Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-82429 (GCVE-0-2026-82429)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 14:16 – Updated: 2026-09-14 20:00

Title

Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root via a Time-of-Check Race in the Worker Launcher

Summary

Description The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user. A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or `chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing. This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with `supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-14 19:59 UTC

CWE

CWE-367 - Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition

Assigner

apache mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread/9vjqrt28g0mxg304v…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/9

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Storm Worker Launcher	Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.1.0 (semver)	guessed

Credits

The ASF using Claude Agents

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-82429

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-14 15:17 - Updated: 2026-09-14 20:58

Severity

7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://lists.apache.org/thread/9vjqrt28g0mxg304vw6pw46cx72v4rvq
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/9

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

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          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-14T19:59:35.240189Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-14T15:17:09.807",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/9vjqrt28g0mxg304vw6pw46cx72v4rvq"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/9"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-367"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QCHC-32XG-C7W6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32

Details

Description

The setuid-root worker-launcher binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling lchown and chmod on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.

A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned lchown or chmod at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.

This crosses the boundary that supervisor.run.worker.as.user and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with supervisor.run.worker.as.user, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82429"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T15:17:09Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Description\n\nThe setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking\nthe tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry\u0027s full pathname while running with an\neffective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the\nentry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.\n\nA tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with\na symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or\n`chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker\nforces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.\n\nThis crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to\nenforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat\u0027d rather than\non pathnames re-resolved at call time.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with\n`supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher\nmust be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.",
  "id": "GHSA-qchc-32xg-c7w6",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-14T15:32:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/9vjqrt28g0mxg304vw6pw46cx72v4rvq"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-82429 (GCVE-0-2026-82429)

FKIE_CVE-2026-82429

GHSA-QCHC-32XG-C7W6

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature