CVE-2026-47205 (GCVE-0-2026-47205)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-26 18:01 – Updated: 2026-06-26 18:01
VLAI
Title
Envoy: ext_authz Use-After-Free during Stream Teardown with Per-Route Overrides
Summary
Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.36.0 until 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, a Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability leading to a sudden segmentation fault exists in Envoy's ext_authz HTTP filter when processing per-route authorization overrides concurrently with rapid downstream client disconnects. During standard request lifecycles, Envoy instantiates the ext_authz filter with a foundational authorization client object (client_). If a matched route dictates a dynamic per-route HTTP or gRPC authorization service override, the filter generates a localized client. In the vulnerable implementation, this transient client aggressively overwrote the default client_ unique pointer by executing client_ = std::move(per_route_client). When a client rapidly establishes and subsequently tears down a stream (such as rapidly refreshing a protected WebSocket endpoint), the downstream triggers the ConnectionManagerImpl::doDeferredStreamDestroy() -> ActiveStream::onResetStream() lifecycle. Envoy immediately sequences Filter::onDestroy() in an attempt to securely abort dispatched asynchronous authorization check transactions via client_->cancel(). By destructing the default client abruptly during initiateCall, a memory lifecycle misalignment occurs within the async client manager. The stream teardown fails to reliably track and cancel the dynamically bound asynchronous authorization tasks, orchestrating a sequence where a late asynchronous callback from the network evaluates against a heavily destroyed ActiveStream validation span, generating a UAF process crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3.
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CWE
- CWE-416 - Use After Free
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| envoyproxy | envoy |
Affected:
>= 1.38.0, < 1.38.3
Affected: >= 1.37.0, < 1.37.5 Affected: >= 1.36.0, < 1.36.9 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "envoy",
"vendor": "envoyproxy",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 1.38.0, \u003c 1.38.3"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 1.37.0, \u003c 1.37.5"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 1.36.0, \u003c 1.36.9"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.36.0 until 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, a Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability leading to a sudden segmentation fault exists in Envoy\u0027s ext_authz HTTP filter when processing per-route authorization overrides concurrently with rapid downstream client disconnects. During standard request lifecycles, Envoy instantiates the ext_authz filter with a foundational authorization client object (client_). If a matched route dictates a dynamic per-route HTTP or gRPC authorization service override, the filter generates a localized client. In the vulnerable implementation, this transient client aggressively overwrote the default client_ unique pointer by executing client_ = std::move(per_route_client). When a client rapidly establishes and subsequently tears down a stream (such as rapidly refreshing a protected WebSocket endpoint), the downstream triggers the ConnectionManagerImpl::doDeferredStreamDestroy() -\u003e ActiveStream::onResetStream() lifecycle. Envoy immediately sequences Filter::onDestroy() in an attempt to securely abort dispatched asynchronous authorization check transactions via client_-\u003ecancel(). By destructing the default client abruptly during initiateCall, a memory lifecycle misalignment occurs within the async client manager. The stream teardown fails to reliably track and cancel the dynamically bound asynchronous authorization tasks, orchestrating a sequence where a late asynchronous callback from the network evaluates against a heavily destroyed ActiveStream validation span, generating a UAF process crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-416",
"description": "CWE-416: Use After Free",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-26T18:01:07.766Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-mvh9-767w-x47j",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-mvh9-767w-x47j"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-mvh9-767w-x47j",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Envoy: ext_authz Use-After-Free during Stream Teardown with Per-Route Overrides"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-47205",
"datePublished": "2026-06-26T18:01:07.766Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-18T22:25:21.257Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-26T18:01:07.766Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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