cvelistv5 - cve-2025-7054

CVE-2025-7054 (GCVE-0-2025-7054)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-08-07 15:19 – Updated: 2025-08-07 15:52

Summary

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.

Severity ?

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-835 - Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')

Assigner

cloudflare

References

URL

Tags

https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/adv…

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	Cloudflare	quiche	Affected: 0.15.0 , < 0.24.5 (semver)

Show details on NVD website

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GHSA-M3HH-F9GH-74C2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-07 20:53 – Updated: 2025-08-07 20:53

Summary

quiche connection ID retirement can trigger an infinite loop

Details

Impact

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.

QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000. Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.

Patches

quiche 0.24.5 is the earliest version containing the fix for the issue

Severity ?

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

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        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
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    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-07T20:53:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-07T16:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nCloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nQUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see [Section 5.1 of RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1). Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, [Section 19.16 of RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.16) requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself.  In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID  synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.\n\n## Patches\n\nquiche 0.24.5 is the earliest version containing the fix for the issue",
  "id": "GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2",
  "modified": "2025-08-07T20:53:40Z",
  "published": "2025-08-07T20:53:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7054"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "quiche connection ID retirement can trigger an infinite loop"
}

FKIE_CVE-2025-7054

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-08-07 16:15 - Updated: 2025-08-14 19:58

Severity ?

6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	cna@cloudflare.com	https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2	Third Party Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	cloudflare	quiche	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:quiche:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A953884D-FE8D-4510-BCC3-5B30E3D66F34",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.24.5",
              "versionStartIncluding": "0.15.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nQUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see  Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames,  Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6  requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Se descubri\u00f3 que Cloudflare Quiche era vulnerable a un bucle infinito al enviar paquetes que conten\u00edan tramas RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID. Las conexiones QUIC poseen un conjunto de identificadores de conexi\u00f3n (ID); consulte la Secci\u00f3n 5.1 de RFC 9000 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1). Una vez completado el protocolo de enlace QUIC, un endpoint local se encarga de emitir y retirar los ID de conexi\u00f3n que utiliza el punto remoto para rellenar el campo ID de conexi\u00f3n de destino en los paquetes enviados desde el punto remoto al local. Cada ID de conexi\u00f3n tiene un n\u00famero de secuencia para garantizar la sincronizaci\u00f3n entre los puntos. Un atacante remoto no autenticado puede explotar esta vulnerabilidad completando primero un protocolo de enlace y luego enviando un conjunto de tramas especialmente manipuladas que desencadenan el retiro del ID de conexi\u00f3n en la v\u00edctima. Cuando la v\u00edctima intenta enviar un paquete que contiene tramas RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID, la Secci\u00f3n 19.16 de RFC 9000 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6) exige que el n\u00famero de secuencia del ID de conexi\u00f3n retirado no coincida con el del ID de conexi\u00f3n utilizado por el paquete. En otras palabras, un paquete no puede contener una trama que se retire a s\u00ed misma. En escenarios como la migraci\u00f3n de rutas, es posible que existan m\u00faltiples rutas activas con diferentes ID de conexi\u00f3n activos que podr\u00edan utilizarse para retirarse mutuamente. El exploit desencaden\u00f3 un comportamiento involuntario de una caracter\u00edstica de dise\u00f1o de quiche que permite el retiro entre rutas manteniendo la sincronizaci\u00f3n completa del ID de conexi\u00f3n, lo que provoc\u00f3 un bucle infinito. Este problema afecta a quiche desde la versi\u00f3n 0.15.0 hasta la 0.24.5."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-7054",
  "lastModified": "2025-08-14T19:58:57.683",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-08-07T16:15:31.460",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cna@cloudflare.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-835"
        }
      ],
      "source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2025-7054 (GCVE-0-2025-7054)

GHSA-M3HH-F9GH-74C2

Impact

Patches

FKIE_CVE-2025-7054

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature