CVE-2025-40214 (GCVE-0-2025-40214)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-04 12:38 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:08
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
af_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().
Quang Le reported that the AF_UNIX GC could garbage-collect a
receive queue of an alive in-flight socket, with a nice repro.
The repro consists of three stages.
1)
1-a. Create a single cyclic reference with many sockets
1-b. close() all sockets
1-c. Trigger GC
2)
2-a. Pass sk-A to an embryo sk-B
2-b. Pass sk-X to sk-X
2-c. Trigger GC
3)
3-a. accept() the embryo sk-B
3-b. Pass sk-B to sk-C
3-c. close() the in-flight sk-A
3-d. Trigger GC
As of 2-c, sk-A and sk-X are linked to unix_unvisited_vertices,
and unix_walk_scc() groups them into two different SCCs:
unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->scc_index = 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)
unix_sk(sk-X)->vertex->scc_index = 3
Once GC completes, unix_graph_grouped is set to true.
Also, unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is set to true due to sk-X's
cyclic self-reference, which makes close() trigger GC.
At 3-b, unix_add_edge() allocates unix_sk(sk-B)->vertex and
links it to unix_unvisited_vertices.
unix_update_graph() is called at 3-a. and 3-b., but neither
unix_graph_grouped nor unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is changed
because both sk-B's listener and sk-C are not in-flight.
3-c decrements sk-A's file refcnt to 1.
Since unix_graph_grouped is true at 3-d, unix_walk_scc_fast()
is finally called and iterates 3 sockets sk-A, sk-B, and sk-X:
sk-A -> sk-B (-> sk-C)
sk-X -> sk-X
This is totally fine. All of them are not yet close()d and
should be grouped into different SCCs.
However, unix_vertex_dead() misjudges that sk-A and sk-B are
in the same SCC and sk-A is dead.
unix_sk(sk-A)->scc_index == unix_sk(sk-B)->scc_index <-- Wrong!
&&
sk-A's file refcnt == unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->out_degree
^-- 1 in-flight count for sk-B
-> sk-A is dead !?
The problem is that unix_add_edge() does not initialise scc_index.
Stage 1) is used for heap spraying, making a newly allocated
vertex have vertex->scc_index == 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)
set by unix_walk_scc() at 1-c.
Let's track the max SCC index from the previous unix_walk_scc()
call and assign the max + 1 to a new vertex's scc_index.
This way, we can continue to avoid Tarjan's algorithm while
preventing misjudgments.
Severity
7.8 (High)
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
adfb68b39b39767d6bfb53e48c4f19c183765686 , < 20003fbb9174121b27bd1da6ebe61542ac4c327d
(git)
Affected: d23802221f6755e104606864067c71af8cdb6788 , < 4cd8d755c7d4f515dd9abf483316aca2f1b7b0f3 (git) Affected: ad081928a8b0f57f269df999a28087fce6f2b6ce , < db81ad20fd8aef7cc7d536c52ee5ea4c1f979128 (git) Affected: ad081928a8b0f57f269df999a28087fce6f2b6ce , < 1aa7e40ee850c9053e769957ce6541173891204d (git) Affected: ad081928a8b0f57f269df999a28087fce6f2b6ce , < 60e6489f8e3b086bd1130ad4450a2c112e863791 (git) Affected: 6.1.141 , < 6.1.159 (semver) Affected: 6.6.93 , < 6.6.117 (semver) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.10
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.10 (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.159 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.117 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.59 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.17.9 , ≤ 6.17.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed | |
| Siemens | RUGGEDCOM RST2428P |
Affected:
0 , < V4.0
(custom)
|
guessed |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().\n\nQuang Le reported that the AF_UNIX GC could garbage-collect a\nreceive queue of an alive in-flight socket, with a nice repro.\n\nThe repro consists of three stages.\n\n 1)\n 1-a. Create a single cyclic reference with many sockets\n 1-b. close() all sockets\n 1-c. Trigger GC\n\n 2)\n 2-a. Pass sk-A to an embryo sk-B\n 2-b. Pass sk-X to sk-X\n 2-c. Trigger GC\n\n 3)\n 3-a. accept() the embryo sk-B\n 3-b. Pass sk-B to sk-C\n 3-c. close() the in-flight sk-A\n 3-d. Trigger GC\n\nAs of 2-c, sk-A and sk-X are linked to unix_unvisited_vertices,\nand unix_walk_scc() groups them into two different SCCs:\n\n unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003evertex-\u003escc_index = 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)\n unix_sk(sk-X)-\u003evertex-\u003escc_index = 3\n\nOnce GC completes, unix_graph_grouped is set to true.\nAlso, unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is set to true due to sk-X\u0027s\ncyclic self-reference, which makes close() trigger GC.\n\nAt 3-b, unix_add_edge() allocates unix_sk(sk-B)-\u003evertex and\nlinks it to unix_unvisited_vertices.\n\nunix_update_graph() is called at 3-a. and 3-b., but neither\nunix_graph_grouped nor unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is changed\nbecause both sk-B\u0027s listener and sk-C are not in-flight.\n\n3-c decrements sk-A\u0027s file refcnt to 1.\n\nSince unix_graph_grouped is true at 3-d, unix_walk_scc_fast()\nis finally called and iterates 3 sockets sk-A, sk-B, and sk-X:\n\n sk-A -\u003e sk-B (-\u003e sk-C)\n sk-X -\u003e sk-X\n\nThis is totally fine. All of them are not yet close()d and\nshould be grouped into different SCCs.\n\nHowever, unix_vertex_dead() misjudges that sk-A and sk-B are\nin the same SCC and sk-A is dead.\n\n unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003escc_index == unix_sk(sk-B)-\u003escc_index \u003c-- Wrong!\n \u0026\u0026\n sk-A\u0027s file refcnt == unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003evertex-\u003eout_degree\n ^-- 1 in-flight count for sk-B\n -\u003e sk-A is dead !?\n\nThe problem is that unix_add_edge() does not initialise scc_index.\n\nStage 1) is used for heap spraying, making a newly allocated\nvertex have vertex-\u003escc_index == 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)\nset by unix_walk_scc() at 1-c.\n\nLet\u0027s track the max SCC index from the previous unix_walk_scc()\ncall and assign the max + 1 to a new vertex\u0027s scc_index.\n\nThis way, we can continue to avoid Tarjan\u0027s algorithm while\npreventing misjudgments."
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().\n\nQuang Le reported that the AF_UNIX GC could garbage-collect a\nreceive queue of an alive in-flight socket, with a nice repro.\n\nThe repro consists of three stages.\n\n 1)\n 1-a. Create a single cyclic reference with many sockets\n 1-b. close() all sockets\n 1-c. Trigger GC\n\n 2)\n 2-a. Pass sk-A to an embryo sk-B\n 2-b. Pass sk-X to sk-X\n 2-c. Trigger GC\n\n 3)\n 3-a. accept() the embryo sk-B\n 3-b. Pass sk-B to sk-C\n 3-c. close() the in-flight sk-A\n 3-d. Trigger GC\n\nAs of 2-c, sk-A and sk-X are linked to unix_unvisited_vertices,\nand unix_walk_scc() groups them into two different SCCs:\n\n unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003evertex-\u003escc_index = 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)\n unix_sk(sk-X)-\u003evertex-\u003escc_index = 3\n\nOnce GC completes, unix_graph_grouped is set to true.\nAlso, unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is set to true due to sk-X\u0027s\ncyclic self-reference, which makes close() trigger GC.\n\nAt 3-b, unix_add_edge() allocates unix_sk(sk-B)-\u003evertex and\nlinks it to unix_unvisited_vertices.\n\nunix_update_graph() is called at 3-a. and 3-b., but neither\nunix_graph_grouped nor unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is changed\nbecause both sk-B\u0027s listener and sk-C are not in-flight.\n\n3-c decrements sk-A\u0027s file refcnt to 1.\n\nSince unix_graph_grouped is true at 3-d, unix_walk_scc_fast()\nis finally called and iterates 3 sockets sk-A, sk-B, and sk-X:\n\n sk-A -\u003e sk-B (-\u003e sk-C)\n sk-X -\u003e sk-X\n\nThis is totally fine. All of them are not yet close()d and\nshould be grouped into different SCCs.\n\nHowever, unix_vertex_dead() misjudges that sk-A and sk-B are\nin the same SCC and sk-A is dead.\n\n unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003escc_index == unix_sk(sk-B)-\u003escc_index \u003c-- Wrong!\n \u0026\u0026\n sk-A\u0027s file refcnt == unix_sk(sk-A)-\u003evertex-\u003eout_degree\n ^-- 1 in-flight count for sk-B\n -\u003e sk-A is dead !?\n\nThe problem is that unix_add_edge() does not initialise scc_index.\n\nStage 1) is used for heap spraying, making a newly allocated\nvertex have vertex-\u003escc_index == 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START)\nset by unix_walk_scc() at 1-c.\n\nLet\u0027s track the max SCC index from the previous unix_walk_scc()\ncall and assign the max + 1 to a new vertex\u0027s scc_index.\n\nThis way, we can continue to avoid Tarjan\u0027s algorithm while\npreventing misjudgments."
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"id": "CVE-2025-40214",
"lastModified": "2026-07-30T06:24:18.343",
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"published": "2025-12-04T13:15:48.157",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1aa7e40ee850c9053e769957ce6541173891204d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20003fbb9174121b27bd1da6ebe61542ac4c327d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cd8d755c7d4f515dd9abf483316aca2f1b7b0f3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60e6489f8e3b086bd1130ad4450a2c112e863791"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db81ad20fd8aef7cc7d536c52ee5ea4c1f979128"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://mohandacherir.github.io/Qdiv7/posts/unix_new_gc/"
},
{
"source": "0b142b55-0307-4c5a-b3c9-f314f3fb7c5e",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-253495.html"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-07-30T08:47:31+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2025-40214",
"id": "CVE-2025-40214",
"initial_release_date": "2025-12-04T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "90",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "184",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: af_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge()",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-40214.json",
"version": "3"
},
"suse_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "important",
"current_release_date": "2026-09-12T16:47:06Z",
"cve": "CVE-2025-40214",
"id": "CVE-2025-40214",
"initial_release_date": "2025-12-05T00:26:10Z",
"product_status:first_fixed": "2",
"product_status:known_affected": "394",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "538",
"product_status:recommended": "188",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2025-40214",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2025-40214.json",
"version": "37"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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