{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "63622A95-2D68-404C-9E53-A6D65A4E8629",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.8.4",
              "versionStartIncluding": "0.7.8",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab\u0027s security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "PinchTab es un servidor HTTP independiente que otorga a los agentes de IA control directo sobre un navegador Chrome. PinchTab \u0027v0.7.8\u0027 hasta \u0027v0.8.3\u0027 aceptaba el token de la API de un par\u00e1metro de consulta URL \u0027token\u0027 adem\u00e1s del encabezado \u0027Authorization\u0027. Cuando una credencial de API v\u00e1lida se env\u00eda en la URL, puede ser expuesta a trav\u00e9s de URIs de solicitud registradas por intermediarios o herramientas del lado del cliente, como registros de acceso de proxy inverso, historial del navegador, historial de shell, historial del portapapeles y sistemas de rastreo que capturan URLs completas. Este problema es un patr\u00f3n de transporte de credenciales inseguro en lugar de una omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n directa. Solo afecta a las implementaciones donde se configura un token y un cliente realmente utiliza la forma de par\u00e1metro de consulta. La gu\u00eda de seguridad de PinchTab ya recomendaba \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u0027, pero \u0027v0.8.3\u0027 a\u00fan aceptaba \u0027?token=\u0027 e inclu\u00eda flujos de primera parte que generaban y consum\u00edan URLs que conten\u00edan el token. Esto se abord\u00f3 en v0.8.4 al eliminar la autenticaci\u00f3n de token en la cadena de consulta y al requerir flujos de autenticaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s seguros basados en encabezados o en la sesi\u00f3n."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33620",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-31T15:56:34.637",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-26T21:17:06.410",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Product",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag/v0.8.4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-598"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33620"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:33:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs.\n\nThis issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab\u0027s security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token.\n\nThis was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.\n\n### Details\n**Issue 1 \u2014 Query-string token accepted in `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` (`internal/handlers/middleware.go`):**\nThe `v0.8.3` authentication middleware accepted credentials from the URL query string:\n\n```\n// internal/handlers/middleware.go \u2014 v0.8.3\nauth := r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")\nqToken := r.URL.Query().Get(\"token\")\n\nif auth == \"\" \u0026\u0026 qToken == \"\" {\n    web.ErrorCode(w, 401, \"missing_token\", \"unauthorized\", false, nil)\n    return\n}\n\nprovided := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, \"Bearer \")\nif provided == auth {\n    if qToken != \"\" {\n        provided = qToken\n    } else {\n        provided = auth\n    }\n}\n\nif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(cfg.Token)) != 1 {\n    web.ErrorCode(w, 401, \"bad_token\", \"unauthorized\", false, nil)\n    return\n}\n```\n\nThis means any client sending `GET /health?token=\u003csecret\u003e` in `v0.8.3` would authenticate successfully without using the `Authorization` header. I verified the same query-token auth pattern is present in the historical tag range starting at `v0.7.8`, and it is removed in `v0.8.4`.\n\n**Issue 2 \u2014 First-party setup and dashboard flows in `v0.8.3` generated and consumed `?token=` URLs:**\nThe `v0.8.3` setup flow generated dashboard URLs containing the token in the query string:\n\n```\n// cmd/pinchtab/cmd_wizard.go \u2014 v0.8.3\nfunc dashboardURL(cfg *config.FileConfig, path string) string {\n    host := orDefault(cfg.Server.Bind, \"127.0.0.1\")\n    port := orDefault(cfg.Server.Port, \"9867\")\n    url := fmt.Sprintf(\"http://%s:%s%s\", host, port, path)\n    if cfg.Server.Token != \"\" {\n        url += \"?token=\" + cfg.Server.Token\n    }\n    return url\n}\n```\n\nThe `v0.8.3` dashboard frontend also supported one-click login from that same query-string token:\n\n```\n// dashboard/src/App.tsx \u2014 v0.8.3\nconst params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);\nconst urlToken = params.get(\"token\");\nif (urlToken) {\n    setStoredAuthToken(urlToken);\n    clean.searchParams.delete(\"token\");\n    window.history.replaceState({}, \"\", clean.pathname + clean.hash);\n    window.location.reload();\n}\n```\n\nThat combination materially increased the chance that users would open, copy, paste, bookmark, or log URLs containing live credentials before the token was scrubbed from the visible address bar.\n\n**Issue 3 \u2014 Exposure depends on surrounding systems recording the URL:**\nPinchTab\u0027s own request logger records `r.URL.Path`, not the full raw query string, so the leak is not primarily through PinchTab\u0027s structured application log. The risk comes from surrounding systems or client tooling that record the full request URI, such as:\n\n1. reverse proxies and load balancers\n2. browser history or bookmarks\n3. shell history containing full `curl` commands\n4. clipboard or terminal history when the wizard prints and copies a tokenized URL\n5. tracing or monitoring systems that capture full request URLs\n\n### PoC\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm auth is required**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i http://localhost:9867/health\n```\n\nExpected in token-protected affected deployments:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Authenticate using the vulnerable query-parameter pattern**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i \"http://localhost:9867/health?token=supersecrettoken\"\n```\n\nExpected:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n```\n\nThis demonstrates that the token is accepted from the URL.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Observe the exposure vector**\nIf the request traverses a system that records the full URI, the token may appear in logs or local history, for example:\n\n```text\nGET /health?token=supersecrettoken HTTP/1.1\n```\n\nIn `v0.8.3`, a first-party reproduction path also exists without any external proxy: run the setup wizard, copy the printed dashboard URL containing `?token=...`, and note that the live credential is now present in clipboard history and any place that URL is pasted.\n\n### Impact\n1. Exposure of a valid API token through unsafe URL-based transport when a client uses the `?token=` authentication form.\n2. Lower barrier for credential compromise where reverse proxies, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, or tracing systems retain full request URIs.\n3. The `v0.8.3` wizard/dashboard flow increased the practical likelihood of this exposure by generating and consuming tokenized URLs as a first-party login pattern.\n4. Practical risk depends on actual use of the query-token pattern; deployments that use only `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` are not affected by this issue in practice.\n5. This is not a direct authentication bypass. An attacker still needs access to a secondary source that captured the URL containing the token.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n1. Reject query-string token authentication and accept credentials only through the `Authorization` header or controlled session mechanisms.\n2. Avoid generating user-facing URLs that contain live credentials.\n3. Document header-based auth as the only supported non-browser API authentication pattern.\n4. Recommend token rotation for users who may previously have used query-parameter authentication.\n\n**Screenshot Capture**\n\u003cimg width=\"1162\" height=\"164\" alt=\"\u0e20\u0e32\u0e1e\u0e16\u0e48\u0e32\u0e22\u0e2b\u0e19\u0e49\u0e32\u0e08\u0e2d 2569-03-18 \u0e40\u0e27\u0e25\u0e32 12 46 08\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e68b4469-dafd-400d-a6e1-f74d368cc8ac\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:18:50Z",
  "published": "2026-03-24T19:33:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33620"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag/v0.8.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PinchTab: API Bearer Token Exposed in URL Query Parameter via Server Logs and Intermediary Systems"
}