CVE-2023-37895 (GCVE-0-2023-37895)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-07-25 14:02 – Updated: 2025-02-13 17:01
VLAI?
Summary
Java object deserialization issue in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone on all platforms allows attacker to remotely execute code via RMIVersions up to (including) 2.20.10 (stable branch) and 2.21.17 (unstable branch) use the component "commons-beanutils", which contains a class that can be used for remote code execution over RMI.
Users are advised to immediately update to versions 2.20.11 or 2.21.18. Note that earlier stable branches (1.0.x .. 2.18.x) have been EOLd already and do not receive updates anymore.
In general, RMI support can expose vulnerabilities by the mere presence of an exploitable class on the classpath. Even if Jackrabbit itself does not contain any code known to be exploitable anymore, adding other components to your server can expose the same type of problem. We therefore recommend to disable RMI access altogether (see further below), and will discuss deprecating RMI support in future Jackrabbit releases.
How to check whether RMI support is enabledRMI support can be over an RMI-specific TCP port, and over an HTTP binding. Both are by default enabled in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone.
The native RMI protocol by default uses port 1099. To check whether it is enabled, tools like "netstat" can be used to check.
RMI-over-HTTP in Jackrabbit by default uses the path "/rmi". So when running standalone on port 8080, check whether an HTTP GET request on localhost:8080/rmi returns 404 (not enabled) or 200 (enabled). Note that the HTTP path may be different when the webapp is deployed in a container as non-root context, in which case the prefix is under the user's control.
Turning off RMIFind web.xml (either in JAR/WAR file or in unpacked web application folder), and remove the declaration and the mapping definition for the RemoteBindingServlet:
<servlet>
<servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>org.apache.jackrabbit.servlet.remote.RemoteBindingServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/rmi</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>
Find the bootstrap.properties file (in $REPOSITORY_HOME), and set
rmi.enabled=false
and also remove
rmi.host
rmi.port
rmi.url-pattern
If there is no file named bootstrap.properties in $REPOSITORY_HOME, it is located somewhere in the classpath. In this case, place a copy in $REPOSITORY_HOME and modify it as explained.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp) |
Affected:
2.21.0 , < 2.21.18
(maven)
Affected: 1.0.0 , < 2.20.11 (maven) |
|||||||
|
|||||||||
Credits
Siebene@
Michael Dürig
Manfred Baedke
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"id": "CVE-2023-37895",
"lastModified": "2024-11-21T08:12:24.840",
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"published": "2023-07-25T15:15:13.587",
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"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": "[{\"source\": \"security@apache.org\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-502\"}]}]"
},
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In this case, place a copy in $REPOSITORY_HOME and modify it as explained.\\n\\n\\u00a0\\n\\n\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003ch1\u003eJava object deserialization issue in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone on all platforms allows attacker to remotely execute code via RMI\u003c/h1\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eVersions up to (including) 2.20.10 (stable branch) and 2.21.17 (unstable branch) use the component \\\"commons-beanutils\\\", which contains a class that can be used for remote code execution over RMI.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eUsers are advised to immediately update to versions 2.20.11 or 2.21.18. Note that earlier stable branches (1.0.x .. 2.18.x) have been EOLd already and do not receive updates anymore.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn general, RMI support can expose vulnerabilities by the mere presence of an exploitable class on the classpath. 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"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2023-37895\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-10-02T19:34:47.387Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2023-07-10T17:49:13.901Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"datePublished\": \"2023-07-25T14:02:10.036Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"apache\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
}
}
Loading…
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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