CVE-2026-76186 (GCVE-0-2026-76186)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 09:09 – Updated: 2026-09-17 19:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: Keycloak token cookies not bound to Airflow session identity
Summary
Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: from Airflow 3.3 the Keycloak auth manager takes a user's identity from the signed Airflow session token but takes the Keycloak access and refresh tokens used for every authorization decision from separate, unauthenticated cookies, and never checks that the two describe the same subject. A user who holds any valid Airflow login of their own, together with another subject's Keycloak access or refresh token obtained out of band, can pair the two: Airflow then authorizes requests with the foreign token's privileges while the session identity, audit log and cache keys continue to name the attacker's own account. The refresh path re-issues an Airflow session token for the original identity carrying the foreign tokens, so the mismatched pairing survives across sessions.
Affects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 19:22 UTC
CWE
- CWE-565 - Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72207 | patch |
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q… | vendor-advisory |
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/8 |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Airflow Keycloak provider |
Affected:
0 , < 0.10.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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