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                "id": "CVE-2025-13353",
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                  },
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                    "Automatable": "no"
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
          "product": "gokey",
          "repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
          "vendor": "Cloudflare",
          "versions": [
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              "value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\n  \u003cdiv\u003e\n    \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\n  \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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          "value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n  *  keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n  *  a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n  *  temporarily download  gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3  for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n  *  use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n  *  populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n  *  generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n  *  provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n  *  verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n  *  revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
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To \\ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\\n\\n\\n\\n  *  temporarily download  gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3  for their respective operating system to recover the old password\\n\\n  *  use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\\n\\n  *  populate the system provided password rotation form\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \\nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \\nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \\nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\\n systems users are advised to:\\n\\n\\n\\n  *  generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\\n\\n  *  provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\\n\\n  *  verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\\n\\n  *  revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nCredit\\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cdiv\u003e\\n  \u003cdiv\u003e\\n    \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \\nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \\nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \\nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \\nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cul\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \\nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \\nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \\nused\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \\nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \\nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003c/ul\u003e\\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \\nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \\nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \\nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \\nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \\\"Forgot password\\\" facility or a\\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \\nsending a unique \\\"magic\\\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \\ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \\ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \\nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \\ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cul\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"nofollow\\\" href=\\\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\\\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003c/ul\u003e\\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \\nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \\nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \\nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cul\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\\n\u003c/ul\u003e\\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\\\"_blank\\\" rel=\\\"nofollow\\\" href=\\\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\\\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\\n  \u003c/div\u003e\\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-330\", \"description\": \"CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513\", \"shortName\": \"cloudflare\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2025-13353\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2025-11-18T11:21:27.669Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513\", \"datePublished\": \"2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"cloudflare\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}