CVE-2025-68183 (GCVE-0-2025-68183)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-16 13:43 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:10
VLAI
Title
ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL. Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset. Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL, #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; }
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407 (git)
Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292 (git)
Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < 02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023 (git)
Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 5.14
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.14 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.117 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.58 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.17.8 , ≤ 6.17.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
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{
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\n\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\nfile.\n\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \"ima_appraise=fix\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\n\n    # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\n    # file: usr/bin/bash\n    security.ima=0x0404...\n\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\nwhen the file is closed.\n\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\n\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\n\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\n\n    #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n    #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n    int main() {\n        const char* file_path = \"/usr/sbin/test_binary\";\n        const char* hex_string = \"030204d33204490066306402304\";\n        int length = strlen(hex_string);\n        char* ima_attr_value;\n        int fd;\n\n        fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\n        if (fd == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error opening file\");\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\n        for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\n            sscanf(hex_string + i, \"%2hhx\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\n        }\n\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.ima\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n            close(fd);\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        const char* selinux_value= \"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\";\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.selinux\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n            close(fd);\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        close(fd);\n\n        return 0;\n    }"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - Triggering requires local syscalls against a file on the system \u2014 `setxattr`/`fsetxattr` on an EVM-protected xattr, `setfacl`, or `fremovexattr` \u2014 followed by an open/close of the target file. No network, adjacent-network, or physical path reaches the IMA appraisal hooks.\nAC:L - The commit ships a deterministic reproducer: setting any EVM-protected xattr or a POSIX ACL unconditionally clears IMA_DIGSIG every time, with no memory-layout or timing luck involved. The enforce-mode variant needs a race against `process_measurement()`\u0027s `MAY_WRITE` check, but `ima_reset_appraise_flags()` takes no `iint-\u003emutex`, and the attacker drives both sides (one thread spinning on `setxattr(\"system.posix_acl_access\")`, another on `open(O_WRONLY)`); the required IMA-appraise + EVM configuration is a shipped, supported Fedora/RHEL setup, not a rare build option.\nPR:L - `vfs_set_acl()` invokes `security_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_reset_appraise_flags(inode, 0)` before `set_posix_acl()` ever reaches its `inode_owner_or_capable()` check, so an unprivileged user with no capabilities and no ownership of the file clears the cached IMA_DIGSIG bit on any signed appraised binary \u2014 the syscall fails with -EPERM only after the flag is already gone. No CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this path, unlike the `security.ima` path guarded by `ima_protect_xattr()`.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the xattr/ACL operation and the file open/close entirely from their own process; no victim must mount a filesystem, open a file, or take any other action for the IMA_DIGSIG flag to be cleared and the signature to be replaced.\nS:U - The defeated control (IMA appraisal) and the affected resources (files and their security xattrs) live in the same kernel security authority; no VM, hypervisor, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Clearing IMA_DIGSIG both drops the \"signed files cannot be opened for write\" enforcement at `ima_main.c:472` and lets `ima_update_xattr()` re-bless the modified content with a fresh hash plus EVM HMAC, so attacker-substituted content in an appraised executable passes appraisal and subsequently runs \u2014 typically in a privileged/service context \u2014 yielding full disclosure of data reachable by that code. This is the standard treatment of a code-integrity/signature-verification bypass; the bug itself contains no direct memory-read primitive.\nI:H - The file\u0027s IMA digital signature \u2014 the one integrity artifact a local attacker cannot forge, since it is verified against the trusted IMA keyring \u2014 is silently destroyed and replaced by a locally computed hash written through `__vfs_setxattr_noperm()`, which bypasses the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` gate in `ima_protect_xattr()`. Combined with the lost write-block, this converts \"signed and immutable\" into \"mutable and re-blessed on close\", a complete integrity bypass of IMA appraisal for the affected file.\nA:H - Once a signature is replaced by a plain hash, any policy carrying IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED (`appraise_type=imasig`) rejects that file in enforce mode, so appraised binaries become permanently unexecutable \u2014 applied to system-critical files such as init, sshd, or libc consumers this denies service and can leave the system unbootable, and the corrupted xattr persists on disk until the file is re-signed out of band."
            }
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        }
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:10:06.378Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
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        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292"
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        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd"
        }
      ],
      "title": "ima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr",
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    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-68183",
    "datePublished": "2025-12-16T13:43:01.178Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-12-16T13:41:40.252Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:10:06.378Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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  "dataVersion": "5.2",
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      "date": "2026-08-10",
      "epss": "0.00137",
      "percentile": "0.03505"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2025-68183\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2025-12-16T14:15:50.880\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-07-30T06:24:32.637\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Deferred\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\\n\\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\\nfile.\\n\\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \\\"ima_appraise=fix\\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\\\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\\n\\n    # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\\n    # file: usr/bin/bash\\n    security.ima=0x0404...\\n\\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\\nwhen the file is closed.\\n\\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\\n\\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\\n\\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\\n\\n    #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\\n\\n    int main() {\\n        const char* file_path = \\\"/usr/sbin/test_binary\\\";\\n        const char* hex_string = \\\"030204d33204490066306402304\\\";\\n        int length = strlen(hex_string);\\n        char* ima_attr_value;\\n        int fd;\\n\\n        fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\\n        if (fd == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error opening file\\\");\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\\n        for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\\n            sscanf(hex_string + i, \\\"%2hhx\\\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\\n        }\\n\\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \\\"security.ima\\\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error setting extended attribute\\\");\\n            close(fd);\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        const char* selinux_value= \\\"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\\\";\\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \\\"security.selinux\\\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error setting extended attribute\\\");\\n            close(fd);\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        close(fd);\\n\\n        return 0;\\n    }\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\",\"lessThan\":\"d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\",\"lessThan\":\"edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\",\"lessThan\":\"02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\",\"lessThan\":\"88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"5.14\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"5.14\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.6.117\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.6.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.58\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.17.8\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.17.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-07-30T08:22:46+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-68183",
      "id": "CVE-2025-68183",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-12-16T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:fixed": "1980",
      "product_status:known_affected": "33",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "31",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: ima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-68183.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "suse_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-07-31T00:58:59Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-68183",
      "id": "CVE-2025-68183",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-12-17T00:26:04Z",
      "product_status:first_fixed": "2",
      "product_status:known_affected": "354",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "275",
      "product_status:recommended": "701",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2025-68183",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2025-68183.json",
      "version": "48"
    }
  }
}



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