CVE-2026-89791 (GCVE-0-2026-89791)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 08:48 – Updated: 2026-09-16 14:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
perf: Fix use-after-free when perf mmap() revival races with the last munmap()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix use-after-free when perf mmap() revival races with the last munmap()
perf_mmap_close() drops rb->mmap_count *without* holding
event->mmap_mutex (the refcount_dec_and_test() right before the
refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() of event->mmap_count). A concurrent
perf_mmap_rb() can slot its entire "revival" path into that window
(perf_mmap holds event->mmap_mutex for its whole duration, including
rb_alloc):
munmap side (perf_mmap_close) mmap side (perf_mmap_rb)
----------------------------------- --------------------------------
rb->mmap_count 1 -> 0 (no lock) (holds event->mmap_mutex)
inc_not_zero(rb->mmap_count) fails
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)
rb_alloc() + attach new rb
refcount_set(&event->mmap_count, 1)
lock; event->mmap_count 1 -> 0
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)
ring_buffer_put() -> frees the *new* rb
The revival's refcount_set(&event->mmap_count, 1) is an invisible
1 -> 1 write: the close frees the just-revived buffer although the
other process still has it mapped -- a page-level use-after-free
allowing local privilege escalation to root by any unprivileged user
(default kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2).
Swap the order of the two counter updates: event->mmap_count is
dropped first via refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(), so its 1 -> 0
transition and the ring_buffer_attach() stay serialized with
perf_mmap(). rb->mmap_count == 0 then implies every event using the
buffer is detached already, so the result of the rb->mmap_count drop
can gate the remaining teardown directly and detach_rest is no longer
needed.
An earlier fix for this race from Kyle Zeng and David Lee takes
event->mmap_mutex around both counter updates [0]; here the not-last
close stays lockless.
Severity
7.8 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75 , < 929cb3b9dc818dd9fa89d510d4ff2b255e42badd
(git)
Affected: 59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75 , < 0c739f54f1c77f3a4643160cd2e031b6c2f2aab6 (git) Affected: 59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75 , < 58a8108bc73de0740d5b88150465d6690ea5f85f (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.18
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.18 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.52 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.5 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
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"affected": [
{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/events/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
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"version": "59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75",
"versionType": "git"
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{
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"version": "59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75",
"versionType": "git"
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{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75",
"versionType": "git"
}
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},
{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/events/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.5",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.52",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.18",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
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"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.5",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.18",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc2",
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"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf: Fix use-after-free when perf mmap() revival races with the last munmap()\n\nperf_mmap_close() drops rb-\u003emmap_count *without* holding\nevent-\u003emmap_mutex (the refcount_dec_and_test() right before the\nrefcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() of event-\u003emmap_count). A concurrent\nperf_mmap_rb() can slot its entire \"revival\" path into that window\n(perf_mmap holds event-\u003emmap_mutex for its whole duration, including\nrb_alloc):\n\n munmap side (perf_mmap_close) mmap side (perf_mmap_rb)\n ----------------------------------- --------------------------------\n rb-\u003emmap_count 1 -\u003e 0 (no lock) (holds event-\u003emmap_mutex)\n inc_not_zero(rb-\u003emmap_count) fails\n ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)\n rb_alloc() + attach new rb\n refcount_set(\u0026event-\u003emmap_count, 1)\n lock; event-\u003emmap_count 1 -\u003e 0\n ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)\n ring_buffer_put() -\u003e frees the *new* rb\n\nThe revival\u0027s refcount_set(\u0026event-\u003emmap_count, 1) is an invisible\n1 -\u003e 1 write: the close frees the just-revived buffer although the\nother process still has it mapped -- a page-level use-after-free\nallowing local privilege escalation to root by any unprivileged user\n(default kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2).\n\nSwap the order of the two counter updates: event-\u003emmap_count is\ndropped first via refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(), so its 1 -\u003e 0\ntransition and the ring_buffer_attach() stay serialized with\nperf_mmap(). rb-\u003emmap_count == 0 then implies every event using the\nbuffer is detached already, so the result of the rb-\u003emmap_count drop\ncan gate the remaining teardown directly and detach_rest is no longer\nneeded.\n\nAn earlier fix for this race from Kyle Zeng and David Lee takes\nevent-\u003emmap_mutex around both counter updates [0]; here the not-last\nclose stays lockless."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The UAF is reached only via local syscalls: perf_event_open(2) then mmap(2)/munmap(2) on the resulting perf fd (perf_fops.mmap \u2192 perf_mmap \u2192 perf_mmap_rb racing perf_mmap_close). There is no network, adjacent-radio, or physical path into the ring-buffer revival race.\nAC:L - The attacker drives both sides from threads or processes sharing the fd: one munmap() runs perf_mmap_close() while a concurrent mmap() holds event-\u003emmap_mutex through rb_alloc() and map_range(). That is an attacker-controlled, freely retryable race, not an uninfluenced layout or victim-state condition.\nPR:L - Default kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 still allows an unprivileged per-task software event with exclude_kernel set; perf_mmap() only calls the optional LSM security_perf_event_read hook and does not require CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The fix notes local privilege escalation by any unprivileged user.\nUI:N - The attacker opens the event and races mmap/munmap on that fd in their own process or a helper that inherited the fd. No victim action such as mounting a filesystem or opening a file is required.\nS:U - Impact is host-kernel page use-after-free of the perf ring buffer, i.e. standard local privilege escalation in the same OS security authority. It is not a KVM/Xen guest-to-host escape or IOMMU/DMA boundary bypass.\nC:H - perf_mmap_close() frees the revived ring-buffer pages (rb_free) while the concurrent mmap\u0027s VM_PFNMAP VMA still maps those PFNs. That page-level UAF lets the attacker reclaim the pages and read arbitrary kernel memory through the still-valid mapping.\nI:H - The same still-mapped PFNs remain writable on the user control page (perf_mmap_pfn_mkwrite), so reclaim/spray of the freed pages yields a kernel write primitive. The fix commit describes this as local privilege escalation to root, matching UAF integrity High.\nA:H - Use-after-free of the ring buffer while it remains mapped causes kernel oops or panic on reuse, and the reporters documented a panic reproducer. Any kernel UAF is availability High even without a completed privilege-escalation exploit."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:38:40.190Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/929cb3b9dc818dd9fa89d510d4ff2b255e42badd"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c739f54f1c77f3a4643160cd2e031b6c2f2aab6"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58a8108bc73de0740d5b88150465d6690ea5f85f"
}
],
"title": "perf: Fix use-after-free when perf mmap() revival races with the last munmap()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-89791",
"datePublished": "2026-09-16T08:48:27.020Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.766Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:38:40.190Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-89791",
"date": "2026-09-16",
"epss": "0.00189",
"percentile": "0.08736"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-89791\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-09-16T09:17:09.930\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-16T15:18:09.253\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nperf: Fix use-after-free when perf mmap() revival races with the last munmap()\\n\\nperf_mmap_close() drops rb-\u003emmap_count *without* holding\\nevent-\u003emmap_mutex (the refcount_dec_and_test() right before the\\nrefcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() of event-\u003emmap_count). A concurrent\\nperf_mmap_rb() can slot its entire \\\"revival\\\" path into that window\\n(perf_mmap holds event-\u003emmap_mutex for its whole duration, including\\nrb_alloc):\\n\\n munmap side (perf_mmap_close) mmap side (perf_mmap_rb)\\n ----------------------------------- --------------------------------\\n rb-\u003emmap_count 1 -\u003e 0 (no lock) (holds event-\u003emmap_mutex)\\n inc_not_zero(rb-\u003emmap_count) fails\\n ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)\\n rb_alloc() + attach new rb\\n refcount_set(\u0026event-\u003emmap_count, 1)\\n lock; event-\u003emmap_count 1 -\u003e 0\\n ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL)\\n ring_buffer_put() -\u003e frees the *new* rb\\n\\nThe revival\u0027s refcount_set(\u0026event-\u003emmap_count, 1) is an invisible\\n1 -\u003e 1 write: the close frees the just-revived buffer although the\\nother process still has it mapped -- a page-level use-after-free\\nallowing local privilege escalation to root by any unprivileged user\\n(default kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2).\\n\\nSwap the order of the two counter updates: event-\u003emmap_count is\\ndropped first via refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(), so its 1 -\u003e 0\\ntransition and the ring_buffer_attach() stay serialized with\\nperf_mmap(). rb-\u003emmap_count == 0 then implies every event using the\\nbuffer is detached already, so the result of the rb-\u003emmap_count drop\\ncan gate the remaining teardown directly and detach_rest is no longer\\nneeded.\\n\\nAn earlier fix for this race from Kyle Zeng and David Lee takes\\nevent-\u003emmap_mutex around both counter updates [0]; here the not-last\\nclose stays lockless.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"kernel/events/core.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75\",\"lessThan\":\"929cb3b9dc818dd9fa89d510d4ff2b255e42badd\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75\",\"lessThan\":\"0c739f54f1c77f3a4643160cd2e031b6c2f2aab6\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"59741451b49ce9964a9758c19d6f7df2a1255c75\",\"lessThan\":\"58a8108bc73de0740d5b88150465d6690ea5f85f\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"kernel/events/core.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"6.18\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"6.18\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.52\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2.5\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.2.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.3-rc2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c739f54f1c77f3a4643160cd2e031b6c2f2aab6\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58a8108bc73de0740d5b88150465d6690ea5f85f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/929cb3b9dc818dd9fa89d510d4ff2b255e42badd\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
"suse_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "not set",
"current_release_date": "2026-09-16T15:35:37Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-89791",
"id": "CVE-2026-89791",
"initial_release_date": "2026-09-16T15:35:37Z",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-89791",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2026-89791.json",
"version": "2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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