cve-2024-1544
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-08-27 18:44
Modified
2024-08-27 19:14
Severity ?
4.1 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Summary
Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then truncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the order of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used during the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two digits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of n and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. Observing the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow revealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of k. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a significant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction methods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.
References
facts@wolfssl.comhttps://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.7.2-stable
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Show details on NVD website

To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2024-1544",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2024-08-27T19:14:00.889289Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-27T19:14:35.190Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "wolfSSL",
          "programFiles": [
            "wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c"
          ],
          "vendor": "wolfSSL",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.6.4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "Release"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "user": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
          "value": "Florian Sieck, Luca Wilke and Thomas Eisenbarth from Universit\u00e4t zu L\u00fcbeck"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2024-07-08T17:30:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \u003cbr\u003etruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \u003cbr\u003eorder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \u003cbr\u003eduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \u003cbr\u003edigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \u003cbr\u003en and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \u003cbr\u003eObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \u003cbr\u003erevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \u003cbr\u003ek. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \u003cbr\u003esignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \u003cbr\u003emethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \ntruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \norder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \nduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \ndigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \nn and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \nObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \nrevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \nk. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \nsignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \nmethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Information Disclosure"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-203",
              "description": "CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2024-08-27T18:44:52.770Z",
        "orgId": "50d2cd11-d01a-48ed-9441-5bfce9d63b27",
        "shortName": "wolfSSL"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.7.2-stable"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "ECDSA nonce bias caused by truncation",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.1.0-dev"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "50d2cd11-d01a-48ed-9441-5bfce9d63b27",
    "assignerShortName": "wolfSSL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2024-1544",
    "datePublished": "2024-08-27T18:44:52.770Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-02-15T17:38:16.603Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-08-27T19:14:35.190Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "fkie_nvd": {
      "descriptions": "[{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \\ntruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \\norder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \\nduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \\ndigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \\nn and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \\nObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \\nrevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \\nk. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \\nsignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \\nmethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"Generar el nonce k ECDSA muestra un n\\u00famero aleatorio r y luego trunca esta aleatoriedad con una reducci\\u00f3n modular mod n donde n es el orden de la curva el\\u00edptica. Significado k = r mod n. La divisi\\u00f3n utilizada durante la reducci\\u00f3n estima un factor q_e dividiendo los dos d\\u00edgitos superiores (un d\\u00edgito que tiene, por ejemplo, un tama\\u00f1o de 8 bytes) de r por el d\\u00edgito superior de n y luego disminuye q_e en un bucle hasta que tenga el tama\\u00f1o correcto. Observar el n\\u00famero de veces que q_e disminuye a trav\\u00e9s de un canal lateral revelador de flujo de control revela un sesgo en los bits m\\u00e1s significativos de k. Dependiendo de la curva, esto es un sesgo insignificante o un sesgo significativo lo suficientemente grande como para reconstruir k con m\\u00e9todos de reducci\\u00f3n de celos\\u00eda. Para SECP160R1, por ejemplo, encontramos un sesgo de 15 bits.\"}]",
      "id": "CVE-2024-1544",
      "lastModified": "2024-08-28T12:57:39.090",
      "metrics": "{\"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"source\": \"facts@wolfssl.com\", \"type\": \"Secondary\", \"cvssData\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\", \"baseScore\": 4.1, \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"attackComplexity\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"HIGH\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 0.5, \"impactScore\": 3.6}]}",
      "published": "2024-08-27T19:15:16.547",
      "references": "[{\"url\": \"https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.7.2-stable\", \"source\": \"facts@wolfssl.com\"}]",
      "sourceIdentifier": "facts@wolfssl.com",
      "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
      "weaknesses": "[{\"source\": \"facts@wolfssl.com\", \"type\": \"Secondary\", \"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-203\"}]}]"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2024-1544\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"facts@wolfssl.com\",\"published\":\"2024-08-27T19:15:16.547\",\"lastModified\":\"2024-08-28T12:57:39.090\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Awaiting Analysis\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \\ntruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \\norder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \\nduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \\ndigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \\nn and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \\nObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \\nrevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \\nk. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \\nsignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \\nmethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"Generar el nonce k ECDSA muestra un n\u00famero aleatorio r y luego trunca esta aleatoriedad con una reducci\u00f3n modular mod n donde n es el orden de la curva el\u00edptica. Significado k = r mod n. La divisi\u00f3n utilizada durante la reducci\u00f3n estima un factor q_e dividiendo los dos d\u00edgitos superiores (un d\u00edgito que tiene, por ejemplo, un tama\u00f1o de 8 bytes) de r por el d\u00edgito superior de n y luego disminuye q_e en un bucle hasta que tenga el tama\u00f1o correcto. Observar el n\u00famero de veces que q_e disminuye a trav\u00e9s de un canal lateral revelador de flujo de control revela un sesgo en los bits m\u00e1s significativos de k. Dependiendo de la curva, esto es un sesgo insignificante o un sesgo significativo lo suficientemente grande como para reconstruir k con m\u00e9todos de reducci\u00f3n de celos\u00eda. Para SECP160R1, por ejemplo, encontramos un sesgo de 15 bits.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"facts@wolfssl.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\",\"baseScore\":4.1,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"HIGH\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"HIGH\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"NONE\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":0.5,\"impactScore\":3.6}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"facts@wolfssl.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-203\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.7.2-stable\",\"source\":\"facts@wolfssl.com\"}]}}",
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2024-1544\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2024-08-27T19:14:00.889289Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-08-27T19:14:28.355Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"ECDSA nonce bias caused by truncation\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"EXTERNAL\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"user\": \"00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000\", \"value\": \"Florian Sieck, Luca Wilke and Thomas Eisenbarth from Universit\\u00e4t zu L\\u00fcbeck\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Information Disclosure\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 4.1, \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"HIGH\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"wolfSSL\", \"product\": \"wolfSSL\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"versionType\": \"Release\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"5.6.4\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unknown\"}], \"datePublic\": \"2024-07-08T17:30:00.000Z\", \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.7.2-stable\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"Vulnogram 0.1.0-dev\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \\ntruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \\norder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \\nduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \\ndigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \\nn and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \\nObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \\nrevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \\nk. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \\nsignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \\nmethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then \u003cbr\u003etruncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the \u003cbr\u003eorder of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used \u003cbr\u003eduring the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two \u003cbr\u003edigits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of \u003cbr\u003en and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. \u003cbr\u003eObserving the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow \u003cbr\u003erevealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of \u003cbr\u003ek. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a \u003cbr\u003esignificant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction \u003cbr\u003emethods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-203\", \"description\": \"CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"50d2cd11-d01a-48ed-9441-5bfce9d63b27\", \"shortName\": \"wolfSSL\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-08-27T18:44:52.770Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2024-1544\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-08-27T19:14:35.190Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-02-15T17:38:16.603Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"50d2cd11-d01a-48ed-9441-5bfce9d63b27\", \"datePublished\": \"2024-08-27T18:44:52.770Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"wolfSSL\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.1"
    }
  }
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.