",\"lastModified\":\"2024-08-29T02:35:56.343\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Analyzed\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nsched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()\\n\\nSince commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\\\"sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be\\nrestricted on asymmetric systems\\\"), the setting and clearing of\\nuser_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,\\ndup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock\\nprotection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another\\nprocess, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at\\nthe same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\n__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and\\npossibly double-free in arm64 kernel.\\n\\nCommit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\\\"sched: Always preserve the user requested\\ncpumask\\\") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never\\nbe cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced\\nin commit 851a723e45d1 (\\\"sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed()\\\") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.\\n\\nFix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly\\ncloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the\\nuser_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.\\n\\nNote to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.\\nJust copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: sched/core: corrige el error de use-after-free en dup_user_cpus_ptr() Desde el commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\\\"sched: permitir que la afinidad de la CPU de la tarea se restrinja en sistemas asimétricos\\\"), la configuración y La limpieza de user_cpus_ptr se realiza en pi_lock para la arquitectura arm64. Sin embargo, dup_user_cpus_ptr() accede a user_cpus_ptr sin ninguna protección de bloqueo. Dado que sched_setaffinity() puede invocarse desde otro proceso, el proceso que se está modificando puede estar pasando por fork() al mismo tiempo. Cuando se corre con la limpieza de user_cpus_ptr en __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), puede llevar a una liberación posterior del usuario y posiblemente a una liberación doble en el kernel arm64. El commit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\\\"programación: conservar siempre la máscara de CPU solicitada por el usuario\\\") soluciona este problema ya que user_cpus_ptr, una vez configurado, nunca se borrará durante la vida de una tarea. Sin embargo, este error se reintrodujo en el commit 851a723e45d1 (\\\"sched: borrar siempre user_cpus_ptr en do_set_cpus_allowed()\\\") que permite borrar user_cpus_ptr en do_set_cpus_allowed(). Esta vez afectará a todos los arcos. Corrija este error borrando siempre el user_cpus_ptr de la tarea recién clonada/bifurcada antes de que comience el proceso de copia y verifique el estado de user_cpus_ptr de la tarea fuente en pi_lock. Nota para las versiones estables: este parche no se aplicará a las versiones estables. Simplemente copie la nueva función dup_user_cpus_ptr().\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-415\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-416\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"5.15\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"5.15.89\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"AF60D859-5B7E-4CFA-9318-AFEFAB130E64\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"5.16\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.1.7\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"9275C81F-AE96-4CDB-AD20-7DBD36E5D909\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5cc7fd1789ea5dbb942c9f8207b076d365badc\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b22faa21b6230d5eccd233e1b7e0026a5002b287\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}", vulnrichment: { containers: "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2022-48892\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2024-09-10T16:04:18.997658Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-09-11T12:42:14.840Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"sched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()\", \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"07ec77a1d4e8\", \"lessThan\": \"b22faa21b623\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"07ec77a1d4e8\", \"lessThan\": \"7b5cc7fd1789\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"07ec77a1d4e8\", \"lessThan\": \"87ca4f9efbd7\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"kernel/sched/core.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"5.15\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"5.15\", \"versionType\": \"custom\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"5.15.89\", \"versionType\": \"custom\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"5.15.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.1.7\", \"versionType\": \"custom\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.1.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.2\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"kernel/sched/core.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b22faa21b6230d5eccd233e1b7e0026a5002b287\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5cc7fd1789ea5dbb942c9f8207b076d365badc\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87ca4f9efbd7cc649ff43b87970888f2812945b8\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-c9c4e1df01b2\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nsched/core: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()\\n\\nSince commit 07ec77a1d4e8 (\\\"sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be\\nrestricted on asymmetric systems\\\"), the setting and clearing of\\nuser_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,\\ndup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock\\nprotection. Since sched_setaffinity() can be invoked from another\\nprocess, the process being modified may be undergoing fork() at\\nthe same time. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\n__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and\\npossibly double-free in arm64 kernel.\\n\\nCommit 8f9ea86fdf99 (\\\"sched: Always preserve the user requested\\ncpumask\\\") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never\\nbe cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced\\nin commit 851a723e45d1 (\\\"sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed()\\\") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in\\ndo_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.\\n\\nFix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly\\ncloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the\\nuser_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.\\n\\nNote to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.\\nJust copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-08-21T06:10:24.407Z\"}}}", cveMetadata: "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2022-48892\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-09-12T17:33:06.281Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-08-21T06:06:23.290Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2024-08-21T06:10:24.407Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}", dataType: "CVE_RECORD", dataVersion: "5.1", }, }, }
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
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- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.