CVE-2024-47702 (GCVE-0-2024-47702)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-10-21 11:53 – Updated: 2026-08-05 11:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta
syzbot reported a kernel crash due to
commit 1f1e864b6555 ("bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses").
The reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for
packet data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.
The original code looks like:
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff->data_end */
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto +1
...
Note that __sk_buff->data load has 32-bit sign extension.
After verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 = (s32)r2
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
...
Note that 'r2 = (s32)r2' may make the kernel __sk_buff->data address invalid
which may cause runtime failure.
Currently, in C code, typically we have
void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
and it will generate
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
If we allow sign-extension,
void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
the generated code looks like
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 <<= 32
r2 s>>= 32
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
and this will cause verification failure since "r2 <<= 32" is not allowed
as "r2" is a packet pointer.
To fix this issue for case
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
this patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback
function for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses
are with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/
Severity
7.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-10-21 13:04 UTC
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
1f1e864b65554e33fe74e3377e58b12f4302f2eb , < f1620c93a1ec950d87ef327a565d3907736d3340
(git)
Affected: 1f1e864b65554e33fe74e3377e58b12f4302f2eb , < f09757fe97a225ae505886eac572e4cbfba96537 (git) Affected: 1f1e864b65554e33fe74e3377e58b12f4302f2eb , < 92de36080c93296ef9005690705cba260b9bd68a (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.6
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.6 (semver) Unaffected: 6.10.13 , ≤ 6.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.11.2 , ≤ 6.11.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta\n\nsyzbot reported a kernel crash due to\n commit 1f1e864b6555 (\"bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses\").\nThe reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for\npacket data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.\n\nThe original code looks like:\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\n r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata_end */\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto +1\n ...\nNote that __sk_buff-\u003edata load has 32-bit sign extension.\n\nAfter verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 = (s32)r2\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n ...\nNote that \u0027r2 = (s32)r2\u0027 may make the kernel __sk_buff-\u003edata address invalid\nwhich may cause runtime failure.\n\nCurrently, in C code, typically we have\n void *data = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nand it will generate\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n\nIf we allow sign-extension,\n void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nthe generated code looks like\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\n r2 s\u003e\u003e= 32\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\nand this will cause verification failure since \"r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\" is not allowed\nas \"r2\" is a packet pointer.\n\nTo fix this issue for case\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\nthis patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback\nfunction for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses\nare with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.\n\n [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/"
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"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: Error en la verificaci\u00f3n de la extensi\u00f3n de signo del paquete data/data_end/data_meta syzbot inform\u00f3 de un fallo del kernel debido a el commit 1f1e864b6555 (\"bpf: Manejar los accesos a miembros ctx de la extensi\u00f3n de signo\"). La raz\u00f3n se debe a la extensi\u00f3n de signo de la carga de 32 bits para el campo uapi del paquete data/data_end/data_meta. El c\u00f3digo original se ve as\u00ed: r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data */ r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data_end */ r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto +1 ... Tenga en cuenta que la carga de __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data tiene una extensi\u00f3n de signo de 32 bits. Despu\u00e9s de la verificaci\u00f3n y convert_ctx_accesses(), el c\u00f3digo asm final se ve as\u00ed: r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 = (s32)r2 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 ... Tenga en cuenta que \u0027r2 = (s32)r2\u0027 puede hacer que la direcci\u00f3n __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data del n\u00facleo sea inv\u00e1lida, lo que puede causar un error en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n. Actualmente, en el c\u00f3digo C, normalmente tenemos void *data = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data_end; ... y generar\u00e1 r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 Si permitimos la extensi\u00f3n de signo, void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb-\u0026gt;data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data_end; ... el c\u00f3digo generado se ve as\u00ed r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 \u0026lt;\u0026lt;= 32 r2 s\u0026gt;\u0026gt;= 32 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 y esto causar\u00e1 un error de verificaci\u00f3n ya que \"r2 \u0026lt;\u0026lt;= 32\" no est\u00e1 permitido ya que \"r2\" es un puntero de paquete. Para solucionar este problema en el caso r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data */, este parche agreg\u00f3 una verificaci\u00f3n adicional en la funci\u00f3n de devoluci\u00f3n de llamada is_valid_access() para el acceso a los paquetes data/data_end/data_meta. Si esos accesos son con la extensi\u00f3n sign-extenstion, la verificaci\u00f3n fallar\u00e1. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/"
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta\n\nsyzbot reported a kernel crash due to\n commit 1f1e864b6555 (\"bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses\").\nThe reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for\npacket data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.\n\nThe original code looks like:\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\n r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata_end */\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto +1\n ...\nNote that __sk_buff-\u003edata load has 32-bit sign extension.\n\nAfter verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 = (s32)r2\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n ...\nNote that \u0027r2 = (s32)r2\u0027 may make the kernel __sk_buff-\u003edata address invalid\nwhich may cause runtime failure.\n\nCurrently, in C code, typically we have\n void *data = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nand it will generate\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n\nIf we allow sign-extension,\n void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nthe generated code looks like\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\n r2 s\u003e\u003e= 32\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\nand this will cause verification failure since \"r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\" is not allowed\nas \"r2\" is a packet pointer.\n\nTo fix this issue for case\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\nthis patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback\nfunction for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses\nare with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.\n\n [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: Error en la verificaci\u00f3n de la extensi\u00f3n de signo del paquete data/data_end/data_meta syzbot inform\u00f3 de un fallo del kernel debido a el commit 1f1e864b6555 (\"bpf: Manejar los accesos a miembros ctx de la extensi\u00f3n de signo\"). La raz\u00f3n se debe a la extensi\u00f3n de signo de la carga de 32 bits para el campo uapi del paquete data/data_end/data_meta. El c\u00f3digo original se ve as\u00ed: r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data */ r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data_end */ r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto +1 ... Tenga en cuenta que la carga de __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data tiene una extensi\u00f3n de signo de 32 bits. Despu\u00e9s de la verificaci\u00f3n y convert_ctx_accesses(), el c\u00f3digo asm final se ve as\u00ed: r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 = (s32)r2 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 ... Tenga en cuenta que \u0027r2 = (s32)r2\u0027 puede hacer que la direcci\u00f3n __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data del n\u00facleo sea inv\u00e1lida, lo que puede causar un error en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n. Actualmente, en el c\u00f3digo C, normalmente tenemos void *data = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data_end; ... y generar\u00e1 r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 Si permitimos la extensi\u00f3n de signo, void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb-\u0026gt;data; void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u0026gt;data_end; ... el c\u00f3digo generado se ve as\u00ed r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208) r2 \u0026lt;\u0026lt;= 32 r2 s\u0026gt;\u0026gt;= 32 r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80) r0 = r2 r0 += 8 if r3 \u0026gt; r0 goto pc+1 y esto causar\u00e1 un error de verificaci\u00f3n ya que \"r2 \u0026lt;\u0026lt;= 32\" no est\u00e1 permitido ya que \"r2\" es un puntero de paquete. Para solucionar este problema en el caso r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u0026gt;data */, este parche agreg\u00f3 una verificaci\u00f3n adicional en la funci\u00f3n de devoluci\u00f3n de llamada is_valid_access() para el acceso a los paquetes data/data_end/data_meta. Si esos accesos son con la extensi\u00f3n sign-extenstion, la verificaci\u00f3n fallar\u00e1. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-47702",
"lastModified": "2026-08-04T11:20:42.080",
"metrics": {
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{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
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"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
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"baseScore": 5.5,
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"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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},
"published": "2024-10-21T12:15:06.743",
"references": [
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"redhat_vex": {
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"current_release_date": "2026-08-04T22:41:12+00:00",
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"id": "CVE-2024-47702",
"initial_release_date": "2024-10-21T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "136",
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"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta",
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"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2024-47702.json",
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"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta\n\nsyzbot reported a kernel crash due to\n commit 1f1e864b6555 (\"bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses\").\nThe reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for\npacket data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.\n\nThe original code looks like:\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\n r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata_end */\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto +1\n ...\nNote that __sk_buff-\u003edata load has 32-bit sign extension.\n\nAfter verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 = (s32)r2\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n ...\nNote that \u0027r2 = (s32)r2\u0027 may make the kernel __sk_buff-\u003edata address invalid\nwhich may cause runtime failure.\n\nCurrently, in C code, typically we have\n void *data = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nand it will generate\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\n\nIf we allow sign-extension,\n void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb-\u003edata;\n void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb-\u003edata_end;\n ...\nthe generated code looks like\n r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)\n r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\n r2 s\u003e\u003e= 32\n r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)\n r0 = r2\n r0 += 8\n if r3 \u003e r0 goto pc+1\nand this will cause verification failure since \"r2 \u003c\u003c= 32\" is not allowed\nas \"r2\" is a packet pointer.\n\nTo fix this issue for case\n r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff-\u003edata */\nthis patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback\nfunction for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses\nare with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.\n\n [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/"
}
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"value": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached by loading a crafted eBPF program through the bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) syscall, which requires local access to the system; the attacker supplies the malicious LDSX instruction, not a remote peer.\nAC:L - The attacker authors the BPF bytecode directly, so the verifier bypass is accepted deterministically on every load, and the corrupted `(s32)skb-\u003edata` pointer is produced on every execution of the program with no race or unpredictable precondition; running the hook repeatedly over many skbs makes the out-of-bounds dereference a certainty.\nPR:L - Loading the affected program types requires CAP_BPF/CAP_NET_ADMIN, which BPF token delegation (`bpf_token_capable()` \u2192 `bpf_ns_capable(token-\u003euserns, cap)`, present in the affected 6.9\u20136.11 range) makes available to a host-unprivileged user inside a user namespace, and CAP_BPF is by design a reduced privilege whose security boundary is the verifier itself.\nUI:N - The attacker loads and attaches the program and then generates the traffic (or uses BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN) that executes it; no action from any other user is needed.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds access and resulting corruption occur within the kernel\u0027s own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The verifier still tracks the truncated value as a valid PTR_TO_PACKET, so the program performs kernel-mode reads at `(s32)skb-\u003edata + K` far outside any packet buffer and can copy the results into a BPF map or the packet, giving an out-of-bounds kernel memory read primitive.\nI:H - `may_access_direct_pkt_data()` grants direct packet writes to SCHED_CLS, SCHED_ACT, XDP, LWT_XMIT and SK_SKB, so the same corrupted pointer yields kernel-mode stores at an attacker-influenced address \u2014 memory corruption exploitable for further escalation.\nA:H - syzbot reported this as a kernel crash; dereferencing the mangled address from softirq/NAPI context produces a page fault or general protection fault in kernel mode, oopsing or panicking the machine."
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"cveId": "CVE-2024-47702",
"datePublished": "2024-10-21T11:53:37.958Z",
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}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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