{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0-34.0.0.41.oe2403"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nrtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validation\r\n\r\nEach attribute inside a nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST is assumed to be a\nstruct ifla_vf_vlan_info so the size of such attribute needs to be at least\nof sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) which is 14 bytes.\nThe current size validation in do_setvfinfo is against NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes)\nwhich is less than sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) so this validation\nis not enough and a too small attribute might be cast to a\nstruct ifla_vf_vlan_info, this might result in an out of bands\nread access when accessing the saved (casted) entry in ivvl.(CVE-2024-36017)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnull_blk: fix null-ptr-dereference while configuring \u0026apos;power\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;submit_queues\u0026apos;\r\n\r\nWriting \u0026apos;power\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;submit_queues\u0026apos; concurrently will trigger kernel\npanic:\r\n\r\nTest script:\r\n\r\nmodprobe null_blk nr_devices=0\nmkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0\nwhile true; do echo 1 \u0026gt; submit_queues; echo 4 \u0026gt; submit_queues; done \u0026amp;\nwhile true; do echo 1 \u0026gt; power; echo 0 \u0026gt; power; done\r\n\r\nTest result:\r\n\r\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148\nOops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\nRIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n lock_acquire+0x121/0x450\n down_write+0x5f/0x1d0\n simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0\n blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100\n blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720\n nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]\n nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk]\n configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0\n vfs_write+0x326/0x730\n ksys_write+0x74/0x150\r\n\r\nThis is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with\nblk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues():\r\n\r\nnullb_device_power_store\tnullb_apply_submit_queues\n null_del_dev\n del_gendisk\n\t\t\t\t nullb_update_nr_hw_queues\n\t\t\t\t  if (!dev-\u0026gt;nullb)\n\t\t\t\t  // still set while gendisk is deleted\n\t\t\t\t   return 0\n\t\t\t\t  blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues\n dev-\u0026gt;nullb = NULL\r\n\r\nFix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect\nnullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs.(CVE-2024-36478)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntracing/probes: fix error check in parse_btf_field()\r\n\r\nbtf_find_struct_member() might return NULL or an error via the\nERR_PTR() macro. However, its caller in parse_btf_field() only checks\nfor the NULL condition. Fix this by using IS_ERR() and returning the\nerror up the stack.(CVE-2024-36481)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: lpfc: Release hbalock before calling lpfc_worker_wake_up()\r\n\r\nlpfc_worker_wake_up() calls the lpfc_work_done() routine, which takes the\nhbalock.  Thus, lpfc_worker_wake_up() should not be called while holding the\nhbalock to avoid potential deadlock.(CVE-2024-36924)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs\r\n\r\nSKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become\ninvalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or\nskb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later\ncall to skb_gso_segment.(CVE-2024-36929)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ns390/cio: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated\r\n\r\nCurrently, we allocate a lbuf-sized kernel buffer and copy lbuf from\nuserspace to that buffer. Later, we use scanf on this buffer but we don\u0026apos;t\nensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead to\nOOB read when using scanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul instead.(CVE-2024-36931)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amdkfd: range check cp bad op exception interrupts\r\n\r\nDue to a CP interrupt bug, bad packet garbage exception codes are raised.\nDo a range check so that the debugger and runtime do not receive garbage\ncodes.\nUpdate the user api to guard exception code type checking as well.(CVE-2024-36951)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nblk-cgroup: fix list corruption from reorder of WRITE -\u0026gt;lqueued\r\n\r\n__blkcg_rstat_flush() can be run anytime, especially when blk_cgroup_bio_start\nis being executed.\r\n\r\nIf WRITE of `-\u0026gt;lqueued` is re-ordered with READ of \u0026apos;bisc-\u0026gt;lnode.next\u0026apos; in\nthe loop of __blkcg_rstat_flush(), `next_bisc` can be assigned with one\nstat instance being added in blk_cgroup_bio_start(), then the local\nlist in __blkcg_rstat_flush() could be corrupted.\r\n\r\nFix the issue by adding one barrier.(CVE-2024-38384)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6\r\n\r\nOVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.\r\n\r\nOVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure\nwith the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,\netc.  Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the\nkeys from the packet headers.\r\n\r\nWhenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it\nfirst zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery\ninformation even if it is not an ND packet.\r\n\r\nIt is an \u0026apos;ipv6.nd\u0026apos; field.  However, the \u0026apos;ipv6\u0026apos; is a union that shares\nthe space between \u0026apos;nd\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;ct_orig\u0026apos; that holds the original tuple\nconntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.\r\n\r\nND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it\u0026apos;s fine to\nshare the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of\nICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.\r\n\r\nThe issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination\naddress being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to\nincorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions\nin case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back\nto userspace.\r\n\r\nND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing\nthem should be fine.  Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to\navoid the issue.\r\n\r\nInitializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet\nmay not contain all the options.\r\n\r\nThe issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn\u0026apos;t\naffect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because\nin this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is\nalready parsed.(CVE-2024-38558)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount\r\n\r\nWhen a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that\nlockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically.  Commit\nfb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem\nunmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn\u0026apos;t want to unlock and then\nrelease the lockspace.  This didn\u0026apos;t take the bast callbacks for\nasynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain\nactive until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.\r\n\r\nTo prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the\nglocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release\nthe lockspace, and only then free those glocks.\r\n\r\nAs an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if\nthe receiving glock is dead.(CVE-2024-38570)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amdgpu/mes: fix use-after-free issue\r\n\r\nDelete fence fallback timer to fix the ramdom\nuse-after-free issue.\r\n\r\nv2: move to amdgpu_mes.c(CVE-2024-38581)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix use-after-free of timer for log writer thread\r\n\r\nPatch series \u0026quot;nilfs2: fix log writer related issues\u0026quot;.\r\n\r\nThis bug fix series covers three nilfs2 log writer-related issues,\nincluding a timer use-after-free issue and potential deadlock issue on\nunmount, and a potential freeze issue in event synchronization found\nduring their analysis.  Details are described in each commit log.\r\n\r\n\nThis patch (of 3):\r\n\r\nA use-after-free issue has been reported regarding the timer sc_timer on\nthe nilfs_sc_info structure.\r\n\r\nThe problem is that even though it is used to wake up a sleeping log\nwriter thread, sc_timer is not shut down until the nilfs_sc_info structure\nis about to be freed, and is used regardless of the thread\u0026apos;s lifetime.\r\n\r\nFix this issue by limiting the use of sc_timer only while the log writer\nthread is alive.(CVE-2024-38583)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nr8169: Fix possible ring buffer corruption on fragmented Tx packets.\r\n\r\nAn issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented\npackets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring\nbuffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null\naddress.\r\n\r\nThis was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags\nwhich may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware\nquirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2().\r\n\r\nTo fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been\napplied.(CVE-2024-38586)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nopenrisc: traps: Don\u0026apos;t send signals to kernel mode threads\r\n\r\nOpenRISC exception handling sends signals to user processes on floating\npoint exceptions and trap instructions (for debugging) among others.\nThere is a bug where the trap handling logic may send signals to kernel\nthreads, we should not send these signals to kernel threads, if that\nhappens we treat it as an error.\r\n\r\nThis patch adds conditions to die if the kernel receives these\nexceptions in kernel mode code.(CVE-2024-38614)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: HCI: Remove HCI_AMP support\r\n\r\nSince BT_HS has been remove HCI_AMP controllers no longer has any use so\nremove it along with the capability of creating AMP controllers.\r\n\r\nSince we no longer need to differentiate between AMP and Primary\ncontrollers, as only HCI_PRIMARY is left, this also remove\nhdev-\u0026gt;dev_type altogether.(CVE-2024-38620)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvfio/pci: fix potential memory leak in vfio_intx_enable()\r\n\r\nIf vfio_irq_ctx_alloc() failed will lead to \u0026apos;name\u0026apos; memory leak.(CVE-2024-38632)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ns390/ap: Fix crash in AP internal function modify_bitmap()\r\n\r\nA system crash like this\r\n\r\n  Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403\n  Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.\n  AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d\n  Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n  Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ...\n  CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8\n  Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)\n  Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8)\n  R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3\n  Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3\n  000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0\n  000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff\n  000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8\n  Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047            brc     8,0000014b75e7b68a\n  0000014b75e7b600: 18b2                lr      %r11,%r2\n  #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a            brc     15,0000014b75e7b616\n  \u0026gt;0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6        laog    %r2,%r2,0(%r13)\n  0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001            lhi     %r6,1\n  0000014b75e7b610: 187b                lr      %r7,%r11\n  0000014b75e7b612: 84960021            brxh    %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654\n  0000014b75e7b616: 18e9                lr      %r14,%r9\n  Call Trace:\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b75e7b606\u0026gt;] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8\n  ([\u0026lt;0000014b75e7b5dc\u0026gt;] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8)\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b75e7b758\u0026gt;] apmask_store+0x68/0x140\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b75679196\u0026gt;] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b75598524\u0026gt;] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b7559894c\u0026gt;] ksys_write+0x74/0x100\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b7618a440\u0026gt;] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b761a3558\u0026gt;] system_call+0x70/0x98\n  INFO: lockdep is turned off.\n  Last Breaking-Event-Address:\n  [\u0026lt;0000014b75e7b636\u0026gt;] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops\r\n\r\noccured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value\n(like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX.\r\n\r\nThe fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The\ncorrect checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for\nthe internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow.(CVE-2024-38661)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nclk: bcm: dvp: Assign -\u0026gt;num before accessing -\u0026gt;hws\r\n\r\nCommit f316cdff8d67 (\u0026quot;clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with\n__counted_by\u0026quot;) annotated the hws member of \u0026apos;struct clk_hw_onecell_data\u0026apos;\nwith __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer about the number\nof elements in hws, so that it can warn when hws is accessed out of\nbounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be\ninitialized with the number of elements before the first array access\nhappens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the\ninitialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in\nclk_dvp_probe() due to -\u0026gt;num being assigned after -\u0026gt;hws has been\naccessed:\r\n\r\n  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2711-dvp.c:59:2\n  index 0 is out of range for type \u0026apos;struct clk_hw *[] __counted_by(num)\u0026apos; (aka \u0026apos;struct clk_hw *[]\u0026apos;)\r\n\r\nMove the -\u0026gt;num initialization to before the first access of -\u0026gt;hws, which\nclears up the warning.(CVE-2024-39462)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmedia: v4l: async: Fix notifier list entry init\r\n\r\nstruct v4l2_async_notifier has several list_head members, but only\nwaiting_list and done_list are initialized. notifier_entry was kept\n\u0026apos;zeroed\u0026apos; leading to an uninitialized list_head.\nThis results in a NULL-pointer dereference if csi2_async_register() fails,\ne.g. node for remote endpoint is disabled, and returns -ENOTCONN.\nThe following calls to v4l2_async_nf_unregister() results in a NULL\npointer dereference.\nAdd the missing list head initializer.(CVE-2024-39464)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncrypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer\r\n\r\nRSA text data uses variable length buffer allocated in software stack.\nCalling kfree on it causes undefined behaviour in subsequent operations.(CVE-2024-39478)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/i915/hwmon: Get rid of devm\r\n\r\nWhen both hwmon and hwmon drvdata (on which hwmon depends) are device\nmanaged resources, the expectation, on device unbind, is that hwmon will be\nreleased before drvdata. However, in i915 there are two separate code\npaths, which both release either drvdata or hwmon and either can be\nreleased before the other. These code paths (for device unbind) are as\nfollows (see also the bug referenced below):\r\n\r\nCall Trace:\nrelease_nodes+0x11/0x70\ndevres_release_group+0xb2/0x110\ncomponent_unbind_all+0x8d/0xa0\ncomponent_del+0xa5/0x140\nintel_pxp_tee_component_fini+0x29/0x40 [i915]\nintel_pxp_fini+0x33/0x80 [i915]\ni915_driver_remove+0x4c/0x120 [i915]\ni915_pci_remove+0x19/0x30 [i915]\npci_device_remove+0x32/0xa0\ndevice_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200\nunbind_store+0x9c/0xb0\r\n\r\nand\r\n\r\nCall Trace:\nrelease_nodes+0x11/0x70\ndevres_release_all+0x8a/0xc0\ndevice_unbind_cleanup+0x9/0x70\ndevice_release_driver_internal+0x1c1/0x200\nunbind_store+0x9c/0xb0\r\n\r\nThis means that in i915, if use devm, we cannot gurantee that hwmon will\nalways be released before drvdata. Which means that we have a uaf if hwmon\nsysfs is accessed when drvdata has been released but hwmon hasn\u0026apos;t.\r\n\r\nThe only way out of this seems to be do get rid of devm_ and release/free\neverything explicitly during device unbind.\r\n\r\nv2: Change commit message and other minor code changes\nv3: Cleanup from i915_hwmon_register on error (Armin Wolf)\nv4: Eliminate potential static analyzer warning (Rodrigo)\n    Eliminate fetch_and_zero (Jani)\nv5: Restore previous logic for ddat_gt-\u0026gt;hwmon_dev error return (Andi)(CVE-2024-39479)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nkdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete\r\n\r\nCurrently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb\nwill use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer.\nUnfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the\ndestination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously\nif the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in\nthe middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied\nbuffer.\r\n\r\nFix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy()\ncalls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space\nbefore we start moving characters around.(CVE-2024-39480)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbonding: Fix out-of-bounds read in bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set()\r\n\r\nIn function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval-\u0026gt;string is an\nempty string, newval-\u0026gt;string+1 will point to the byte after the\nstring, causing an out-of-bound read.\r\n\r\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107\nCPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]\n print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475\n kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588\n strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418\n __fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline]\n in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130\n bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910\ndrivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201\n __bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767\n __bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792\n bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817\n bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156\n dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366\n sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584\n ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\n---[ end trace ]---\r\n\r\nFix it by adding a check of string length before using it.(CVE-2024-39487)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\narm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes\nto bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will\nbe ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior\nentries in the table will be handled correctly.\r\n\r\nThe arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are\nnaturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct\nare suitably aligned within arrays.\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:\r\n\r\n\tstruct bug_entry {\n\t\tsigned int      bug_addr_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tsigned int      file_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  line;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  flags;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t}\r\n\r\n... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:\r\n\r\n\tstruct bug_entry {\n\t\tsigned int      bug_addr_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  flags;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t\t\u0026lt; implicit padding \u0026gt;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t}\r\n\r\n... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing\npadding, requiring 4-byte alginment.\r\n\r\nWhen we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry\nto 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.\nHowever, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when\nCONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding\nbytes.\r\n\r\nFor the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn\u0026apos;t\ndepend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:\r\n\r\n\tfor (bug = __start___bug_table; bug \u0026lt; __stop___bug_table; ++bug)\n\t\tif (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))\n\t\t\treturn bug;\r\n\r\nHowever for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing\nbytes when calculating the number of entries:\r\n\r\n\tmod-\u0026gt;num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);\r\n\r\n... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry\nwill not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:\r\n\r\n\tsechdrs[i].sh_size == 6\n\tsizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;\r\n\r\n\tsechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;\r\n\r\nConsequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:\r\n\r\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u0026lt; mod-\u0026gt;num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)\n\t\tif (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))\n\t\t\tgoto out;\r\n\r\n... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.\r\n\r\nThis can be demonstrated with the following module:\r\n\r\n\tstatic int __init buginit(void)\n\t{\n\t\tWARN(1, \u0026quot;hello\\n\u0026quot;);\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tstatic void __exit bugexit(void)\n\t{\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmodule_init(buginit);\n\tmodule_exit(bugexit);\n\tMODULE_LICENSE(\u0026quot;GPL\u0026quot;);\r\n\r\n... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:\r\n\r\n\t------------[ cut here ]------------\n\thello\n\tUnexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1\n\tInternal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n\tModules linked in: hello(O+)\n\tCPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O       6.9.1 #8\n\tHardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n\tpstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n\tpc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\tlr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\tsp : ffff800080533ae0\n\tx29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000\n\tx26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58\n\tx23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0\n\tx20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006\n\tx17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720\n\tx14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312\n\tx11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8\n\tx8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000\n\tx5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\n\tx2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0\n\tCall trace:\n\t buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\t do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8\n\t do_init_module+0x60/0x218\n\t load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70\n\t __do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0\n\t __arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28\n\t invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114\n\t el0_svc\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-39488)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: sr: fix memleak in seg6_hmac_init_algo\r\n\r\nseg6_hmac_init_algo returns without cleaning up the previous allocations\nif one fails, so it\u0026apos;s going to leak all that memory and the crypto tfms.\r\n\r\nUpdate seg6_hmac_exit to only free the memory when allocated, so we can\nreuse the code directly.(CVE-2024-39489)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put\r\n\r\nsk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which\nwill happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,\nsk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still\npoint to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.\r\n\r\nThis can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,\nwhile the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.\r\n\r\nThat will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:\r\n\r\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nRIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701\nCode: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840\nR13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870\nFS:  000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048\n __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]\n sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421\n __fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422\n __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]\n __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]\n __x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070\nCode: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c\nRSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070\nRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nUse sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to\nNULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,\nthen, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel\npsock-\u0026gt;work.\r\n\r\nAs suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is\nless convoluted.\r\n\r\nAfter that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE\nanymore.(CVE-2024-39500)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nionic: fix use after netif_napi_del()\r\n\r\nWhen queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called.\nIf there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current\nconfiguration, only 3 queues\u0026apos; napi should be registered and enabled.\nThe ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for\nenabling only the using queue\u0026apos; napi. Unused queues\u0026apos; napi will not be\nregistered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL.\nBut it couldn\u0026apos;t distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not\nbecause netif_napi_del() doesn\u0026apos;t reset the .poll pointer to NULL.\nSo, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was\nunregistered by netif_napi_del().\r\n\r\nReproducer:\n   ethtool -L \u0026lt;interface name\u0026gt; rx 1 tx 1 combined 0\n   ethtool -L \u0026lt;interface name\u0026gt; rx 0 tx 0 combined 1\n   ethtool -L \u0026lt;interface name\u0026gt; rx 0 tx 0 combined 4\r\n\r\nSplat looks like:\nkernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666!\nOops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\nCPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16\nWorkqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic]\nRIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\nCode: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f\nRSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029\nRDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28\nRBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? die+0x33/0x90\n ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100\n ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\n ? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0\n ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\n ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70\n ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20\n ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40\n ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]\n ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]\n ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]\n ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]\n process_one_work+0x145/0x360\n worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0\n ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0xcc/0x100\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30(CVE-2024-39502)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()\r\n\r\nsyzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]\r\n\r\nIf compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),\nsecond read could read NULL, if another cpu clears\nthe value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().\r\n\r\nAdd a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.\r\n\r\nAlso add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because\nwe rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n\r\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]\nCPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\n RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984\nCode: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 \u0026lt;80\u0026gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206\nRAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16\nRDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091\nRBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8\nR13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]\n  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]\n  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038\n  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]\n  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043\n  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205\n  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127\n  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175\n  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255\n  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271\n  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]\n  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911\n  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855\n  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778\n  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]\n  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]\n  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585\n  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193\n  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]\n  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759\n  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\n  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640\n  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231\n  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]\n  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393\n  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389\n  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-40905)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmptcp: ensure snd_una is properly initialized on connect\r\n\r\nThis is strictly related to commit fb7a0d334894 (\u0026quot;mptcp: ensure snd_nxt\nis properly initialized on connect\u0026quot;). It turns out that syzkaller can\ntrigger the retransmit after fallback and before processing any other\nincoming packet - so that snd_una is still left uninitialized.\r\n\r\nAddress the issue explicitly initializing snd_una together with snd_nxt\nand write_seq.(CVE-2024-40931)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nHID: logitech-dj: Fix memory leak in logi_dj_recv_switch_to_dj_mode()\r\n\r\nFix a memory leak on logi_dj_recv_send_report() error path.(CVE-2024-40934)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nALSA: hda: cs35l41: Possible null pointer dereference in cs35l41_hda_unbind()\r\n\r\nThe cs35l41_hda_unbind() function clears the hda_component entry\nmatching it\u0026apos;s index and then dereferences the codec pointer held in the\nfirst element of the hda_component array, this is an issue when the\ndevice index was 0.\r\n\r\nInstead use the codec pointer stashed in the cs35l41_hda structure as it\nwill still be valid.(CVE-2024-40964)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nf2fs: remove clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag in default_options\r\n\r\nIn f2fs_remount, SB_INLINECRYPT flag will be clear and re-set.\nIf create new file or open file during this gap, these files\nwill not use inlinecrypt. Worse case, it may lead to data\ncorruption if wrappedkey_v0 is enable.\r\n\r\nThread A:                               Thread B:\r\n\r\n-f2fs_remount\t\t\t\t-f2fs_file_open or f2fs_new_inode\n  -default_options\n\t\u0026lt;- clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag\r\n\r\n                                          -fscrypt_select_encryption_impl\r\n\r\n  -parse_options\n\t\u0026lt;- set SB_INLINECRYPT again(CVE-2024-40971)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncpufreq: amd-pstate: fix memory leak on CPU EPP exit\r\n\r\nThe cpudata memory from kzalloc() in amd_pstate_epp_cpu_init() is\nnot freed in the analogous exit function, so fix that.\r\n\r\n[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ](CVE-2024-40997)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1863",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:19Z",
  "published": "2024-07-19T11:07:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1863"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36017"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36478"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36481"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36924"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36929"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36931"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36951"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38384"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38558"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38570"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38581"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38583"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38586"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38614"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38620"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38632"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38661"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39462"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39464"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39478"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39479"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39480"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39487"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39488"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39489"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39500"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39502"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40905"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40931"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40934"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40964"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40971"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40997"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-36017",
    "CVE-2024-36478",
    "CVE-2024-36481",
    "CVE-2024-36924",
    "CVE-2024-36929",
    "CVE-2024-36931",
    "CVE-2024-36951",
    "CVE-2024-38384",
    "CVE-2024-38558",
    "CVE-2024-38570",
    "CVE-2024-38581",
    "CVE-2024-38583",
    "CVE-2024-38586",
    "CVE-2024-38614",
    "CVE-2024-38620",
    "CVE-2024-38632",
    "CVE-2024-38661",
    "CVE-2024-39462",
    "CVE-2024-39464",
    "CVE-2024-39478",
    "CVE-2024-39479",
    "CVE-2024-39480",
    "CVE-2024-39487",
    "CVE-2024-39488",
    "CVE-2024-39489",
    "CVE-2024-39500",
    "CVE-2024-39502",
    "CVE-2024-40905",
    "CVE-2024-40931",
    "CVE-2024-40934",
    "CVE-2024-40964",
    "CVE-2024-40971",
    "CVE-2024-40997"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nlib/generic-radix-tree.c: Don\u0026apos;t overflow in peek()\r\n\r\nWhen we started spreading new inode numbers throughout most of the 64\nbit inode space, that triggered some corner case bugs, in particular\nsome integer overflows related to the radix tree code. Oops.(CVE-2021-47432)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler\r\n\r\nThe following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:\r\n\r\n - All tags allocated\r\n\r\n - The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()\r\n\r\n - ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls\n   ufshcd_err_handler()\r\n\r\n - ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:\r\n\r\nWorkqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt\nCall trace:\n __switch_to+0x298/0x5d8\n __schedule+0x6cc/0xa94\n schedule+0x12c/0x298\n blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480\n __blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284\n blk_get_request+0x74/0x134\n ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640\n ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c\n ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8\n ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254\n ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354\n ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58\n process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c\n worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c\n kthread+0x150/0x1b4\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30\r\n\r\nFix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved\nrequest.(CVE-2021-47622)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres\r\n\r\nAs explained in commits:\n74b6d7d13307 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres\u0026quot;)\n5135e96a3dd2 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: don\u0026apos;t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres\u0026quot;)\r\n\r\nmdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() \u0026lt;-\ndevres_release_all() \u0026lt;- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was\nnot previously unregistered.\r\n\r\nThe Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of\nconstraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call\n-\u0026gt;remove on -\u0026gt;shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which\napplies here.\r\n\r\nIf the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -\u0026gt;remove from -\u0026gt;shutdown\n(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link\nbetween the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()\nwill unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.\r\n\r\nSo the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which\nis: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,\nor don\u0026apos;t use devres at all.\r\n\r\nThe seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the\nmdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external\ndependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls\ndevm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring\nthat, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let\u0026apos;s work\nwith devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.\nWhen we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn\u0026apos;t free a\nstill-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).(CVE-2022-48814)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nSUNRPC: lock against -\u0026gt;sock changing during sysfs read\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt;sock can be set to NULL asynchronously unless -\u0026gt;recv_mutex is held.\nSo it is important to hold that mutex.  Otherwise a sysfs read can\ntrigger an oops.\nCommit 17f09d3f619a (\u0026quot;SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before\nhandling sysfs reads\u0026quot;) appears to attempt to fix this problem, but it\nonly narrows the race window.(CVE-2022-48816)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: hci_core: Fix leaking sent_cmd skb\r\n\r\nsent_cmd memory is not freed before freeing hci_dev causing it to leak\nit contents.(CVE-2022-48844)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsmb: client: fix potential deadlock when releasing mids\r\n\r\nAll release_mid() callers seem to hold a reference of @mid so there is\nno need to call kref_put(\u0026amp;mid-\u0026gt;refcount, __release_mid) under\n@server-\u0026gt;mid_lock spinlock.  If they don\u0026apos;t, then an use-after-free bug\nwould have occurred anyways.\r\n\r\nBy getting rid of such spinlock also fixes a potential deadlock as\nshown below\r\n\r\nCPU 0                                CPU 1\n------------------------------------------------------------------\ncifs_demultiplex_thread()            cifs_debug_data_proc_show()\n release_mid()\n  spin_lock(\u0026amp;server-\u0026gt;mid_lock);\n                                     spin_lock(\u0026amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock)\n\t\t\t\t      spin_lock(\u0026amp;server-\u0026gt;mid_lock)\n  __release_mid()\n   smb2_find_smb_tcon()\n    spin_lock(\u0026amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock) *deadlock*(CVE-2023-52757)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb: config: fix iteration issue in \u0026apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()\u0026apos;\r\n\r\nThe BOS descriptor defines a root descriptor and is the base descriptor for\naccessing a family of related descriptors.\r\n\r\nFunction \u0026apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()\u0026apos; encounters an iteration issue when\nskipping the \u0026apos;USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY\u0026apos; descriptor type. This results in\nthe same descriptor being read repeatedly.\r\n\r\nTo address this issue, a \u0026apos;goto\u0026apos; statement is introduced to ensure that the\npointer and the amount read is updated correctly. This ensures that the\nfunction iterates to the next descriptor instead of reading the same\ndescriptor repeatedly.(CVE-2023-52781)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nkeys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiation\r\n\r\nThe expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten during\ninstantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problem\nfor DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten to\nTIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring the\ncondition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets a\nspecific expiry.(CVE-2024-36031)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\nsyzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature\nnetns.\r\n\r\nrpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error\nhas been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4\n(\u0026quot;Linux-2.6.12-rc2\u0026quot;).\r\n\r\nRecently, commit d47151b79e32 (\u0026quot;nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs\nin net namespaces\u0026quot;) converted the procfs to per-netns and made\nthe problem more visible.\r\n\r\nEven when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,\nand thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.\r\n\r\nThen, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc\ndirectory and trigger the warning below.\r\n\r\nLet\u0026apos;s handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\n[0]:\nname \u0026apos;nfs\u0026apos;\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nCode: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c\nRDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc\nR13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8\nFS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310\n nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438\n ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170\n setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372\n copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505\n create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d\nCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600\nRBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002\nR13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36939)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: qedf: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated\r\n\r\nCurrently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count from\nuserspace to that buffer. Later, we use kstrtouint on this buffer but we\ndon\u0026apos;t ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can\nlead to OOB read when using kstrtouint. Fix this issue by using\nmemdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.(CVE-2024-38559)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrivers/perf: hisi: hns3: Fix out-of-bound access when valid event group\r\n\r\nThe perf tool allows users to create event groups through following\ncmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out\nof bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of\nevents in an event_group is greater than HNS3_PMU_MAX_HW_EVENTS, the\nmemory write overflow of event_group array occurs.\r\n\r\nAdd array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,\nand return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.\r\n\r\nThere are 9 different events in an event_group.\n[1] perf stat -e \u0026apos;{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}(CVE-2024-38568)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\necryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet\r\n\r\nThe \u0026apos;TAG 66 Packet Format\u0026apos; description is missing the cipher code and\nchecksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,\nthe buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and\nwrite_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the\nbuffer.\r\n\r\nFix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet\nwill always fit in the buffer.\r\n\r\nThis fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:\r\n\r\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181\r\n\r\n  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014\n  Call Trace:\n   \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70\n   print_report+0xc5/0x610\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80\n   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10\n   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540\n   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]\n   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0\n   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550\n   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10\n   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190\n   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150\n   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0\n   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0\n   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10\n   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290\n   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10\n   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30\n   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0\n   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30\n   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330\n   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160\n   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10\n   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170\n   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10\n   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67\n  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f\n  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101\n  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67\n  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c\n  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\n  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941\n  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040\n   \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\n  Allocated by task 181:\n   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60\n   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40\n   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40\n   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0\n   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160\n   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0\n   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550\n   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150\n   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0\n   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0\n   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290\n   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160\n   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170\n   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8(CVE-2024-38578)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()\r\n\r\nsyzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]\r\n\r\nMake sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)\r\n\r\n[1]\nWARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected\n6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted\n------------------------------------------------------\nsyz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\r\n\r\nbut task is already holding lock:\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\r\n\r\nwhich lock already depends on the new lock.\r\n\r\nthe existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt; #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:\n        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754\n        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]\n        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178\n        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n        nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]\n        nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355\n        nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683\n        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222\n        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341\n        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]\n        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890\n        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt; #0 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:\n        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]\n        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]\n        validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869\n        __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137\n        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754\n        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]\n        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178\n        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n        nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]\n        nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]\n        nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\n        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222\n        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341\n        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]\n        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890\n        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\r\n\r\nother info that might help us debug this:\r\n\r\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\r\n\r\n       CPU0                    CPU1\n       ----                    ----\n  lock(nr_node_list_lock);\n                               lock(\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock);\n                               lock(nr_node_list_lock);\n  lock(\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock);\r\n\r\n *** DEADLOCK ***\r\n\r\n1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:\n  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8f70\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-38589)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time\r\n\r\nCurrently ALSA timer doesn\u0026apos;t have the lower limit of the start tick\ntime, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution\nfor hrtimer.  Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall,\nwhere  the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported\nby fuzzer.\r\n\r\nThis patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so\nthat the system returns an error when a too small start size is set.\nAs of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is\nsmall enough but can still work somehow.(CVE-2024-38618)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized\r\n\r\nThe member \u0026quot;uzonesize\u0026quot; of struct alauda_info will remain 0\nif alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors\nin alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba().\n- Add a member \u0026quot;media_initialized\u0026quot; to struct alauda_info.\n- Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the\n  first initialization.\n- Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media().(CVE-2024-38619)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix nilfs_empty_dir() misjudgment and long loop on I/O errors\r\n\r\nThe error handling in nilfs_empty_dir() when a directory folio/page read\nfails is incorrect, as in the old ext2 implementation, and if the\nfolio/page cannot be read or nilfs_check_folio() fails, it will falsely\ndetermine the directory as empty and corrupt the file system.\r\n\r\nIn addition, since nilfs_empty_dir() does not immediately return on a\nfailed folio/page read, but continues to loop, this can cause a long loop\nwith I/O if i_size of the directory\u0026apos;s inode is also corrupted, causing the\nlog writer thread to wait and hang, as reported by syzbot.\r\n\r\nFix these issues by making nilfs_empty_dir() immediately return a false\nvalue (0) if it fails to get a directory folio/page.(CVE-2024-39469)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nxfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup\r\n\r\nCommit a70f9fe52daa (\u0026quot;xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by\nmkfs\u0026quot;) added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial\numount record in old xfsprogs versions.  Later commit 0c771b99d6c9\n(\u0026quot;xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks\u0026quot;) cleaned up the log\nreover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value\nto size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds\naccess when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs\ntool, but a fuzzer.\r\n\r\nFix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size\ninto account for this calculation.(CVE-2024-39472)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry\u0026apos;s dname.name\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt;d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed;\nthere are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (-\u0026gt;d_lock on dentry,\n-\u0026gt;d_lock on its parent, -\u0026gt;i_rwsem exclusive on the parent\u0026apos;s inode,\nrename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable\nsnapshot of the name instead.(CVE-2024-39494)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()\r\n\r\nCoverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,\nevent_msg-\u0026gt;event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used\nas an index without sanitization.\r\n\r\nThis change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any\npossibility of speculative information leaks.\r\n\r\nThis bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis\nSecurity Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.\r\n\r\nOnly compile tested, no access to HW.(CVE-2024-39499)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/komeda: check for error-valued pointer\r\n\r\nkomeda_pipeline_get_state() may return an error-valued pointer, thus\ncheck the pointer for negative or null value before dereferencing.(CVE-2024-39505)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nUSB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages\r\n\r\nThe syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in\nthe cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver\u0026apos;s immediate\nresubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the\ndummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:\r\n\r\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]\nCPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:\n\t#1:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#2:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#3:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#4:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#5:  98% system,\t  1% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 73096\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582\nsoftirqs last disabled at (73043): [\u0026lt;ffff800080020de8\u0026gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588\nCPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\r\n\r\nTesting showed that the problem did not occur if the two error\nmessages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding\nmaterial to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.\r\n\r\nIn any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to\navoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is\nto ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with\ndev_err_ratelimited().(CVE-2024-40904)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()\r\n\r\nsyzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]\r\n\r\nIf compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),\nsecond read could read NULL, if another cpu clears\nthe value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().\r\n\r\nAdd a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.\r\n\r\nAlso add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because\nwe rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n\r\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]\nCPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\n RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984\nCode: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 \u0026lt;80\u0026gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206\nRAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16\nRDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091\nRBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8\nR13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]\n  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]\n  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038\n  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]\n  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043\n  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205\n  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127\n  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175\n  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255\n  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271\n  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]\n  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911\n  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855\n  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778\n  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]\n  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]\n  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585\n  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193\n  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]\n  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759\n  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\n  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640\n  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231\n  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]\n  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393\n  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389\n  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-40905)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: mac80211: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup()\r\n\r\nThe ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() function takes sta-\u0026gt;ps_lock to\nsynchronizes with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() which is called from\nsoftirq context. However using only spin_lock() to get sta-\u0026gt;ps_lock in\nieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() does not prevent softirq to execute\non this same CPU, to run ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() and try to\ntake this same lock ending in deadlock. Below is an example of rcu stall\nthat arises in such situation.\r\n\r\n rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU\n rcu:    2-....: (42413413 ticks this GP) idle=b154/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=1763/1765 fqs=21206996\n rcu:    (t=42586894 jiffies g=2057 q=362405 ncpus=4)\n CPU: 2 PID: 719 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G        W          6.4.0-02158-g1b062f552873 #742\n Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)\n pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n lr : invoke_tx_handlers_early+0x5b4/0x5c0\n sp : ffff00001ef64660\n x29: ffff00001ef64660 x28: ffff000009bc1070 x27: ffff000009bc0ad8\n x26: ffff000009bc0900 x25: ffff00001ef647a8 x24: 0000000000000000\n x23: ffff000009bc0900 x22: ffff000009bc0900 x21: ffff00000ac0e000\n x20: ffff00000a279e00 x19: ffff00001ef646e8 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: ffff800016468000 x16: ffff00001ef608c0 x15: 0010533c93f64f80\n x14: 0010395c9faa3946 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000fa83b2da\n x11: 000000012edeceea x10: ffff0000010fbe00 x9 : 0000000000895440\n x8 : 000000000010533c x7 : ffff00000ad8b740 x6 : ffff00000c350880\n x5 : 0000000000000007 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff00000ac0e0e8\n Call trace:\n  queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n  ieee80211_tx+0x80/0x12c\n  ieee80211_tx_pending+0x110/0x278\n  tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x144\n  tasklet_action+0x20/0x28\n  _stext+0x11c/0x284\n  ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14\n  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34\n  do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20\n  do_softirq+0x74/0x7c\n  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4\n  _ieee80211_wake_txqs+0x3b0/0x4b8\n  __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x12c/0x168\n  ieee80211_add_pending_skbs+0xec/0x138\n  ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup+0x2a4/0x480\n  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update.part.0+0xd8/0x11c\n  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update+0x18/0x24\n  sta_apply_parameters+0x3bc/0x4c0\n  ieee80211_change_station+0x1b8/0x2dc\n  nl80211_set_station+0x444/0x49c\n  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xa4/0xfc\n  genl_rcv_msg+0x1b0/0x244\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x38/0x10c\n  genl_rcv+0x34/0x48\n  netlink_unicast+0x254/0x2bc\n  netlink_sendmsg+0x190/0x3b4\n  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x218\n  ___sys_sendmsg+0x68/0x8c\n  __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x84\n  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28\n  do_el0_svc+0x6c/0xe8\n  el0_svc+0x14/0x48\n  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4\n  el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150\r\n\r\nUsing spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead prevents softirq to raise\non the same CPU that is holding the lock.(CVE-2024-40912)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids\r\n\r\nIn some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even\nthough n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an\nout-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first.(CVE-2024-40929)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/exynos/vidi: fix memory leak in .get_modes()\r\n\r\nThe duplicated EDID is never freed. Fix it.(CVE-2024-40932)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don\u0026apos;t read past the mfuart notifcation\r\n\r\nIn case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data\nthan it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.\nRemove the print of the buffer, we won\u0026apos;t see it by default. If needed,\nwe can see the content with tracing.\r\n\r\nThis was reported by KFENCE.(CVE-2024-40941)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO\r\n\r\nAfter commit \u0026quot;ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block\u0026quot;,\nfstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed:\r\n\r\n========================================================================\n[  473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300\r\n\r\n[  475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal\n[  475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode.\n[  494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found\n[  494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.\n[  494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only.\n[  494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30\n[  494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3\nfio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072\n=========================================================================\r\n\r\nIn __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten\nextents to a list.  extents are also inserted into extent tree in\nocfs2_write_begin_nolock.  Then another thread call fallocate to puch a\nhole at one of the unwritten extent.  The extent at cpos was removed by\nocfs2_remove_extent().  At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list\nfound there is no such extent at the cpos.\r\n\r\n    T1                        T2                T3\n                              inode lock\n                                ...\n                                insert extents\n                                ...\n                              inode unlock\nocfs2_fallocate\n __ocfs2_change_file_space\n  inode lock\n  lock ip_alloc_sem\n  ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode\n   ocfs2_remove_btree_range\n    ocfs2_remove_extent\n    ^---remove the extent at cpos 78723\n  ...\n  unlock ip_alloc_sem\n  inode unlock\n                                       ocfs2_dio_end_io\n                                        ocfs2_dio_end_io_write\n                                         lock ip_alloc_sem\n                                         ocfs2_mark_extent_written\n                                          ocfs2_change_extent_flag\n                                           ocfs2_search_extent_list\n                                           ^---failed to find extent\n                                          ...\n                                          unlock ip_alloc_sem\r\n\r\nIn most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO,\nso fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like\next4.(CVE-2024-40943)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nMIPS: Octeon: Add PCIe link status check\r\n\r\nThe standard PCIe configuration read-write interface is used to\naccess the configuration space of the peripheral PCIe devices\nof the mips processor after the PCIe link surprise down, it can\ngenerate kernel panic caused by \u0026quot;Data bus error\u0026quot;. So it is\nnecessary to add PCIe link status check for system protection.\nWhen the PCIe link is down or in training, assigning a value\nof 0 to the configuration address can prevent read-write behavior\nto the configuration space of peripheral PCIe devices, thereby\npreventing kernel panic.(CVE-2024-40968)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\npowerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size\r\n\r\nplpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to\nprovide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this\nis communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has\nno idea.\r\n\r\nFor example, if I write a bug like this:\r\n\r\n  long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE\n  plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);\r\n\r\nThis compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack\ncorruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end\nof the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not\nfound a real instance yet.)\r\n\r\nTo make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized\narray parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall\nAPIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now\nprovokes a diagnostic like this:\r\n\r\nerror: array argument is too small;\nis of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds]\n   60 |                 plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf,\n      |                 ^                                   ~~~~~~\r\n\r\n[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit\n    0da6e5fd6c37 (\u0026quot;gcc: disable \u0026apos;-Warray-bounds\u0026apos; for gcc-13 too\u0026quot;) and\n    related changes.(CVE-2024-40974)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption\r\n\r\nAs it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 (\u0026quot;xfrm: Force a dst refcount before\nentering the xfrm type handlers\u0026quot;):\r\n\r\n\u0026quot;Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the\n rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb\u0026apos;s destination\n entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers.\u0026quot;\r\n\r\nOn TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()\nshould be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.\r\n\r\nShuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:\r\n\r\n  [] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]\n  [] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug\n  [] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker\n  [] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]\n  [] Call Trace:\n  [] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]\n  [] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]\n  [] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]\n  [] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190\n  [] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190\n  [] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0(CVE-2024-40983)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nACPICA: Revert \u0026quot;ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\u0026quot;\r\n\r\nUndo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 (\u0026quot;ACPICA: avoid\n\u0026quot;Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\u0026quot;\u0026quot;). The initial\npurpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation\nregions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings\nif different page attributes are present.\r\n\r\nHowever, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping\ncontinues until the boundary\u0026apos;s end, but there is still an attempt to\nread/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer\ndeference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but\nonly one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary\u0026apos;s\nend, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL\npointer deference.\r\n\r\nInstead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not\nmandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is\npermissible for it to be mapped across different regions.(CVE-2024-40984)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amdgpu: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c\r\n\r\nAdds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry.(CVE-2024-40987)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntracing: Build event generation tests only as modules\r\n\r\nThe kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock\n(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,\nand unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those\nare designed for playing as modules.\r\n\r\nIf we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the\nkernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure\nas below.\r\n\r\n[   97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[   97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.357106] Modules linked in:\n[   97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14\n[   97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n[   97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90\n[   97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286\n[   97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[   97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68\n[   97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\n[   97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000\n[   97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000\n[   97.381536] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[   97.383813] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0\n[   97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[   97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[   97.391196] Call Trace:\n[   97.391967]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[   97.392647]  ? __warn+0xcc/0x180\n[   97.393640]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.395181]  ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150\n[   97.396234]  ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60\n[   97.397311]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50\n[   97.398434]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[   97.399652]  ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20\n[   97.400904]  ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90\n[   97.402304]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.403773]  ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50\n[   97.404972]  do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240\n[   97.406113]  do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0\n[   97.407286]  ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0\n[   97.408401]  do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70\n[   97.409452]  kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0\n[   97.410662]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[   97.411738]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0\n[   97.412788]  ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50\n[   97.413817]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[   97.414844]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n[   97.416285]  \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n[   97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323\n[   97.418376] hardirqs last  enabled at (13437337): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8110bc0c\u0026gt;] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150\n[   97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8110bbf1\u0026gt;] console_unlock+0x101/0x150\n[   97.423838] softirqs last  enabled at (13437366): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8108e17f\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0\n[   97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8108e346\u0026gt;] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0\n[   97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\r\n\r\nAnd also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are\nfailed too.\r\n\r\nTo avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.(CVE-2024-41004)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active\r\n\r\nKCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:\r\n\r\n\tBUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb\n\twrite (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:\n\tnet_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)\n\u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n\tread to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:\n\tnetpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)\n\tnetpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)\n\u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n\tvalue changed: 0x0000000a -\u0026gt; 0xffffffff\r\n\r\nThis happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the\ncurrent CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi-\u0026gt;poll_owner\nnon atomically. The -\u0026gt;poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding\nthe lock.\r\n\r\nUse an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.(CVE-2024-41005)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntcp: avoid too many retransmit packets\r\n\r\nIf a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer\nretracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can\nretransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),\nfor about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has \u0026apos;expired\u0026apos;.\r\n\r\nThe fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes\nicsk-\u0026gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.\r\n\r\nBefore blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after\nicsk-\u0026gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential\nbackoff for the retransmits.\r\n\r\nAlso worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 (\u0026quot;net: tcp:\nfix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0\u0026quot;), the issue\nwould last 2 minutes instead of 4.(CVE-2024-41007)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf\r\n\r\nThe BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular\nbuffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the\nconsumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the\ndata, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of\ndata reserved by all producers.\r\n\r\nEach time a record is reserved, the producer that \u0026quot;owns\u0026quot; the record will\nsuccessfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is\nread, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished\nprocessing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user\nspace, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.\r\n\r\nOne aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both\nproducers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously\nback-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures\nfor samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data\narea, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page\nagain, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual\nmemory.\r\n\r\nEach record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for\nbook-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.\nHelpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`\nfor the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however\npossible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first\nchunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk\u0026apos;s\nheader.\r\n\r\nFor example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size\nof 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to\nbpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in\n[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets\nallocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos\nwas edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos \u0026gt; rb-\u0026gt;mask`\ncheck. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able\nto edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned\nearlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data\npages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A\u0026apos;s header.\nbpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header\u0026apos;s pg_off to then\nlocate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk\nB modified chunk A\u0026apos;s header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong\npage and could cause a crash.\r\n\r\nFix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range\nfrom the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring\nbuffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We\u0026apos;ve tested with\nthe ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)\nbefore/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it\nis still not significantly enough to matter.(CVE-2024-41009)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1894",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:21Z",
  "published": "2024-07-26T11:07:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47432"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47622"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48814"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48816"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48844"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52757"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52781"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36031"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36939"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38559"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38568"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38578"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38589"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38618"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38619"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39469"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39472"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39494"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39499"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39505"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40904"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40905"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40912"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40929"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40932"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40941"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40943"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40968"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40974"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40983"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40984"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40987"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41004"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41005"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41007"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41009"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-47432",
    "CVE-2021-47622",
    "CVE-2022-48814",
    "CVE-2022-48816",
    "CVE-2022-48844",
    "CVE-2023-52757",
    "CVE-2023-52781",
    "CVE-2024-36031",
    "CVE-2024-36939",
    "CVE-2024-38559",
    "CVE-2024-38568",
    "CVE-2024-38578",
    "CVE-2024-38589",
    "CVE-2024-38618",
    "CVE-2024-38619",
    "CVE-2024-39469",
    "CVE-2024-39472",
    "CVE-2024-39494",
    "CVE-2024-39499",
    "CVE-2024-39505",
    "CVE-2024-40904",
    "CVE-2024-40905",
    "CVE-2024-40912",
    "CVE-2024-40929",
    "CVE-2024-40932",
    "CVE-2024-40941",
    "CVE-2024-40943",
    "CVE-2024-40968",
    "CVE-2024-40974",
    "CVE-2024-40983",
    "CVE-2024-40984",
    "CVE-2024-40987",
    "CVE-2024-41004",
    "CVE-2024-41005",
    "CVE-2024-41007",
    "CVE-2024-41009"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-136.86.0.167.oe2203sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nlib/generic-radix-tree.c: Don\u0026apos;t overflow in peek()\r\n\r\nWhen we started spreading new inode numbers throughout most of the 64\nbit inode space, that triggered some corner case bugs, in particular\nsome integer overflows related to the radix tree code. Oops.(CVE-2021-47432)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler\r\n\r\nThe following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:\r\n\r\n - All tags allocated\r\n\r\n - The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()\r\n\r\n - ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls\n   ufshcd_err_handler()\r\n\r\n - ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:\r\n\r\nWorkqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt\nCall trace:\n __switch_to+0x298/0x5d8\n __schedule+0x6cc/0xa94\n schedule+0x12c/0x298\n blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480\n __blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284\n blk_get_request+0x74/0x134\n ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640\n ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c\n ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8\n ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254\n ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354\n ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58\n process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c\n worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c\n kthread+0x150/0x1b4\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30\r\n\r\nFix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved\nrequest.(CVE-2021-47622)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres\r\n\r\nAs explained in commits:\n74b6d7d13307 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres\u0026quot;)\n5135e96a3dd2 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: don\u0026apos;t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres\u0026quot;)\r\n\r\nmdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() \u0026lt;-\ndevres_release_all() \u0026lt;- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was\nnot previously unregistered.\r\n\r\nThe Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of\nconstraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call\n-\u0026gt;remove on -\u0026gt;shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which\napplies here.\r\n\r\nIf the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -\u0026gt;remove from -\u0026gt;shutdown\n(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link\nbetween the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()\nwill unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.\r\n\r\nSo the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which\nis: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,\nor don\u0026apos;t use devres at all.\r\n\r\nThe seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the\nmdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external\ndependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls\ndevm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring\nthat, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let\u0026apos;s work\nwith devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.\nWhen we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn\u0026apos;t free a\nstill-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).(CVE-2022-48814)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nSUNRPC: lock against -\u0026gt;sock changing during sysfs read\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt;sock can be set to NULL asynchronously unless -\u0026gt;recv_mutex is held.\nSo it is important to hold that mutex.  Otherwise a sysfs read can\ntrigger an oops.\nCommit 17f09d3f619a (\u0026quot;SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before\nhandling sysfs reads\u0026quot;) appears to attempt to fix this problem, but it\nonly narrows the race window.(CVE-2022-48816)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: hci_core: Fix leaking sent_cmd skb\r\n\r\nsent_cmd memory is not freed before freeing hci_dev causing it to leak\nit contents.(CVE-2022-48844)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsmb: client: fix potential deadlock when releasing mids\r\n\r\nAll release_mid() callers seem to hold a reference of @mid so there is\nno need to call kref_put(\u0026amp;mid-\u0026gt;refcount, __release_mid) under\n@server-\u0026gt;mid_lock spinlock.  If they don\u0026apos;t, then an use-after-free bug\nwould have occurred anyways.\r\n\r\nBy getting rid of such spinlock also fixes a potential deadlock as\nshown below\r\n\r\nCPU 0                                CPU 1\n------------------------------------------------------------------\ncifs_demultiplex_thread()            cifs_debug_data_proc_show()\n release_mid()\n  spin_lock(\u0026amp;server-\u0026gt;mid_lock);\n                                     spin_lock(\u0026amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock)\n\t\t\t\t      spin_lock(\u0026amp;server-\u0026gt;mid_lock)\n  __release_mid()\n   smb2_find_smb_tcon()\n    spin_lock(\u0026amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock) *deadlock*(CVE-2023-52757)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb: config: fix iteration issue in \u0026apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()\u0026apos;\r\n\r\nThe BOS descriptor defines a root descriptor and is the base descriptor for\naccessing a family of related descriptors.\r\n\r\nFunction \u0026apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()\u0026apos; encounters an iteration issue when\nskipping the \u0026apos;USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY\u0026apos; descriptor type. This results in\nthe same descriptor being read repeatedly.\r\n\r\nTo address this issue, a \u0026apos;goto\u0026apos; statement is introduced to ensure that the\npointer and the amount read is updated correctly. This ensures that the\nfunction iterates to the next descriptor instead of reading the same\ndescriptor repeatedly.(CVE-2023-52781)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\nsyzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature\nnetns.\r\n\r\nrpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error\nhas been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4\n(\u0026quot;Linux-2.6.12-rc2\u0026quot;).\r\n\r\nRecently, commit d47151b79e32 (\u0026quot;nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs\nin net namespaces\u0026quot;) converted the procfs to per-netns and made\nthe problem more visible.\r\n\r\nEven when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,\nand thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.\r\n\r\nThen, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc\ndirectory and trigger the warning below.\r\n\r\nLet\u0026apos;s handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\n[0]:\nname \u0026apos;nfs\u0026apos;\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nCode: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c\nRDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc\nR13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8\nFS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310\n nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438\n ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170\n setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372\n copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505\n create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d\nCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600\nRBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002\nR13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36939)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: qedf: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated\r\n\r\nCurrently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count from\nuserspace to that buffer. Later, we use kstrtouint on this buffer but we\ndon\u0026apos;t ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can\nlead to OOB read when using kstrtouint. Fix this issue by using\nmemdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.(CVE-2024-38559)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrivers/perf: hisi: hns3: Fix out-of-bound access when valid event group\r\n\r\nThe perf tool allows users to create event groups through following\ncmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out\nof bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of\nevents in an event_group is greater than HNS3_PMU_MAX_HW_EVENTS, the\nmemory write overflow of event_group array occurs.\r\n\r\nAdd array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,\nand return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.\r\n\r\nThere are 9 different events in an event_group.\n[1] perf stat -e \u0026apos;{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}(CVE-2024-38568)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\necryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet\r\n\r\nThe \u0026apos;TAG 66 Packet Format\u0026apos; description is missing the cipher code and\nchecksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,\nthe buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and\nwrite_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the\nbuffer.\r\n\r\nFix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet\nwill always fit in the buffer.\r\n\r\nThis fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:\r\n\r\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181\r\n\r\n  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014\n  Call Trace:\n   \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70\n   print_report+0xc5/0x610\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110\n   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80\n   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0\n   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10\n   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540\n   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]\n   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0\n   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550\n   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10\n   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190\n   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150\n   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0\n   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0\n   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10\n   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290\n   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10\n   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30\n   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0\n   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30\n   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330\n   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160\n   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10\n   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170\n   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10\n   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67\n  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f\n  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101\n  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67\n  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c\n  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\n  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941\n  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040\n   \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\n  Allocated by task 181:\n   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60\n   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40\n   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40\n   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0\n   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160\n   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0\n   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550\n   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150\n   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0\n   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0\n   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290\n   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160\n   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170\n   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8(CVE-2024-38578)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()\r\n\r\nsyzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]\r\n\r\nMake sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)\r\n\r\n[1]\nWARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected\n6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted\n------------------------------------------------------\nsyz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]\n ffff8880186e2070 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\r\n\r\nbut task is already holding lock:\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]\n ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\r\n\r\nwhich lock already depends on the new lock.\r\n\r\nthe existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt; #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:\n        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754\n        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]\n        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178\n        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n        nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]\n        nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355\n        nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683\n        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222\n        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341\n        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]\n        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890\n        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt; #0 (\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:\n        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]\n        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]\n        validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869\n        __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137\n        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754\n        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]\n        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178\n        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n        nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]\n        nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]\n        nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697\n        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222\n        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341\n        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]\n        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890\n        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\r\n\r\nother info that might help us debug this:\r\n\r\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\r\n\r\n       CPU0                    CPU1\n       ----                    ----\n  lock(nr_node_list_lock);\n                               lock(\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock);\n                               lock(nr_node_list_lock);\n  lock(\u0026amp;nr_node-\u0026gt;node_lock);\r\n\r\n *** DEADLOCK ***\r\n\r\n1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:\n  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8f70\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-38589)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time\r\n\r\nCurrently ALSA timer doesn\u0026apos;t have the lower limit of the start tick\ntime, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution\nfor hrtimer.  Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall,\nwhere  the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported\nby fuzzer.\r\n\r\nThis patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so\nthat the system returns an error when a too small start size is set.\nAs of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is\nsmall enough but can still work somehow.(CVE-2024-38618)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized\r\n\r\nThe member \u0026quot;uzonesize\u0026quot; of struct alauda_info will remain 0\nif alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors\nin alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba().\n- Add a member \u0026quot;media_initialized\u0026quot; to struct alauda_info.\n- Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the\n  first initialization.\n- Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media().(CVE-2024-38619)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix nilfs_empty_dir() misjudgment and long loop on I/O errors\r\n\r\nThe error handling in nilfs_empty_dir() when a directory folio/page read\nfails is incorrect, as in the old ext2 implementation, and if the\nfolio/page cannot be read or nilfs_check_folio() fails, it will falsely\ndetermine the directory as empty and corrupt the file system.\r\n\r\nIn addition, since nilfs_empty_dir() does not immediately return on a\nfailed folio/page read, but continues to loop, this can cause a long loop\nwith I/O if i_size of the directory\u0026apos;s inode is also corrupted, causing the\nlog writer thread to wait and hang, as reported by syzbot.\r\n\r\nFix these issues by making nilfs_empty_dir() immediately return a false\nvalue (0) if it fails to get a directory folio/page.(CVE-2024-39469)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nxfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup\r\n\r\nCommit a70f9fe52daa (\u0026quot;xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by\nmkfs\u0026quot;) added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial\numount record in old xfsprogs versions.  Later commit 0c771b99d6c9\n(\u0026quot;xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks\u0026quot;) cleaned up the log\nreover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value\nto size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds\naccess when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs\ntool, but a fuzzer.\r\n\r\nFix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size\ninto account for this calculation.(CVE-2024-39472)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry\u0026apos;s dname.name\r\n\r\n-\u0026gt;d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed;\nthere are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (-\u0026gt;d_lock on dentry,\n-\u0026gt;d_lock on its parent, -\u0026gt;i_rwsem exclusive on the parent\u0026apos;s inode,\nrename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable\nsnapshot of the name instead.(CVE-2024-39494)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()\r\n\r\nCoverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,\nevent_msg-\u0026gt;event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used\nas an index without sanitization.\r\n\r\nThis change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any\npossibility of speculative information leaks.\r\n\r\nThis bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis\nSecurity Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.\r\n\r\nOnly compile tested, no access to HW.(CVE-2024-39499)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/komeda: check for error-valued pointer\r\n\r\nkomeda_pipeline_get_state() may return an error-valued pointer, thus\ncheck the pointer for negative or null value before dereferencing.(CVE-2024-39505)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nUSB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages\r\n\r\nThe syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in\nthe cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver\u0026apos;s immediate\nresubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the\ndummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:\r\n\r\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]\nCPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:\n\t#1:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#2:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#3:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#4:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#5:  98% system,\t  1% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 73096\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582\nsoftirqs last disabled at (73043): [\u0026lt;ffff800080020de8\u0026gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588\nCPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\r\n\r\nTesting showed that the problem did not occur if the two error\nmessages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding\nmaterial to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.\r\n\r\nIn any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to\navoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is\nto ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with\ndev_err_ratelimited().(CVE-2024-40904)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()\r\n\r\nsyzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]\r\n\r\nIf compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),\nsecond read could read NULL, if another cpu clears\nthe value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().\r\n\r\nAdd a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.\r\n\r\nAlso add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because\nwe rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n\r\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]\nCPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\n RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984\nCode: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 \u0026lt;80\u0026gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206\nRAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16\nRDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091\nRBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8\nR13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]\n  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]\n  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038\n  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]\n  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043\n  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205\n  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127\n  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175\n  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255\n  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271\n  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]\n  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911\n  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855\n  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778\n  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]\n  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]\n  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585\n  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193\n  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]\n  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759\n  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\n  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640\n  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231\n  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]\n  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393\n  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389\n  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-40905)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: mac80211: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup()\r\n\r\nThe ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() function takes sta-\u0026gt;ps_lock to\nsynchronizes with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() which is called from\nsoftirq context. However using only spin_lock() to get sta-\u0026gt;ps_lock in\nieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() does not prevent softirq to execute\non this same CPU, to run ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() and try to\ntake this same lock ending in deadlock. Below is an example of rcu stall\nthat arises in such situation.\r\n\r\n rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU\n rcu:    2-....: (42413413 ticks this GP) idle=b154/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=1763/1765 fqs=21206996\n rcu:    (t=42586894 jiffies g=2057 q=362405 ncpus=4)\n CPU: 2 PID: 719 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G        W          6.4.0-02158-g1b062f552873 #742\n Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)\n pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n lr : invoke_tx_handlers_early+0x5b4/0x5c0\n sp : ffff00001ef64660\n x29: ffff00001ef64660 x28: ffff000009bc1070 x27: ffff000009bc0ad8\n x26: ffff000009bc0900 x25: ffff00001ef647a8 x24: 0000000000000000\n x23: ffff000009bc0900 x22: ffff000009bc0900 x21: ffff00000ac0e000\n x20: ffff00000a279e00 x19: ffff00001ef646e8 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: ffff800016468000 x16: ffff00001ef608c0 x15: 0010533c93f64f80\n x14: 0010395c9faa3946 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000fa83b2da\n x11: 000000012edeceea x10: ffff0000010fbe00 x9 : 0000000000895440\n x8 : 000000000010533c x7 : ffff00000ad8b740 x6 : ffff00000c350880\n x5 : 0000000000000007 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff00000ac0e0e8\n Call trace:\n  queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n  ieee80211_tx+0x80/0x12c\n  ieee80211_tx_pending+0x110/0x278\n  tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x144\n  tasklet_action+0x20/0x28\n  _stext+0x11c/0x284\n  ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14\n  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34\n  do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20\n  do_softirq+0x74/0x7c\n  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4\n  _ieee80211_wake_txqs+0x3b0/0x4b8\n  __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x12c/0x168\n  ieee80211_add_pending_skbs+0xec/0x138\n  ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup+0x2a4/0x480\n  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update.part.0+0xd8/0x11c\n  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update+0x18/0x24\n  sta_apply_parameters+0x3bc/0x4c0\n  ieee80211_change_station+0x1b8/0x2dc\n  nl80211_set_station+0x444/0x49c\n  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xa4/0xfc\n  genl_rcv_msg+0x1b0/0x244\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x38/0x10c\n  genl_rcv+0x34/0x48\n  netlink_unicast+0x254/0x2bc\n  netlink_sendmsg+0x190/0x3b4\n  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x218\n  ___sys_sendmsg+0x68/0x8c\n  __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x84\n  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28\n  do_el0_svc+0x6c/0xe8\n  el0_svc+0x14/0x48\n  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4\n  el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150\r\n\r\nUsing spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead prevents softirq to raise\non the same CPU that is holding the lock.(CVE-2024-40912)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids\r\n\r\nIn some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even\nthough n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an\nout-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first.(CVE-2024-40929)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/exynos/vidi: fix memory leak in .get_modes()\r\n\r\nThe duplicated EDID is never freed. Fix it.(CVE-2024-40932)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don\u0026apos;t read past the mfuart notifcation\r\n\r\nIn case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data\nthan it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.\nRemove the print of the buffer, we won\u0026apos;t see it by default. If needed,\nwe can see the content with tracing.\r\n\r\nThis was reported by KFENCE.(CVE-2024-40941)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO\r\n\r\nAfter commit \u0026quot;ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block\u0026quot;,\nfstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed:\r\n\r\n========================================================================\n[  473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300\r\n\r\n[  475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal\n[  475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode.\n[  494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found\n[  494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.\n[  494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only.\n[  494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30\n[  494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3\nfio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072\n=========================================================================\r\n\r\nIn __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten\nextents to a list.  extents are also inserted into extent tree in\nocfs2_write_begin_nolock.  Then another thread call fallocate to puch a\nhole at one of the unwritten extent.  The extent at cpos was removed by\nocfs2_remove_extent().  At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list\nfound there is no such extent at the cpos.\r\n\r\n    T1                        T2                T3\n                              inode lock\n                                ...\n                                insert extents\n                                ...\n                              inode unlock\nocfs2_fallocate\n __ocfs2_change_file_space\n  inode lock\n  lock ip_alloc_sem\n  ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode\n   ocfs2_remove_btree_range\n    ocfs2_remove_extent\n    ^---remove the extent at cpos 78723\n  ...\n  unlock ip_alloc_sem\n  inode unlock\n                                       ocfs2_dio_end_io\n                                        ocfs2_dio_end_io_write\n                                         lock ip_alloc_sem\n                                         ocfs2_mark_extent_written\n                                          ocfs2_change_extent_flag\n                                           ocfs2_search_extent_list\n                                           ^---failed to find extent\n                                          ...\n                                          unlock ip_alloc_sem\r\n\r\nIn most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO,\nso fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like\next4.(CVE-2024-40943)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nMIPS: Octeon: Add PCIe link status check\r\n\r\nThe standard PCIe configuration read-write interface is used to\naccess the configuration space of the peripheral PCIe devices\nof the mips processor after the PCIe link surprise down, it can\ngenerate kernel panic caused by \u0026quot;Data bus error\u0026quot;. So it is\nnecessary to add PCIe link status check for system protection.\nWhen the PCIe link is down or in training, assigning a value\nof 0 to the configuration address can prevent read-write behavior\nto the configuration space of peripheral PCIe devices, thereby\npreventing kernel panic.(CVE-2024-40968)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\npowerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size\r\n\r\nplpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to\nprovide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this\nis communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has\nno idea.\r\n\r\nFor example, if I write a bug like this:\r\n\r\n  long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE\n  plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);\r\n\r\nThis compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack\ncorruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end\nof the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not\nfound a real instance yet.)\r\n\r\nTo make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized\narray parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall\nAPIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now\nprovokes a diagnostic like this:\r\n\r\nerror: array argument is too small;\nis of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds]\n   60 |                 plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf,\n      |                 ^                                   ~~~~~~\r\n\r\n[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit\n    0da6e5fd6c37 (\u0026quot;gcc: disable \u0026apos;-Warray-bounds\u0026apos; for gcc-13 too\u0026quot;) and\n    related changes.(CVE-2024-40974)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption\r\n\r\nAs it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 (\u0026quot;xfrm: Force a dst refcount before\nentering the xfrm type handlers\u0026quot;):\r\n\r\n\u0026quot;Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the\n rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb\u0026apos;s destination\n entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers.\u0026quot;\r\n\r\nOn TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()\nshould be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.\r\n\r\nShuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:\r\n\r\n  [] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]\n  [] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug\n  [] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker\n  [] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]\n  [] Call Trace:\n  [] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]\n  [] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]\n  [] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]\n  [] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190\n  [] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190\n  [] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0(CVE-2024-40983)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nACPICA: Revert \u0026quot;ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\u0026quot;\r\n\r\nUndo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 (\u0026quot;ACPICA: avoid\n\u0026quot;Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\u0026quot;\u0026quot;). The initial\npurpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation\nregions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings\nif different page attributes are present.\r\n\r\nHowever, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping\ncontinues until the boundary\u0026apos;s end, but there is still an attempt to\nread/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer\ndeference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but\nonly one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary\u0026apos;s\nend, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL\npointer deference.\r\n\r\nInstead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not\nmandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is\npermissible for it to be mapped across different regions.(CVE-2024-40984)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amdgpu: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c\r\n\r\nAdds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry.(CVE-2024-40987)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntracing: Build event generation tests only as modules\r\n\r\nThe kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock\n(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,\nand unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those\nare designed for playing as modules.\r\n\r\nIf we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the\nkernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure\nas below.\r\n\r\n[   97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[   97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.357106] Modules linked in:\n[   97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14\n[   97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n[   97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90\n[   97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286\n[   97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[   97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68\n[   97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\n[   97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000\n[   97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000\n[   97.381536] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[   97.383813] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0\n[   97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[   97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[   97.391196] Call Trace:\n[   97.391967]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[   97.392647]  ? __warn+0xcc/0x180\n[   97.393640]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.395181]  ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150\n[   97.396234]  ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60\n[   97.397311]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50\n[   97.398434]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[   97.399652]  ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20\n[   97.400904]  ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90\n[   97.402304]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480\n[   97.403773]  ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50\n[   97.404972]  do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240\n[   97.406113]  do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0\n[   97.407286]  ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0\n[   97.408401]  do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70\n[   97.409452]  kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0\n[   97.410662]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[   97.411738]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0\n[   97.412788]  ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50\n[   97.413817]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[   97.414844]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n[   97.416285]  \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n[   97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323\n[   97.418376] hardirqs last  enabled at (13437337): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8110bc0c\u0026gt;] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150\n[   97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8110bbf1\u0026gt;] console_unlock+0x101/0x150\n[   97.423838] softirqs last  enabled at (13437366): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8108e17f\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0\n[   97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [\u0026lt;ffffffff8108e346\u0026gt;] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0\n[   97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\r\n\r\nAnd also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are\nfailed too.\r\n\r\nTo avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.(CVE-2024-41004)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active\r\n\r\nKCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:\r\n\r\n\tBUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb\n\twrite (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:\n\tnet_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)\n\u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n\tread to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:\n\tnetpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)\n\tnetpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)\n\u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n\tvalue changed: 0x0000000a -\u0026gt; 0xffffffff\r\n\r\nThis happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the\ncurrent CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi-\u0026gt;poll_owner\nnon atomically. The -\u0026gt;poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding\nthe lock.\r\n\r\nUse an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.(CVE-2024-41005)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntcp: avoid too many retransmit packets\r\n\r\nIf a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer\nretracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can\nretransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),\nfor about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has \u0026apos;expired\u0026apos;.\r\n\r\nThe fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes\nicsk-\u0026gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.\r\n\r\nBefore blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after\nicsk-\u0026gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential\nbackoff for the retransmits.\r\n\r\nAlso worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 (\u0026quot;net: tcp:\nfix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0\u0026quot;), the issue\nwould last 2 minutes instead of 4.(CVE-2024-41007)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf\r\n\r\nThe BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular\nbuffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the\nconsumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the\ndata, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of\ndata reserved by all producers.\r\n\r\nEach time a record is reserved, the producer that \u0026quot;owns\u0026quot; the record will\nsuccessfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is\nread, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished\nprocessing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user\nspace, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.\r\n\r\nOne aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both\nproducers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously\nback-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures\nfor samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data\narea, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page\nagain, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual\nmemory.\r\n\r\nEach record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for\nbook-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.\nHelpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`\nfor the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however\npossible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first\nchunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk\u0026apos;s\nheader.\r\n\r\nFor example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size\nof 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to\nbpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in\n[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets\nallocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos\nwas edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos \u0026gt; rb-\u0026gt;mask`\ncheck. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able\nto edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned\nearlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data\npages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A\u0026apos;s header.\nbpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header\u0026apos;s pg_off to then\nlocate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk\nB modified chunk A\u0026apos;s header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong\npage and could cause a crash.\r\n\r\nFix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range\nfrom the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring\nbuffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We\u0026apos;ve tested with\nthe ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)\nbefore/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it\nis still not significantly enough to matter.(CVE-2024-41009)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1896",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:21Z",
  "published": "2024-07-26T11:07:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1896"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47432"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47622"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48814"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48816"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48844"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52757"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52781"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36939"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38559"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38568"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38578"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38589"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38618"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38619"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39469"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39472"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39494"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39499"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39505"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40904"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40905"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40912"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40929"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40932"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40941"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40943"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40968"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40974"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40983"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40984"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40987"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41004"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41005"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41007"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41009"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-47432",
    "CVE-2021-47622",
    "CVE-2022-48814",
    "CVE-2022-48816",
    "CVE-2022-48844",
    "CVE-2023-52757",
    "CVE-2023-52781",
    "CVE-2024-36939",
    "CVE-2024-38559",
    "CVE-2024-38568",
    "CVE-2024-38578",
    "CVE-2024-38589",
    "CVE-2024-38618",
    "CVE-2024-38619",
    "CVE-2024-39469",
    "CVE-2024-39472",
    "CVE-2024-39494",
    "CVE-2024-39499",
    "CVE-2024-39505",
    "CVE-2024-40904",
    "CVE-2024-40905",
    "CVE-2024-40912",
    "CVE-2024-40929",
    "CVE-2024-40932",
    "CVE-2024-40941",
    "CVE-2024-40943",
    "CVE-2024-40968",
    "CVE-2024-40974",
    "CVE-2024-40983",
    "CVE-2024-40984",
    "CVE-2024-40987",
    "CVE-2024-41004",
    "CVE-2024-41005",
    "CVE-2024-41007",
    "CVE-2024-41009"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-220.0.0.119.oe2203sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres\r\n\r\nAs explained in commits:\n74b6d7d13307 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres\u0026quot;)\n5135e96a3dd2 (\u0026quot;net: dsa: don\u0026apos;t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres\u0026quot;)\r\n\r\nmdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() \u0026lt;-\ndevres_release_all() \u0026lt;- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was\nnot previously unregistered.\r\n\r\nThe Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of\nconstraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call\n-\u0026gt;remove on -\u0026gt;shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which\napplies here.\r\n\r\nIf the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -\u0026gt;remove from -\u0026gt;shutdown\n(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link\nbetween the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()\nwill unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.\r\n\r\nSo the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which\nis: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,\nor don\u0026apos;t use devres at all.\r\n\r\nThe seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the\nmdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external\ndependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls\ndevm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring\nthat, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let\u0026apos;s work\nwith devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.\nWhen we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn\u0026apos;t free a\nstill-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).(CVE-2022-48814)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\nsyzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature\nnetns.\r\n\r\nrpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error\nhas been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4\n(\u0026quot;Linux-2.6.12-rc2\u0026quot;).\r\n\r\nRecently, commit d47151b79e32 (\u0026quot;nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs\nin net namespaces\u0026quot;) converted the procfs to per-netns and made\nthe problem more visible.\r\n\r\nEven when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,\nand thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.\r\n\r\nThen, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc\ndirectory and trigger the warning below.\r\n\r\nLet\u0026apos;s handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().\r\n\r\n[0]:\nname \u0026apos;nfs\u0026apos;\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nCode: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c\nRDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc\nR13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8\nFS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310\n nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438\n ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170\n setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372\n copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505\n create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d\nCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600\nRBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002\nR13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36939)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nUSB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages\r\n\r\nThe syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in\nthe cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver\u0026apos;s immediate\nresubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the\ndummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:\r\n\r\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]\nCPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:\n\t#1:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#2:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#3:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#4:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#5:  98% system,\t  1% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 73096\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582\nsoftirqs last disabled at (73043): [\u0026lt;ffff800080020de8\u0026gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588\nCPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\r\n\r\nTesting showed that the problem did not occur if the two error\nmessages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding\nmaterial to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.\r\n\r\nIn any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to\navoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is\nto ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with\ndev_err_ratelimited().(CVE-2024-40904)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()\r\n\r\nsyzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]\r\n\r\nIf compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),\nsecond read could read NULL, if another cpu clears\nthe value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().\r\n\r\nAdd a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.\r\n\r\nAlso add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because\nwe rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n\r\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]\nCPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\n RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984\nCode: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 \u0026lt;80\u0026gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206\nRAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16\nRDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091\nRBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8\nR13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]\n  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]\n  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038\n  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]\n  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043\n  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205\n  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127\n  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175\n  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255\n  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271\n  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]\n  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911\n  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855\n  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778\n  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992\n  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]\n  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]\n  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585\n  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193\n  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]\n  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759\n  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\n  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640\n  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231\n  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]\n  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393\n  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389\n  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-40905)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1898",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:21Z",
  "published": "2024-07-26T11:07:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1898"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48814"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36939"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40904"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40905"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2022-48814",
    "CVE-2024-36939",
    "CVE-2024-40904",
    "CVE-2024-40905"
  ]
}