CVE-2026-82759 (GCVE-0-2026-82759)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:08 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:19
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode
Summary
Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.
AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant "default-salt-change-in-production" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 18:19 UTC
CWE
- CWE-760 - Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
4.12.0 , < 4.15.0
(semver)
Affected: 5.0.0-rc.0 , < 5.0.0-rc.14 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82759"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-760"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-82759",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T18:19:03.885925Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:19:10.006Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/audit_log/ip_privacy.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027:hash_ip/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027:apply_privacy/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.15.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.12.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027"
],
"packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/audit_log/ip_privacy.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027:hash_ip/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy\u0027:apply_privacy/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "c3a6d5fe0d4fd383ea81b0402db0a96638479478",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly applications that enable the \u003ccode\u003eaudit_log\u003c/code\u003e add-on and set its \u003ccode\u003eip_privacy\u003c/code\u003e mode to \u003ccode\u003e:hash\u003c/code\u003e store the affected value. Other modes (\u003ccode\u003e:none\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e:truncate\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e:exclude\u003c/code\u003e) do not reach \u003ccode\u003ehash_ip/1\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither \u003ccode\u003e:audit_log_ip_salt\u003c/code\u003e nor \u003ccode\u003e:secret\u003c/code\u003e configured under the \u003ccode\u003e:ash_authentication\u003c/code\u003e application. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Only applications that enable the `audit_log` add-on and set its `ip_privacy` mode to `:hash` store the affected value. Other modes (`:none`, `:truncate`, `:exclude`) do not reach `hash_ip/1`.\n\nThe complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither `:audit_log_ip_salt` nor `:secret` configured under the `:ash_authentication` application. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use."
}
],
"value": "Only applications that enable the audit_log add-on and set its ip_privacy mode to :hash store the affected value. Other modes (:none, :truncate, :exclude) do not reach hash_ip/1.\n\nThe complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither :audit_log_ip_salt nor :secret configured under the :ash_authentication application. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.12.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "James Harton"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-11T17:53:27.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eUse of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on\u0027s \u003ccode\u003e:hash\u003c/code\u003e privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1\u003c/code\u003e computes a single unkeyed \u003ccode\u003e:crypto.hash(:sha256, salt \u0026lt;\u0026gt; ip)\u003c/code\u003e and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the \u003ccode\u003e:audit_log_ip_salt\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e:secret\u003c/code\u003e application config keys, and falls back to the constant \u003ccode\u003e\"default-salt-change-in-production\"\u003c/code\u003e published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on\u0027s `:hash` privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.\n\n`AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1` computes a single unkeyed `:crypto.hash(:sha256, salt \u003c\u003e ip)` and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the `:audit_log_ip_salt` or `:secret` application config keys, and falls back to the constant `\"default-salt-change-in-production\"` published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"value": "Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on\u0027s :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.\n\nAshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt \u003c\u003e ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant \"default-salt-change-in-production\" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-112",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-112 Brute Force"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 1.8,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-760",
"description": "CWE-760 Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T13:08:21.929Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82759",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82759.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82759",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82759"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 255cfc9 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit d8a9c4b in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit c3a6d5f in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c3a6d5fe0d4fd383ea81b0402db0a96638479478"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82759",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:08:21.929Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T01:00:10.817Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:19:18.209Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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