{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "pacioli",
          "vendor": "john-broadway",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.9.6, \u003c 0.10.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "pacioli provides least-privilege governance and a governed agent broker for ERPNext. From version 0.9.6 until version 0.10.0, the pacioli-guard document-layer consent gate allows nested cancellation operations to ride any consent established by an enclosing governed act without checking whether the marker authorizes cancellation. A credential with API Key Scope.require_consent can submit a caller-controlled Sales Invoice or other supported document under a valid human-minted submit marker and reach Document.cancel() for a different pre-existing submitted document, bypassing the marker\u0027s document and act binding, single-use spend, and denial audit. The unauthorized cancellation can reverse the target document\u0027s ledger effect; principals without a consent-gated grant are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-107841",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-16T17:17:04.113",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.7,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-107841",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-09T18:41:39.063509Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-09T18:17:06.110",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pacioli-guard"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107841"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-09T18:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`pacioli-guard`\u0027s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to \"ride\" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own.\n\nThe ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**.\n\nThis is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document\u0027s identity is caller-controlled:\n\n- `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`).\n- That iterates the invoice\u0027s item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(\"Asset\", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field.\n- The chain reaches `depreciation.py:481` and then `asset_depreciation_schedule.py:215-217`, which calls `current_schedule.cancel()` on a `docstatus == 1`, submittable `Asset Depreciation Schedule` **through the document lifecycle** (only `should_not_cancel_depreciation_entries` is set, not `ignore_validate`, so `before_cancel` does fire and the ride is what admitted it).\n\nSo one marker authorising `submit Sales Invoice X` cancelled a submitted document the human was never shown and never approved. Cancelling such a document reverses its ledger effect.\n\nThe same shape exists behind wider grants, for example `Unreconcile Payment.on_submit` (`unreconcile_payment.py:59-64`), which walks a child table the caller fills and reaches `accounts/utils.py:857`/`:859` `gain_loss_je.cancel()` on submitted Journal Entries.\n\n### Who is affected\n\nOnly sites that had opted into consent gating: a credential must hold an `API Key Scope` with `require_consent` set. `pacioli-guard` is inert for principals without such a grant, and the credential-scoping floor (`auth_hooks`) is unaffected by this issue.\n\nThe document-layer consent gate was first published in 0.9.6, which is the only released version in the affected range.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.10.0**. The ride now discriminates on the **enclosing act**: an undo may cascade into further undos, but a submit may not cascade into the cancellation of a document that already has a name, because that is an act a human could have been asked to approve. The custody stamp carries the act it was established for rather than a bare boolean, which is the state the vulnerable code lacked.\n\n**Upgrading changes behavior.** Any ERPNext flow where a submit cascades into a lifecycle cancel now requires a consent marker for that cancel as well as for the act itself. In ERPNext v16 that includes asset sale, partial-quantity asset sale, a credit note against an asset sale, Asset Repair capitalization, Asset Shift Allocation, Asset Value Adjustment, and `Unreconcile Payment`. To make that possible, the `X-Pacioli-Consent` header now accepts several markers separated by whitespace or commas; each remains bound to one document and one act, requires a different minter, and is spent exactly once.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nOn 0.9.6, remove `require_consent` from affected grants and rely on the credential-scoping floor alone, or scope governed credentials so they cannot submit documents whose controllers cancel other documents (for ERPNext slice-one, `Sales Invoice` with a populated item-row `asset` link is the known path). Neither is a substitute for upgrading.\n\n### Residual, stated\n\nUnder a governed **cancel**, a cascaded cancel of a pre-existing document still rides. That is load-bearing for undo (an ordinary invoice cancel makes ERPNext cancel the credit/debit notes and journals it generated, via `accounts_controller.py:2001-2005`) and cannot be narrowed without a signal that a cascaded cancel is a consequence of the enclosing document specifically. That justification does not describe everything the residual admits: at least one instance is caller-steered in the same shape as the issue fixed here, `Asset Repair.on_cancel` (`asset_repair.py:215-222`), which cancels a `Serial and Batch Bundle` named by a Link the caller fills in a child table. `pacioli-guard` also does not see writes that set `flags.ignore_validate` or that skip the document lifecycle entirely (raw SQL, `db_update`/`db_set` field writes); those residuals are published in the project\u0027s own documentation and are unchanged by this advisory.\n\n### Credit\n\nFound by an internal adversarial review on 2026-07-28 that traced the predicate against frappe 16.28.0 and ERPNext v16 source rather than the project\u0027s own documentation. The prior code comment asserted that no such lever was known; that assertion had been written without the corresponding source sweep.",
  "id": "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107841"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pacioli-guard",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/pacioli-guard"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.9.6"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107841",
    "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
  ],
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`pacioli-guard`\u0027s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to \"ride\" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own.\n\nThe ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**.\n\nThis is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document\u0027s identity is caller-controlled:\n\n- `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`).\n- That iterates the invoice\u0027s item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(\"Asset\", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field.\n- The chain reaches `depreciation.py:481` and then `asset_depreciation_schedule.py:215-217`, which calls `current_schedule.cancel()` on a `docstatus == 1`, submittable `Asset Depreciation Schedule` **through the document lifecycle** (only `should_not_cancel_depreciation_entries` is set, not `ignore_validate`, so `before_cancel` does fire and the ride is what admitted it).\n\nSo one marker authorising `submit Sales Invoice X` cancelled a submitted document the human was never shown and never approved. Cancelling such a document reverses its ledger effect.\n\nThe same shape exists behind wider grants, for example `Unreconcile Payment.on_submit` (`unreconcile_payment.py:59-64`), which walks a child table the caller fills and reaches `accounts/utils.py:857`/`:859` `gain_loss_je.cancel()` on submitted Journal Entries.\n\n### Who is affected\n\nOnly sites that had opted into consent gating: a credential must hold an `API Key Scope` with `require_consent` set. `pacioli-guard` is inert for principals without such a grant, and the credential-scoping floor (`auth_hooks`) is unaffected by this issue.\n\nThe document-layer consent gate was first published in 0.9.6, which is the only released version in the affected range.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.10.0**. The ride now discriminates on the **enclosing act**: an undo may cascade into further undos, but a submit may not cascade into the cancellation of a document that already has a name, because that is an act a human could have been asked to approve. The custody stamp carries the act it was established for rather than a bare boolean, which is the state the vulnerable code lacked.\n\n**Upgrading changes behavior.** Any ERPNext flow where a submit cascades into a lifecycle cancel now requires a consent marker for that cancel as well as for the act itself. In ERPNext v16 that includes asset sale, partial-quantity asset sale, a credit note against an asset sale, Asset Repair capitalization, Asset Shift Allocation, Asset Value Adjustment, and `Unreconcile Payment`. To make that possible, the `X-Pacioli-Consent` header now accepts several markers separated by whitespace or commas; each remains bound to one document and one act, requires a different minter, and is spent exactly once.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nOn 0.9.6, remove `require_consent` from affected grants and rely on the credential-scoping floor alone, or scope governed credentials so they cannot submit documents whose controllers cancel other documents (for ERPNext slice-one, `Sales Invoice` with a populated item-row `asset` link is the known path). Neither is a substitute for upgrading.\n\n### Residual, stated\n\nUnder a governed **cancel**, a cascaded cancel of a pre-existing document still rides. That is load-bearing for undo (an ordinary invoice cancel makes ERPNext cancel the credit/debit notes and journals it generated, via `accounts_controller.py:2001-2005`) and cannot be narrowed without a signal that a cascaded cancel is a consequence of the enclosing document specifically. That justification does not describe everything the residual admits: at least one instance is caller-steered in the same shape as the issue fixed here, `Asset Repair.on_cancel` (`asset_repair.py:215-222`), which cancels a `Serial and Batch Bundle` named by a Link the caller fills in a child table. `pacioli-guard` also does not see writes that set `flags.ignore_validate` or that skip the document lifecycle entirely (raw SQL, `db_update`/`db_set` field writes); those residuals are published in the project\u0027s own documentation and are unchanged by this advisory.\n\n### Credit\n\nFound by an internal adversarial review on 2026-07-28 that traced the predicate against frappe 16.28.0 and ERPNext v16 source rather than the project\u0027s own documentation. The prior code comment asserted that no such lever was known; that assertion had been written without the corresponding source sweep.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-4246",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T14:37:59.240986Z",
  "published": "2026-10-15T10:22:55.058463Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107841"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/pacioli-guard"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents"
}