CVE-2026-19429 (GCVE-0-2026-19429)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-10 12:07 – Updated: 2026-08-10 18:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Jenkins - FilePath.untarFrom() Symlink Target Validation Bypass (Arbitrary File Read)
Summary
Jenkins FilePath.untarFrom() in all versions, including those with the CVE-2026-33001 patch applied, validates symlink destinations but not targets. The CVE-2026-33001 fix enforces that the symlink file is created within the workspace boundary, but the symlink target — the path returned by te.getLinkName() and passed directly to symlinkTo() — is never validated and may point to any path on the controller filesystem. An attacker with Item/Configure permission can configure a job to extract a malicious .tar or .tar.gz archive via a tool installer or custom build step. When FilePath.untarFrom() processes the archive, it creates symlinks inside the workspace that resolve to arbitrary controller paths. By targeting the entire $JENKINS_HOME/secrets/ directory — including master.key, hudson.util.Secret, hudson.model.Secrets.xml, and any other files present — an attacker can exfiltrate all Jenkins cryptographic material through the workspace viewer (GET /job/{name}/ws/) or build artifacts. Combined with credentials.xml and per-user config.xml files, this enables offline AES-128 decryption of all {AQA...}-format credential entries, exposing in plaintext every password, API key, cloud provider secret, and SSH private key stored in the Jenkins credential store — compromising all downstream systems those credentials protect.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-59 - Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2026-03-… | related |
| https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jenkins Project | Jenkins |
Date Public
2026-08-10 12:00
Credits
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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