CVE-2025-15575 (GCVE-0-2025-15575)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-12 10:51 – Updated: 2026-02-12 15:13
VLAI?
Title
Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks in Solax Power Pocket WiFi models
Summary
The firmware update functionality does not verify the authenticity of the supplied firmware update files. This allows attackers to flash malicious firmware update files on the device. Initial analysis of the firmware update functionality does not show any cryptographic checks (e.g. digital signature checks) on the supplied firmware update files. Furthermore, ESP32 security features such as secure boot are not used.
Severity ?
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CWE
  • CWE-494 - Download of Code Without Integrity Check
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SolaX Power Pocket WiFi 3.0 Affected: <3.022.03
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Stefan Viehböck, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.