CVE-2026-48074 (GCVE-0-2026-48074)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-06 20:27 – Updated: 2026-08-07 17:02
VLAI
Title
OpenReception: Staff deletion removes pending invites cross-tenant by email match
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-07 17:01 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
open-reception appointment-booking-software Affected: < 1.0.6
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
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